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Abstract
On the Provision of Public Goods on Networks:
Incentives, Exit Equilibrium, and Applications to Cyber Security
by
Parinaz Naghizadeh Ardabili
Chair: Mingyan Liu
Attempts to improve the state of cyber security have been on the rise over the
past years. In addition to improving prevention and protection methods, recent
efforts have emphasized the need for ensuring that organizations and individuals
have appropriate incentives for adopting better security practices. The importance
of incentivizing better security decisions by users in the current landscape is two-fold:
it not only helps users protect themselves against attacks, but also provides positive
externalities to others interacting with them, as a protected user is less likely to
become compromised and be used to propagate attacks against other entities. As
a result, security can be viewed as a public good, the optimal provision of which
requires the introduction of appropriate regulations or incentive mechanisms.
This thesis takes a game-theoretic approach to understanding the theoretical
underpinnings of users’ incentives in the provision of public goods, and in particular,
cyber security. We analyze the strategic interactions of users in the provision of
security as a non-excludable public good. We propose the notion of exit equilibrium
to describe users’ outside options from mechanisms for incentivizing the adoption of
better security decisions, and use it to highlight the crucial effect of outside options
on the design of incentive mechanisms for improving the state of cyber security.
xi
We further focus on the general problem of public good provision games on net-
works, which include a class of security games played on networks as a special case.
We identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of the network for
the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in these games. We show that
previous results in the literature can be recovered as special cases of our result. We
provide a graph-theoretical interpretation of users’ efforts at the Nash equilibria,
Pareto efficient outcomes, and semi-cooperative equilibria of these games, by linking
users’ effort decisions to their centralities in the interaction network. Using this char-
acterization, we separate the effects of users’ dependencies and influences (outgoing
and incoming edges in the network, respectively) on their effort levels, and uncover
an alternating effect over walks of different length in the network.
We also propose the design of inter-temporal incentives in a particular type of
security games, namely, security information sharing agreement. We show that either
public or private assessments can be used in designing incentives for participants to
disclose their information in these agreements. In the case of private assessments,
this is possible if participants are provided with a communication platform. Finally,
we present a method for crowdsourcing reputation that can be useful in attaining
assessments of users’ efforts in security games.
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation: The current state of cyber security
The increased adoption of cyber technology in all aspects of our lives over the
past few decades has proven to be a double-edged sword: while it has led to improved
connection and ease of interaction for users across the globe, it has also increased the
exposure of users to cyber risks, particularly systemic risks. This upward trend, as
well as the evolution of types of cyber attacks, have been documented in Verizon’s
annual Data Breach Investigation Reports (DBIR) [32]. The latest DBIR report
[33] uses data from insurance claims to estimate the average cost of a cyber-attack
for the compromised entity, forecasting it to be from $25k to $8.8M, depending on
the number of compromised records. The Ponemon institute conducts similar “Cost
of Cyber Crime” studies, with its 2015 report estimating an average cost of cyber
crime per company of $7.7M [61]. Several high-profile security incidents have been
covered extensively by the media in the past couple of years, including the Target,
JP Morgan, Home Depot, Ashley Madison, and Sony Pictures hacks [29, 63].
This increase in the number of cyber attacks, as well as the considerable financial
losses they impose on the affected organizations and individuals, have led to increased
attention to methods for improving the state of cyber security. To this end, on one
hand there is a need for improved cyber defense technologies as attackers grow ever
more sophisticated. On the other hand, there is a need to provide appropriate in-
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centives for users to adopt these enhanced technologies. In fact, several studies show
that a vast number of attacks could have been prevented had the victims adopted
better cyber security practices. For example, experts have argued that the Sony
Pictures hack could have been easily prevented by encrypting email communications
and having better employee education [19, 108]. Another example is a 2013 study
by the Australian Signals Directorate which showed that at least 85% of cyber intru-
sions they responded to could have been prevented by only 4 mitigating strategies,
including limiting administrative privileges and maintaining up-to-date software [6].
Such studies highlight the need for ensuring that organizations/individuals have the
incentives to properly adopt existing software and best practices to improve their
state of security.
Moreover, the importance of increasing cyber security investments by users in this
landscape is two-fold: it not only helps users protect themselves against potential
attacks, but it also provides positive externalities to other users interacting with
them. This is because a protected user is less likely to become compromised and
subsequently used for generating or propagating attacks against other entities. As
a result, users’ investments in security measures can be viewed as a public good.
Formally, public goods are defined as those that are non-rivalrous [84], i.e., goods
for which consumption by a user does not reduce its availability to others. In the case
of cyber security, the investment by a user is viewed as a non-rivalrous good which,
due to its (positive) externality, affects entities other than the investor. Anecdotal
evidence also points to the public good nature of security. In a letter to shareholders
announcing plans to increase expenditure in improving the company’s cyber security
posture, JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon refers to the complex and interdependent
nature of cyber attacks [36]:
“In our existing environment and at our company, cyber security attacks
are becoming increasingly complex and more dangerous. The threats are
coming in not just from computer hackers trying to take over our systems
and steal our data but also from highly coordinated external attacks both
directly and via third-party systems (e.g., suppliers, vendors, partners,
exchanges, etc.)”
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Another commonly adopted viewpoint reflecting a belief in the interdependent nature
of security is that “a system is only as strong as its weakest link” [23], with human
factors often regarded as the weakest link [4], and a starting point for improving the
security of the entire system. According to Matt Moynahan, the chief executive of
the security company Veracode, “the law of the weakest link always seems to prevail”
[114].
Consequently, the provision of security in an interconnected system can be viewed
as a public good provision problem. It is well known in the economic literature
that, in the absence of regulation or incentive mechanisms, the provision of public
goods by rational users is in general inefficient [84]. This further motivates the need
for designing appropriate mechanisms to incentivize users’ improved efforts towards
providing the public good (here, improved security investment decisions).
Together, the rising number and cost of cyber incidents, lack of incentives for
users to adopt better security practices, and the systemic and interdependent nature
of cyber risks, motivate a collective effort towards increasing security investments to
their optimal levels. A main focus of this dissertation is to work towards this goal
by analyzing the theoretical underpinnings of users’ incentives for provision of public
goods in interconnected and interdependent systems.
While we will focus on cyber security as the main motivation, the framework and
findings of this thesis are applicable to the general problem of provision of public
goods over networks. Other applications and illustrative examples are presented
throughout the thesis. These include the spread of data, innovation, or research,
among firms in an industry, creation of new parks or libraries at neighborhood level
in cities, and implementing measures for reducing pollution by neighboring towns.
1.2 Problem formulation and key challenges
1.2.1 Economics of security
The approach of this thesis is to look at security from an economic perspective,
and to use tools from mathematical economics, namely game theory and mecha-
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nism design, to gain a better understanding of users’ incentives towards investing in
security. Specifically, users’ effort decisions depend on their cognitive abilities. We
adopt a game-theoretic point of view, and assume that all users are rational decision-
makers. Consequently, they account for other users’ actions when optimizing their
own security investment decisions. The interactions of such strategic users when
providing the public good (security) will constitute a game, henceforth referred to
as a security game.
From a social welfare perspective, the ideal outcome attainable in a security game
is known as the socially optimal solution. These are the levels of effort at which the
collective cost of security to all users is minimized. However, it is well known in
the economics literature that the level of a public good provided by rational users
at the status quo is generally far from its socially optimal level, and most often
under-provided. This sub-optimality arises from the fact that users do not account
for the externality of their actions when choosing effort levels, as they are optimizing
only their own payoffs. Moreover, some users further decrease their effort levels,
as they can free-ride on the externality of others’ actions. Therefore, improving
the provision of security to its socially optimal level requires the introduction of
additional regulations or incentive schemes. These regulations/incentives result in
a modified game structure, the equilibria of which lead to the designer’s desired
outcome. Proposing the regulations/incentives that lead to an appropriate game
structure is the subject of mechanism design theory.
In the realm of cyber security, mechanisms that either dictate or incentivize
better security efforts have been proposed in recent literature; see Section 1.3. This
thesis will also adopt a mechanism design approach to the problem, with a focus on
the design and performance of tax-based incentive mechanisms that guarantee the
following desiderata. First, the objective of the proposed mechanism is to maximize
social welfare. In addition, the mechanism should ensure voluntary participation, i.e.,
each user should prefer the outcome she attains through participation in the incentive
mechanism, to that she could attain by opting out. The importance of ensuring
voluntary participation lies in the fact that, in general, the mechanism designer either
lacks the authority, or is reluctant, to mandate user cooperation. Finally, we will
4
be interested in mechanisms that maintain a weakly balanced budget. Weak budget
balance is a requirement on the taxes collected/distributed by the mechanism; it
ensures that the designer can redistribute users’ payments as rewards, and ideally
either retain a surplus as profit or at least not sustain losses. If the condition is not
satisfied, the designer would need to spend (a potentially large amount of) external
resources to run a proposed mechanism; such access to financing is not necessarily
available to a designer or the users.
The three goals of social optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget bal-
ance, are attainable using tax-based incentive mechanisms in several environments;
examples include the financing of public projects (where users choose whether to do
a given project or not), allocation of a single indivisible unit of a private good, and
allocation of downlink power in cellular networks [115]. We are similarly interested in
achieving these goals in security games, using either existing or new incentive mech-
anisms. One of the contributions of this thesis is to show that the non-excludable
nature of security (as well as other non-excludable public goods1) introduces addi-
tional challenges in this mechanism design problem.
1.2.2 The issue of voluntary participation
A user’s decision when contemplating participation in an incentive mechanism
depends not only on the structure of the induced game, but also on the options
available when staying out. The latter is what sets the study of incentive mechanisms
for security games (as well as other non-excludable goods) apart from private or
excludable goods.
To highlight this difference, note that due to the non-excludable nature of security,
1We note that according to an alternative definition, see e.g., [121, Chapter 23], all public
goods are assumed non-excludable, with excludable non-rivalrous goods referred to as club goods.
However, it is also common in the literature, especially in the engineering applications’ literature,
to make the coarser distinction of public vs. private goods based on rivalry alone. Examples
include Samuelson’s seminal work on public goods [113], where he considers private vs. collective
consumption goods, the definition of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [84, Chapter 11.C], where
public goods are defined based on their non-depletable nature, and in the engineering applications’
literature, the work of [115] on decentralized power allocation in cellular networks. We adopt this
coarser categorization, and further distinguish based on excludability when needed.
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a user who opts out from a proposed incentive mechanism can continue benefiting
from the spill-over of improved investments by those participating in the mechanism.
Similarly, the security decisions of this outlier continue to affect the security outcome
for the participating users. This is in contrast to excludable goods, in which an outlier
neither benefits from, nor influences, the public good produced by the participating
users. For such excludable goods, tax-based mechanisms such as the Externality
mechanism (e.g., [115]) and the Pivotal mechanism (e.g., [103]), can be designed
so as to incentivize the socially optimal provision of an excludable good, guarantee
voluntary participation, and maintain weak budget balance.
Given this distinction, to enable the design and study of similar incentive mech-
anisms for security games (and non-excludable public goods in general), this thesis
proposes the notion of exit equilibrium. This new notion captures the different nature
of outside options available to users given non-excludability, by accounting for how
an outlier benefits from, and influences, the participants. In particular, at the exit
equilibrium, a user unilaterally opts out of the proposed incentive mechanism, and
best-responds to the remaining users who continue participating (these users are also
best-responding to the outlier’s action). A mechanism ensures voluntary participa-
tion if each user prefers the outcome attained in the socially optimal solution to that
she can attain under her exit equilibrium.
Using this notion, this thesis shows a negative result: given that users can opt
out to their exit equilibria, there exists no tax-based incentive mechanism that can
simultaneously guarantee social optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget
balance, in all instances of security games. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is the non-
excludability of the good that gives rise to this conflict. This requires the mechanism
designer to consider restricted or modified problem environments, so as to work
around this negative result. Accordingly, we proceed with the study of two alternative
settings in this thesis. We begin by analyzing a subclass of security games played on
networks. As the second alternative, we study the design of inter-temporal incentives
by accounting for the repeated nature of users’ interactions.
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1.2.3 The effects of network structure
Public good provision games can be viewed as a subclass of games played on
networks. Networks have been used extensively to model social and economic inter-
actions. In settings where the n nodes represent rational players, games on networks
are the n-person games in which network links represent the strengths and types
of interactions among these players. Similar to other strategic settings, we may be
interested in the existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics of equilibria of these
games. For games on networks in particular, we are interested in answers in terms of
the network structure and its graph-theoretical metrics. These characterizations can
allow us to answer questions such as: how do players’ positions in the network affect
their effort decisions?, which player(s) should we target with tax/subsidy policies
to improve the provision of the public good?, what network structures guarantee
that equilibria exist and/or are stable?, and how will modifying the network struc-
ture, including adding or removing links, affect players’ decisions? Answers to these
questions advance the theory of n-person games on networks, and lead to important
design and policy implications.
We will focus on the particular class of public good provision games on networks.
These will be simultaneous move and complete information games, in which each
player’s payoff will depend on a linear weighted sum of her neighbors’ efforts, with the
weights determining the strength and type of interactions among players. Security
games played on networks, as well as local public good games, coordination games,
peer effect games, and the like, can be modeled in this framework. For these settings,
we will consider Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles (which include the
socially optimal outcomes as a special case), and semi-cooperative equilibria emerging
from interactions of coalitions of players (which include exit equilibria as a special
case). We will study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, as well as graph-
theoretical interpretations of players’ efforts at the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient
profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria. The findings will provide additional tools
needed to address the theoretical challenges and policy design aspects of public good
provision games, including security games.
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1.2.4 Inter-temporal incentives
Another alternative when designing incentives for users to improve their security
decisions is to account for the repeated nature of their interactions. This allows
the designer to forgo monetary taxes/rewards, instead introducing inter-temporal
incentives for users’ cooperation. Conditioning users’ future cooperation on the
history of their past interactions can lead players to act cooperatively due to the
prospect of higher future payoffs. This design is carried out in a repeated game
framework. It has been well-known in the economic literature that repetitions of
an otherwise non-cooperative and inefficient game can lead economically rational
users to coordinate on efficient equilibria [1, 45, 80]. A prominent example of this
phenomenon is that of a prisoner’s dilemma game: while two rational players should
always defect in one shot (or for finite repetitions) of the game, cooperation can
be supported in an infinitely repeated game, as conditioning of future behavior on
the history of past interactions can prevent players from behaving opportunistically.
Similarly, we are interested in the design of inter-temporal incentives to sustain
cooperation in security games.
Motivated by several recent policy initiatives (see Section 1.3), we will focus on a
particular class of security games, namely, security information sharing agreements.
The action of a user in these games is to decide whether to (fully and honestly)
disclose security information, including but not limited to reports on recent successful
and failed security breaches, to other users within her agreement. This disclosed
information can help improve the state of cyber security, as participants can prevent
similar attacks and invest in the best security measures by leveraging other users’
experience.
Several studies have shown the positive effects of information sharing laws. Ro-
manosky et al. [110] show that the introduction of breach disclosure laws has resulted
in a reduction in identity theft incidents. Gordon et al. [52] argue that shared in-
formation can reduce the uncertainty in adopting a cyber security investment, thus
leading firms to take a proactive rather than reactive approach to security, and con-
sequently increasing the expected amount of investments in cyber security. Finally,
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Gordon et al. [51] show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (despite only indi-
rectly encouraging higher focus on reporting of security-related information) has had
a positive effect on disclosure of information security by organizations.
Nevertheless, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that security breaches
remain under-reported; see e.g., [24, 120]. These observed disincentives for sharing
security information can be primarily explained by analyzing the associated economic
impacts. For example, [20, 21] conduct event-study analyses of market reaction to
breach disclosures, both demonstrating a drop in market values following the an-
nouncement of a security breach. In addition to an initial drop in stock prices, an
exposed breach or security flaw can result in loss of consumer/partner confidence
in a company, leading to a further decrease of revenues in the future [47]. Finally,
documenting and announcing security breaches impose a bureaucratic burden on the
company, e.g., when an agreement requires the reports to comply with a certain
incident reporting terminology. Examples include the recently proposed categoriza-
tion by DHS [119], and the Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing
(VERIS) proposed by the Verizon RISK team [123].
Given these potential disclosure costs, and the evidence of under-reporting of
security information, it is clear that we need a better understanding of firms’ incen-
tives for participating in information sharing organizations, as well as the economic
incentives that can lead to voluntary cooperation by firms in these agreements. Our
work in Chapter 4 focuses on this problem, and analyzes the use of public and private
indicators of users’ cooperation in the design of appropriate inter-temporal incentives
in these agreements.
1.3 Related literature and policy initiatives
Related work will be presented throughout the dissertation to highlight the con-
tributions of each chapter within the literature. This section discusses some of the
theoretical work that is most closely related in terms of motivation and general
methodologies, as well as some recent policy proposals, in order to situate this work
within the broader context of cyber security.
9
1.3.1 Incentive mechanisms for improved security
Provision of security by interconnected users, both in general as well as in the
context of cyber security, has been extensively studied in the framework of game
theory, see e.g., [70, 122, 54, 55, 74, 64], and [71, 81] for surveys. Security games
were first presented by Kunreuther and Heal [70] to study the incentive of airlines to
invest in baggage checking systems, and by Varian [122] in the context of computer
system reliability.
The majority of this literature focuses on under-investment in security, by com-
paring users’ investments in the Nash equilibrium of the security game to the socially
optimal levels of investments. Several methods for increasing users’ investments, and
thus the reliability of the interconnected system, have also been proposed in the lit-
erature. These mechanisms can be grouped into two main categories, based on
whether they incentivize or dictate user cooperation [71]. Mechanisms that dictate
user investment in security include regulations, audits, and third party inspections
[71]. These methods leverage the power of an authority such as the government or
an Internet service provider (ISP), and are therefore only effective if the authority
has sufficient control over the users so as to accurately monitor their actions and
establish a credible threat of punishment.
In the absence of authorities with regulation power, or in order to preserve users’
autonomy and privacy, a designer can choose mechanisms that attempt to incentivize
improved security behavior. A commonly proposed form of these incentives, also
adopted in this thesis, is the introduction of monetary taxes/rewards or transfers;
see e.g., [70, 122, 55]. Another increasingly popular incentive mechanism is cyber
insurance; we further elaborate on this approach and its relation to this thesis in
Section 1.3.2. The primary focus of this thesis in Chapter 2 is on the design of
tax-based incentive mechanisms. It is the first in the literature to focus specifically
on the issue of voluntary participation in these mechanisms, and to illustrate the
complexities arising from the non-excludable nature of security.
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1.3.2 Cyber insurance: Theory and practice
The study of cyber insurance, both as a risk transfer mechanism, i.e., as a means
of managing residual security risks, as well as a potential solution to the problem of
under-investment in security in interdependent systems, has been receiving consid-
erable attention in both theory and practice. Using insurance, users transfer part
of their security risks to an insurer, receiving coverage for damages due to certain
pre-specified cyber incidents, in return for paying a premium fee.
There are currently over 30 insurance carriers offering cyber insurance contracts
in the U.S. [109, 10]. Many insurers have reported growths of 10-25% in premiums
in a 2012 survey of the market [10], with some carriers reporting even higher rates.
For example, one carrier reports an increase of over 30% in the number of clients
purchasing their contracts during both 2012 and 2014 [82, 83]. The total amount
of premiums written are estimated to be between $500M and $1bn [109]. Typical
premiums are estimated to start from $10k -$25k and go as high as $50M [109, 10].
The average limits of these contracts for one of the insurance brokers are reported as
$16.8M, $11.1M, $12.8M from 2012 to 2014, respectively [82, 83]; other insurers have
reported coverage limits of up to $200M-$300M [109]. We refer the interested reader
to [10, 109, 2] for additional information on both the U.S. and the U.K. insurance
markets, as well as common types of coverage offered through these policies, and the
typical exclusions.
In the security literature, the study of cyber insurance both as a method for
mitigating cyber security risks, and as an incentive mechanism for internalizing the
externalities of security investments, has received considerable attention, see e.g.,
[53, 69, 70, 71, 116, 57, 76, 100, 75, 12]. This literature has mainly focused on
one of the two market environments of competitive or monopolistic insurers when
determining the power of cyber insurance in improving network security. On one
hand, it can be shown that in competitive insurance markets, the introduction of
insurance contracts not only fails to improve, but can further worsen network security
relative to a no-insurance scenario [116, 100]. This is because contracts offered in
such markets are optimal from the viewpoint of individual users, whereas socially
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optimal contracts should be designed by keeping social welfare in mind. On the
other hand, by engaging in premium discrimination, a monopolistic profit-neutral
cyber insurer can induce socially optimal security investments in an interdependent
system where security decisions are binary [57, 76, 100]. Therefore, a careful selection
or regulation of the cyber insurance market is required to ensure its usability as
an incentive mechanism for improved security. We further discuss these issues in
Chapter 2.
Cyber insurance is affected by the classic insurance problems of adverse selec-
tion (higher risk users seek more protection) and moral hazard (users lower their
investment in self-protection after being insured). Therefore, the insurance company
needs to somehow mitigate the information asymmetry and calculate the premium
fees with these considerations in mind. An example of such solutions is when an
insurer chooses to monitor investments and/or inspect users’ devices to prevent the
moral hazard problem, specifying the terms of the contract accordingly to ensure
appropriate levels of investment in self-protection [70]. Our work on the use of rep-
utation mechanisms in security games in Chapter 5 can be viewed as a alternative
solution to the problem of obtaining an assessment of users’ security posture when
designing cyber insurance contracts, without requiring a direct monitoring of users’
investments.
In addition to the classic insurance problems, the design of cyber insurance con-
tracts is further complicated by the risk interdependencies and the possibility of
correlated damages in an interconnected system. Our findings on the design of in-
centive mechanisms for security games in Chapter 2 can be used as a guideline for
devising premium discrimination schemes that consider the interdependent nature
of the environment, and aim at incentivizing better security practices by the cyber
insurance customers.
1.3.3 Security information sharing agreements and laws
In the U.S., improving information sharing is listed as one of President Obama’s
administration’s priorities on cyber security, and is evidenced by its inclusion as one
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of the key focus areas in the 2013 Executive Order 13636 on “Improving Critical In-
frastructure Cybersecurity” [40], and as initiative #5 in the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) [26]. Most recently, during the first White House
Summit on cybersecurity and consumer protection, President Obama signed Execu-
tive Order 13691 on “Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing”,
encouraging companies to share cyber security information with one another and the
federal government [41]. Following the executive order, the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) has started efforts to encourage the development of Information
Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) [35], as well as the Cyber Information
Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) in order to encourage Cooperative Re-
search and Development Agreements. As of July 2015, 125 such agreements have
been placed, with an additional 156 being negotiated [42].
In general, depending on the breach notification law or the information sharing
agreement, a firm may be required to either publicly announce an incident, to re-
port it to other firms participating in the agreement or within its industry sector, to
notify affected individuals, and/or to notify the appropriate authorities. Currently,
most of the existing laws in the U.S. and the European Union require organizations
only to report to an authority, with a few also mandating notification of the affected
individuals, e.g., HIPAA for the health sector in the U.S. (see [73] for a summary
of prominent U.S. and E.U. laws). However, motivated by the aforementioned trend
in the newest initiatives in the U.S. (in particular, EO 13691), in this thesis we are
primarily interested in information sharing agreements among firms, both with and
without facilitation by an authority. Examples of existing agreements/organizations
of this type include Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), Information
Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), the United States Computer Emer-
gency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and InfraGard.
From the theoretical perspective, a number of research papers have analyzed the
welfare implications of information sharing agreements, as well as firms’ incentives for
adhering to these agreements, through the study of one-shot game-theoretic models;
see e.g., [98, 73, 50, 47]. We will review this literature in more detail in Chapter 4,
where we study these agreements in a repeated game framework.
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1.4 Thesis outline
The main focus of this thesis is on using a game-theoretic approach to under-
stand the theoretical underpinnings of users’ incentives for exerting effort towards
the provision of public goods, particularly cyber security.
Towards this end, Chapter 2 studies security games, with a focus on voluntary
participation in incentive mechanisms. It proposes the notion of exit equilibrium to
formalize the study of users’ outside options in mechanisms for incentivizing the pro-
vision of non-excludable public goods. We use this notion to show a general negative
result: there is no tax-based incentive mechanism that can implement the socially op-
timal solution, while guaranteeing voluntary participation and maintaining a weakly
balanced budget, in all instances of security games, i.e., without prior knowledge of
the network structure or users’ preferences. This negative result is in sharp contrast
with the performance guarantees of incentive mechanisms for provision of private and
excludable public good provision problems, using which social optimality, voluntary
participation, and weak budget balance, can be guaranteed simultaneously. It high-
lights the importance of accounting for users’ outside options (in particular, their
continued interaction with the system even after opting out) when incentivizing the
provision of non-excludable goods. This negative result is then shown to extend to
risk-averse users purchasing cyber insurance contracts, with important implications
in the feasibility of using cyber insurance as a method for improving the state of
cyber security. This chapter includes work that has appeared in [97, 93, 91, 89].
In light of this negative result, we pursue two possible alternatives. First, we
can restrict attention to subclasses of the general model, for which the additional
information on the network structure and/or users’ preferences may aid the design
of incentive mechanisms. Chapter 2.4.2 and Chapter 3 explore this alternative by
restricting attention to a class of security games played on networks. Another possi-
bility is to account for the repeated nature of users’ interactions, in order to design
inter-temporal incentives for cooperation. Chapter 4 pursues this direction for a
particular type of security games, namely, security information sharing agreements.
Specifically, Chapter 3 studies the general framework of public good provision
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games on networks, which include security games played on networks as a special
case. These are games in which each user’s payoff depends on a weighted sum of
her neighbors’ efforts, with weights given by those of the links of the network. In
this chapter, we allow for both complements and substitutes, different strengths of
interactions (weighted graphs), and unidirectional interactions (directed graphs). We
are interested in the study of Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-
cooperative equilibria (we define these as the effort profiles emerging when coalitions
of users interact with one another). Our goal is to provide an understanding of
how the aforementioned outcomes (i.e., the results of users’ strategic interactions)
are affected by the properties of the network. We will first identify necessary and
sufficient conditions on the structure of the network for the uniqueness of Nash
equilibria. We show that our finding unifies (and strengthens) existing results in the
literature. We also identify conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria for the
subclasses of games at the two extremes of our model, namely games of strategic
complements and games of strategic substitutes. All identified conditions are based
only on the network structure. We provide a graph-theoretical interpretation of
users’ efforts at Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative
equilibria, by linking each user’s decision to her centrality in the interaction network.
Using this connection, we separate the effects of incoming and outgoing edges on
users’ efforts, and uncover an alternating effect over walks of different length in the
network. This chapter includes work that has appeared in [96, 92].
The design of inter-temporal incentives (i.e., conditioning future cooperation on
the history of past interactions) for disclosure in information sharing agreements
is presented in Chapter 4. We propose a repeated game formulation of these agree-
ments as repeated N -person prisoner’s dilemma games, in order to understand firms’
incentives for sharing their security information given the associated disclosure costs.
Specifically, we show that a rating/assessment system can play a key role in enabling
the design of appropriate incentives for supporting cooperation among firms. We
further show that in the absence of a monitor, similar incentives can be designed
if participating firms are provided with a communication platform, through which
they can share their beliefs about others’ adherence to the agreement. This chapter
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includes work that has appeared in [94, 95].
A common assumption required in some parts of the preceding chapters is that
the mechanism designer knows, or can estimate, users’ efforts towards cyber security.
For example, some incentive mechanisms require knowledge of users’ levels of effort to
determine appropriate taxes/rewards. A similar need arises when mitigating moral
hazard and devising cyber insurance contracts with premium discrimination. Finally,
in security information sharing agreements, there is a need for forming assessments of
participants’ adherence to the terms of the agreement. The aforementioned actions
are commonly only known to the entity herself; an outside observer can in general
only attain a noisy observation of these actions. Chapter 5 proposes a mechanism for
crowdsourcing reputation (here, an estimate of users’ investments or security related
decisions) that allows the mechanism designer to improve her own prior assessment,
without the need for monetary taxation/rewards, by crowdsourcing self-assessments
and cross-observations from different users within the system. This chapter includes
work that has appeared in [90, 88].
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with reflections and directions for future
work.
1.5 Thesis contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation can be summarized as follows.
• Security as a non-excludable public good (Chapter 2)
– It proposes the notion of exit equilibrium to describe strategic users’ out-
side options from mechanisms for incentivizing the adoption of optimal
security practices.
– It shows a general negative result on simultaneously guaranteeing social
optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget balance, in all in-
stances of security games.
– By extending this negative result to risk-averse users, it highlights the
limitations of using cyber insurance as an incentive for the adoption of
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better security practices, which has been widely proposed in both theory
and practice.
• Public good provision games on networks (Chapter 3)
– It identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness of Nash
equilibria in public good provision games, in terms of the network struc-
ture. We show that previous results in the literature can be recovered as
special cases of our result.
– It further identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of Nash equilibria in two subclasses of our model, namely games with
strategic substitutes and games with strategic complements, in terms of
the network structure.
– It presents a graph theoretical characterization of users’ actions at different
effort profiles, namely the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient outcomes, and
semi-cooperative equilibria. Our characterization separates the effects of
users’ dependencies and influences on their efforts. It also uncovers an
alternating effect over walks of different length in the network.
• Inter-temporal incentives in security information sharing agreements (Chapter
4)
– It proposes the design of inter-temporal incentives for supporting cooper-
ation on full disclosure in security information sharing agreements.
– It illustrates the role of a public rating/assessment system in providing
imperfect public monitoring, leading to coordination on cooperation in
information sharing agreements.
– It establishes the possibility of sustaining cooperative behavior in the ab-
sence of a public monitor, by introducing a platform for communication
among firms through which they can exchange their private beliefs on
others’ adherence to the agreement.
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• Crowdsourcing reputation in security games (Chapter 5)
– It proposes a simple reputation mechanism that, by crowdsourcing assess-
ments from a set of strategic users, is able to improve its own prior as-
sessment of these users’ reputation (security posture or related decisions),
without the need for monetary incentives.
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Chapter 2
Security as a Non-Excludable Public Good
2.1 Introduction
Despite advances in cyber-defense technologies, cyber attacks on organizations
across all sectors remain rampant. From an economic perspective, it has been argued
that this sub-optimal security status is due to lack of incentives for organizations to
properly adopt existing software and best practices to improve their state of security
[3, 54, 71]. In particular, as discussed in Chapter 1, security can be viewed as a non-
excludable public good. This is because in a network of interdependent users, the
expenditure in security measures by an entity affects not only herself, but also other
users interacting with her. As a result, due to this public good nature, the optimal
provision of security in a system of self-interested users is in general inefficient, and
requires the design of appropriate incentive mechanisms.
To this end, the literature on security games has proposed incentive mechanisms
for improving expenditures in cyber security; see Section 2.6 for related work. Simi-
larly, our focus in the current chapter is on the use of monetary payments/rewards
that achieve the following goals. First, the mechanism is designed to incentivize so-
cially optimal security behavior, i.e., those minimizing the collective cost of security.
In addition, it should ensure voluntary participation by all users. The importance
of ensuring voluntary participation lies in the fact that, in general, the mechanism
designer either lacks the authority, or is reluctant, to mandate user cooperation.
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Finally, it should maintain a weakly balanced budget, so that the designer does not
need to spend (potentially large amounts of) external resources to implement the
mechanism.
This chapter studies such mechanisms with a focus on the issue of voluntary
participation. It proposes the notion of exit equilibrium to describe users’ ability
to exercise their outside options from a proposed incentive mechanisms. We show a
fundamental result that, due to the non-excludable nature of security, there exists no
reliable mechanism which can incentivize socially optimal investments, while ensuring
voluntary participation and maintaining a weakly balanced budget, for all instances
of security games. This is in contrast to private goods and excludable public goods,
for which tax-based incentive mechanisms such as the Externality and Pivotal (VCG)
mechanisms can simultaneously guarantee social optimality, voluntary participation,
and weak budget balance; see Section 2.6.1.
To further illustrate how the non-excludability of security leads to this result, we
analyze the performance of the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms in a class of secu-
rity games played on networks, referred to as weighted effort games. Through analysis
and numerical simulations, we identify the effects of several features of the problem
environment, including multiplicity of exit equilibria, and users’ self-dependence lev-
els, on the performance of these mechanisms. In addition, we identify two classes of
users in these games: main investors, who receive a reward in return for improving
their investment levels (from which themselves, as well as other users benefit), and
free-riders, who pay a tax to benefit from a more secure environment. We high-
light how voluntary participation constraints may fail to hold for users from either
class. In other words, either free-riders or main investors may decide to opt out of a
proposed mechanism.
We then extend the negative result by considering several variations of the main
model. We illustrate how, given a mechanism, stable coalitions of participating users
may emerge, leading to an improved, yet sub-optimal security status. We discuss
the idea of bundling the role of the mechanism designer and a security vendor; the
intent is to allow the vendor to leverage the additional revenue from the increased
sale of security products to (partially) cover the deficit generated through the in-
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centive mechanism. Finally, we extend the impossibility result to risk-averse users
(as opposed to risk-neutral users in the basic model) who are offered cyber insurance
contracts, and discuss the implications of this negative result on the viability of using
cyber insurance for improving the state of cyber security.
2.1.1 Chapter contributions
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• This chapter proposes the notion of exit equilibrium to describe strategic users’
outside options from mechanisms for incentivizing the adoption of optimal se-
curity practices. This work hence formalizes the study of voluntary participa-
tion in security games, in which the assumption of compulsory compliance is
commonly adopted.
• It shows the fundamental impossibility of simultaneously guaranteeing social
optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget balance in all instances
of security games. By comparing this finding to existing possibility results (see
Section 2.6), this work highlights the crucial effect of users’ outside options
on the design of any mechanism for improving users’ security behavior. The
insights are also applicable to other problems concerning the provision of non-
excludable public goods over social and economic networks; see Section 2.6.
• We extend this impossibility result to risk-averse users who are offered cyber
insurance contracts. This finding highlights the limitations of using cyber in-
surance as an incentive for the adoption of better security practices, which has
been widely proposed in theory [76, 75, 100], as well as in practice, e.g., by the
Department of Homeland Security [34].
• By finding restricted families of positive instances, we identify features of an
environment that can affect the performance of incentive mechanisms for se-
curity games. We further analyze the role of a security vendor in extending
the space of positive instances. These findings can guide the selection of a
mechanism given additional information about the problem environment.
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2.1.2 Chapter organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model
for security games, followed by the impossibility result in Section 2.3. Section 2.4
illustrates this result and identifies restricted families of positive instances by ana-
lyzing the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms, and applying them to the weighted
effort model. Several extensions of the impossibility result are presented in Section
2.5, followed by related work in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Security games
2.2.1 Model
Consider a network of N interconnected and interdependent users. These users
can be the operators of computers on a network, different divisions within a larger
organization, or various sectors of an economy. Each user has an initial wealth Wi,
and is subject to suffering a loss of 0 < Li ≤ Wi if her security is compromised. To
decrease the probability of a successful attack, each user can choose a level of effort
or investment in security xi ∈ R≥0. User i incurs a cost of hi(xi) when exerting effort
xi, where hi(·) : R≥0 → R≥0 is referred to as the cost function.
We assume that the effort xi not only protects the user herself, but further benefits
other users in the system. This is because a better protected user generates positive
externalities to (some or all) other users by decreasing the probability of contagious
infections or attacks using existing connections. Denote the vector of all users’ efforts
by x := {x1, . . . , xN}. The probability of a successful attack on user i, at a vector of
efforts x, is determined by the risk function fi(x) : RN≥0 → [0, 1]. The dependence of
user i’s risk, fi(·), on other users’ efforts, x−i := {x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN}, captures
the interdependence of users’ security.
The utility of user i is therefore given by
ui(x) = Wi − Lifi(x)− hi(xi) . (2.1)
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We refer to the full information, one shot game among the N rational users,
choosing actions xi ≥ 0, with utility functions given in (2.1), as the security game.
We make the following assumptions on the risk and cost functions.
Assumption 2.1. For all users i, fi(·) is continuous, differentiable, decreasing
(strictly decreasing in xi), and strictly convex, in each argument xj.
Intuitively, the decreasing nature of this function in arguments xj, j 6= i, models
the positive externality of users’ security decisions on one another. The convexity
on the other hand implies that the effectiveness of security measures in preventing
attacks (or the marginal benefit) is overall decreasing, as none of the available security
measures can prevent all possible attacks.
Assumption 2.2. For all users i, hi(·) is continuous, differentiable, strictly increas-
ing, and convex.
Intuitively, the assumption of convexity entails that while implementing basic se-
curity measures is relatively cheap (e.g., limiting administrative privileges), protec-
tion may become increasingly costly as its effectiveness increases (e.g., implementing
intrusion detection systems).
2.2.2 Social optimality and exit equilibria
Security games have been extensively studied, see [71, 81] for surveys. The most
commonly studied aspect of these games is their Nash equilibrium, i.e, the vector of
investments in security that emerge when each user chooses an optimal level of effort
accounting for her costs and benefits, while also best-responding to the investments
of other users. Formally, at a Nash equilibrium x˜, for all users i,
x˜i = arg max
x≥0
ui(x, x˜−i) .
Nevertheless, it is well known in the economics literature that, as users do not account
for the externality of their decisions on one another, this effort profile is sub-optimal
from a social welfare perspective. Formally, we define the welfare maximizing profiles
as follows.
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Definition 2.1. A socially optimal profile x∗, for users with utility functions (2.1),
is given by
x∗ = arg max
x0
N∑
j=1
uj(x) . (2.2)
We are interested in incentive mechanisms that use appropriately designed mone-
tary taxation/rewards to implement the socially optimal effort profile. Formally, the
mechanism assesses a tax ti to each participating user i; this tax may be positive,
negative, or zero, indicating payments, rewards, or no transaction, respectively. We
assume that users’ utilities are quasi-linear, i.e., linear in the tax term (see Section
2.5.2 for an extension of our results to risk-averse users). Therefore, the total utility
of a user i when she is assigned a tax ti is given by
vi(x, ti) := ui(x)− ti , (2.3)
where the tax ti can in general be a function of the security investment profile x.
In addition to inducing socially optimal behavior, the mechanism designer select-
ing the tax terms ti wishes to satisfy two goals. On one hand, the designer attempts
to ensure that the implementation of the mechanism does not require spending (a
potentially large amount of) external resources.1 Formally,
Definition 2.2. An incentive mechanism assigning taxes {ti}i=1,...,N , satisfies weak
budget balance (WBB) if
N∑
i=1
ti ≥ 0 .
More importantly, for a successful implementation of an incentive mechanism,
the designer has to ensure that users’ voluntary participation (VP) constraints are
satisfied, as the designer generally lacks the authority to enforce cooperation. Note
the deliberate choice of the term voluntary participation as opposed to the commonly
studied individual rationality (IR) constraint. Individual rationality is often used to
1At least at equilibrium, but ideally, both on and off equilibrium.
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refer to the requirement that a user prefers participation in a proposed mechanism to
an outcome in which she opts out and receives no allocation of the (private or exclud-
able public) good at all. In contrast, we define voluntary participation constraints as
those ensuring that a user prefers implementing the socially optimal outcome while
being assigned a tax ti, to the outcome attained had she unilaterally opted out,
but in which she could still benefit from the (non-excludable) public good. Such
distinction is important with non-excludable public good such as security, as a user
can still benefit from the externalities generated by the participating users, and also
potentially continue contributing to the production of the public good, even when
opting out herself. This is in contrast to games with excludable public goods, where
voluntary participation and individual rationality become equivalent.
Therefore, to formally state users’ voluntary participation, we propose the notion
of exit equilibrium (EE): consider an outlier, who is contemplating unilaterally opting
out of a proposed incentive mechanism. By the assumption of full information, the
remaining participating users, who are choosing a welfare maximizing solution for
their (N − 1)-user system, will have the ability to predict the best-response of the
outlier to their collective action, and thus choose their investments accordingly. As
a result, the equilibrium investment profile where user i opts out is itself a Nash
equilibrium (for the game between this outlier and the coalition of N−1 participating
users). Formally, we define exit equilibria as follows.
Definition 2.3. Assume a user i opts out of a given incentive mechanism, while the
remaining N−1 users continue participating (i.e., implement the welfare maximizing
solution to their (N − 1)-user system). Then, the exit equilibrium xˆi for outlier i is
given by
xˆi−i = arg max
x−i0
∑
j 6=i
uj(x−i, xˆii) ,
xˆii = arg max
xi≥0
ui(xˆ
i
−i, xi) . (2.4)
Using the definition of exit equilibrium, we can formally state users’ voluntary
participation constraints.
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Definition 2.4. A user i’s voluntary participation constraint in an incentive mech-
anism, when assigned a tax ti, is satisfied if
vi(x
∗, ti) ≥ ui(xˆi) .
We would like to highlight two important considerations in studying exit equi-
libria. First, note that the study of exit equilibria to understand users’ unilateral
deviations from socially optimal investment profiles is similar to the study of users’
deviation from Nash equilibria: neither concept precludes the possibility that coali-
tions of deviating users can break the equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is necessary (al-
though indeed not sufficient) for a mechanism to be resilient against unilateral exit
strategies in order to incentivize cooperation. We therefore only focus on unilateral
exit strategies. In fact, as shown in Section 2.3, there exists no incentive mechanism
that can incentivize socially optimal efforts, while guaranteeing weak budget balance
and voluntary participation, even against unilateral deviations, much less against
higher order coalitions. Secondly, we also note that the proposed exit equilibrium
is only an equilibrium under the assumption that the N − 1 remaining users are
cooperating in the mechanism; it is itself not necessarily stable as any of the remain-
ing users may also prefer to opt out. In Section 2.5.1, we extend the definition of
exit equilibrium to allow for multiple outliers, and present instances in which the
resulting exit equilibrium yields a stable coalition of participating users, as well as
instances in which no stable exit equilibrium (other than the degenerate case of Nash
equilibrium) exists.
2.3 An impossibility result
In this section, we prove the following result.
Proposition 2.1. There exists no tax-based incentive mechanism which can im-
plement the socially optimal solution, while guaranteeing weak budget balance and
voluntary participation simultaneously, in all instances of security games.
We prove this impossibility through two families of counter-examples. The first
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counter-example limits the network structure by considering a star topology. The
second family limits users’ preferences to the particular class of weakest link risk
functions.
Counter-example I: The star topology
Assume some tax-based incentive mechanism M is proposed for security games.
Consider N users connected through the star topology with user 1 as the center, such
that the security decisions of the center affect all leaves, but each leaf’s investment
affects only herself and the center. Formally, set Wi = W, Li = L,∀i, and let the
utility function of the center be given by
u1(x) = W − Lf(x1 +
N∑
j=2
xj)− cx1 ,
and that of all leaves j ∈ {2, . . . , N} by
uj(x) = W − Lf(x1 + xj)− cxj .
Here, f(·) is any function satisfying the assumptions in Section 2.2. The investment
cost functions hi(·) are linear, with the same unit investment cost c for all users.
We first solve (2.2) to find the socially optimal investment profile x∗. It is easy to
see that for this graph, only the center will be investing in security, while all leaves
rely on the resulting externality. This socially optimal investment profile x∗ is given
by
∂f
∂x
(x∗1) = −
c
LN
, x∗j = 0,∀j = 2, . . . , N .
Now, assume the center user is considering stepping out of the mechanism. To
find the exit equilibrium profile xˆ1 resulting from this unilateral deviation, first note
that the leaves’ security decisions will not affect one another, so that the socially
optimal investment profile for the N −1 leaves is the same as their myopic decisions.
User 1 will also be choosing her individually optimal level of investment. Therefore,
27
using (2.4), the exit equilibrium xˆ1 will satisfy
∂f
∂x
(xˆ11 +
N∑
j=2
xˆ1j) +
c
L
≥ 0 ,
∂f
∂x
(xˆ11 + xˆ
1
j) +
c
L
≥ 0, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
We conclude that an exit equilibrium when user 1 unilaterally leaves the mechanism
is such that
∂f
∂x
(xˆ11) = −
c
L
, xˆ1j = 0, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
Finally, if any leaf user j ∈ {2, . . . , N} leaves the mechanism, the exit equilibrium
xˆj will satisfy
∂f
∂x
(xˆj1) = −
c
L(N − 1) , xˆ
j
k = 0, ∀k = 2, . . . , N .
We now use the socially optimal investment profile and the exit equilibria to eval-
uate voluntary participation and weak budget balance for mechanism M. Assume
M assigns a tax t∗i to a participating user i. Then, voluntary participation will hold
if and only if vi(x
∗, t∗i ) ≥ ui(xˆi), ∀i, which reduces to
t∗1 ≤ L
(
f(xˆ11)− f(x∗1)
)
+ c(xˆ11 − x∗1) ,
t∗j ≤ L
(
f(xˆj1)− f(x∗1)
)
, ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , N} .
The sum of these taxes is thus bounded by
N∑
i=1
t∗i ≤ L
(
f(xˆ11)− f(x∗1)
)
+ c(xˆ11 − x∗1) + L(N − 1)(f(xˆj1)− f(x∗1))
However, the above sum can be negative, e.g., when f(z) = exp(−z) or f(z) =
1
z
, indicating that weak budget balance will fail regardless of how the taxes are
determined in the mechanism M. For example, replacing f(z) = exp(−z), the
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upper bound can be simplified as follows:
N∑
i=1
t∗i ≤ L
(
f(xˆ11)− f(x∗1)
)
+ c(xˆ11 − x∗1) + L(N − 1)(f(xˆj1)− f(x∗1))
= L(
c
L
− c
LN
) + c(ln
L
c
− ln LN
c
) + L(N − 1)( c
L(N − 1) −
c
LN
)
= c(1− lnN) .
The above upper bound is negative for any N ≥ 3, indicating that the sum of taxes
for any mechanism is necessarily negative as well.
Intuition: the failure of any mechanism M in guaranteeing social optimality,
voluntary participation, and weak budget balance in this topology, is due to the fact
that the center node (a main investor) asks for a reward that the leaves (free-riders)
are not willing to subsidize. Note that if the users were facing a choice between
the center investing the socially optimal level, and staying at the Nash equilibrium,
this problem would have not arisen, and it would be possible to guarantee all three
properties. Nevertheless, as outlier leaf nodes can still enjoy a lower level of security
subsidized by other participating leaves, their willingness to pay is limited, conse-
quently not financing the reward requested by the center, leading to the negative
result of Proposition 2.1.
Counter-example II: Weakest link games
We next consider security games with a family of risk functions that approxi-
mate the weakest link risks fi(x) = exp(−minj xj) [122, 71]. In particular, we use
the approximation minj xj ≈ − 1γ log
∑
j exp(−γxj), where the accuracy of the ap-
proximation is increasing in the constant γ > 0. User i’s utility function is given
by
ui(x) = W − L(
N∑
j=1
exp(−γxj))1/γ − cxi ,
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where investment cost functions hi(·) are assumed to be linear, and users are homo-
geneous, with the same initial wealth W , loss L, and unit investment cost c.
In this game, the socially optimal investment profile x∗ can be found by solving
the first order conditions of (2.2), which are given by
N exp(−γx∗i )(
N∑
j=1
exp(−γx∗j))
1
γ
−1 =
c
L
,∀i.
By symmetry, all users will be exerting the same socially optimal level of effort
x∗i =
1
γ
ln
N
( c
L
)γ
, ∀i .
Next, assume a user i unilaterally opts out of the mechanism, while the remaining
users continue participating. The exit equilibrium profile xˆi can be determined using
the first order conditions on (2.4), leading to
(N − 1) exp(−γxˆij)(
∑
k 6=i
exp(−γxˆik) + exp(−γxˆii))
1
γ
−1 =
c
L
,
exp(−γxˆii)(
∑
k 6=i
exp(−γxˆik) + exp(−γxˆii))
1
γ
−1 =
c
L
.
Solving the above, we get
xˆii =
1
γ
ln
21−γ
( c
L
)γ
,
xˆij =
1
γ
ln
(N − 1)21−γ
( c
L
)γ
,∀j 6= i .
Assume some tax-based incentive mechanismM is proposed in this game. We can
use the socially optimal investment profile and the exit equilibria to analyze users’
participation incentives in M, as well as the budget balance conditions. Denote by
t∗i the tax assigned to user i by M.
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A user i’s utilities when participating and staying out are given by
vi(x
∗, t∗i ) = W − L(N exp(−γx∗i ))
1
γ − cx∗i − t∗i
= W − c(1 + x∗i )− t∗i .
ui(xˆ
i) = W − L(exp(−γxˆii) + (N − 1) exp(−γxˆij))
1
γ − cxˆii
= W − c(2 + xˆii) .
The voluntary participation condition for a user i will hold if and only if vi(x
∗, t∗i ) ≥
ui(xˆ
i), which reduces to
c(1 + x∗i ) + t
∗
i ≤ c(2 + xˆii)⇔ t∗i ≤ c(1 +
1
γ
ln
21−γ
N
) . (2.5)
On the other hand, for weak budget balance to hold, we need
∑
i t
∗
i ≥ 0. Nevertheless,
by (2.5), we have ∑
i
t∗i ≤ cN(1 +
1
γ
ln
21−γ
N
) .
It is easy to see that given γ and for any N > eγ21−γ, the above sum will always be
negative, indicating a budget deficit for a general mechanism M, regardless of how
taxes are determined.
Intuition: note that the lack of any mechanism M occurs only when there is
a sufficient number of players (given a finite γ). This is because with a sufficient
number of participating users, the externality available to an outlier is high enough
to dissuade her from participating. It is also interesting to point out that outside
this region (i.e., N ≤ eγ21−γ, the number of users is sufficiently small), we in fact
have a positive instance, in which the Externality mechanism introduced in Section
2.4.1 can guarantee social optimality, budget balance, and voluntary participation.
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A note on the nature of the impossibility result
We close this section by noting the implications of proving our impossibility re-
sult on a simultaneous guarantee of social optimality, voluntary participation, and
weak budget balance, through counter-examples. We have shown that without prior
knowledge of the graph structure or users’ preferences, it is not possible for a de-
signer to propose a reliable mechanism, i.e., one which can promise to achieve social
optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget balance, regardless of the re-
alizations of utilities. This should be contrasted with environments with the same
utility functions and information constraints, but excludable public goods, in which
there exist reliable mechanisms to guarantee all three properties simultaneously; see
Section 2.6.1. Nevertheless, as also suggested by the counter-example based on the
weakest link games, it may still be possible to design reliable mechanisms for non-
excludable public goods under a restricted problem space. With this in mind, we
next analyze the class of weighted effort models, and aim to identify such positive
instances, as well as the intuition behind the existence of each instance.
2.4 A tale of two mechanisms: Analysis of existing incentive
schemes
In light of the negative result of Proposition 2.1, in this section we set out to better
understand the performance of existing incentive mechanisms in security games, and
identify features of the problem environment that affect the properties attainable
through given mechanisms. We further find positive instances (in a restricted utility
space) for which these existing mechanisms can guarantee all three properties of
social optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget balance. Specifically,
we analyze the performance of the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms within the
restricted class of security games played on networks, referred to as weighted effort
security games.
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2.4.1 The Pivotal and Externality mechanisms
Throughout this section, we will be studying the performance of two well-known
tax-based incentive mechanisms, namely the Pivotal (VCG) and Externality mech-
anisms. We chose these mechanisms as they have been shown to simultaneously
guarantee the achievement of social optimality, weak budget balance, and voluntary
participation, in games of provision of excludable public goods. Our goal is hence to
illustrate their inefficiencies in the provision of non-excludable public goods.
2.4.1.1 The Pivotal mechanism
Groves mechanisms [84, 103], also commonly known as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanisms, refer to a family of mechanisms in which, through the appro-
priate design of taxes for users with quasi-linear utilities, a mechanism designer can
incentivize users to reveal their true preferences in dominant strategies, thus imple-
menting the socially optimal solution. One particular instance of these mechanisms,
the Pivotal (or Clarke) mechanism, has been shown to further satisfy the participa-
tion constraints and achieve weak budget balance in many private and public good
games [103, 25, 56]; however, this is not necessarily the case in security games. The
taxes in the Pivotal mechanism for security games are given by
tPi =
∑
j 6=i
uj(xˆ
i
−i, xˆ
i
i)−
∑
j 6=i
uj(x
∗
−i, x
∗
i ) , (2.6)
where ui(x) is user i’s utility function, x
∗ = (x∗−i, x
∗
i ) is the socially optimal solution,
and xˆi = (xˆi−i, xˆ
i
i) is the exit equilibrium under user i’s unilateral deviation. In
Appendix A, we show that the taxes in (2.6) incentivize users’ voluntary participation
and attain the socially optimal solution. However, these taxes may generate a budget
deficit for the designer.
2.4.1.2 The Externality mechanism
We next introduce the Externality mechanism adapted from the work of Hurwicz
in [59]. A main design goal of this mechanism is to guarantee a complete redistri-
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bution of taxes, i.e., strong budget balance. This mechanism has been adapted in
[115], where it is shown to achieve social optimality, guarantee voluntary participa-
tion, and maintain a balanced budget, in allocation of power in cellular networks (an
excludable public good). However, this is again not the case in security games. The
tax terms tEi at the equilibrium of the Externality mechanism in security games are
given by
tEi (x
∗) = −
N∑
j=1
x∗jLi
∂fi
∂xj
(x∗)− x∗i
∂hi
∂xi
(x∗i ) . (2.7)
The interpretation is that by implementing this mechanism, each user i will be fi-
nancing part of user j 6= i’s reimbursement. According to (2.7), this amount is
proportional to the positive externality of j’s investment on user i’s utility. In Ap-
pendix B, we show that the taxes in (2.7) attain the socially optimal solution and lead
to a (strongly) balanced budget. However, they may fail to satisfy users’ voluntary
participation constraints in security games.
2.4.2 Weighted effort security games
The gap between the Nash equilibrium and the socially optimal investment profile
of a security game, as well as users’ participation incentives and possible budget
imbalances, are dependent on the specifics of users’ utility functions defined in (2.1).
In particular, the risk function fi(·) can model the types of connection and extent
of interdependencies among users. Examples of existing security interdependence
models include the total effort, weakest link, and best shot models considered in the
seminal work of Varian [122], as well as the weakest target models studied in [54], the
effective investment and bad traffic models in [64], and the linear influence network
games in [85].
Here, we take the special case of weighted effort models2, with exponential risks
2The weighted effort game is an instance of the public good provision games studied in Chapter
3. We use the term “weighted effort” to highlight the connection to the total effort model in the
seminal work of Varian on security games [122].
34
and linear investment cost functions. This is a class of security games played on
networks, in which the weights on the links among users determine the strength of
their interdependencies. Formally, the total utility of user i is given by
vi(x, ti) = Wi − Li exp(−
N∑
j=1
aijxj)− cixi − ti . (2.8)
For simplicity, we assume Wi = W , Li = L = 1, and ci = c, for all i. The coefficients
aij ≥ 0 determine the dependence of user i’s risk on user j’s action. Consequently,
user i’s risk is dependent on a weighted sum of all users’ efforts. We define the
dependence matrix containing these coefficients as
A :=
( a11 a12 ··· a1N
a21 a22 ··· a2N
...
...
...
...
aN1 aN2 ··· aNN
)
.
We isolate the effect of different features of the model on the performance of
the two incentive mechanisms, by focusing on the following two sub-classes of this
model:3
1. Varying users’ self-dependence:
A =
(
a 1 ··· 1
1 a ··· 1
...
...
...
...
1 1 ··· a
)
, (2.9)
for both a > 1 and a < 1.
2. Making all users increasingly dependent on a single user:
A =
(
a 1 ··· 1
a 1 ··· 1
...
...
...
...
a 1 ··· 1
)
, (2.10)
for a > 1.
We present numerical results and intuitive interpretation for each of the above
3We refer the interested reader to [93] for an additional subclass, where we consider the effects
of diversity by breaking users into two groups of self-dependent and reliant users.
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Table 2.1: Effect of self-dependence in weighted effort security games
Parameter Conditions Exit Equilibrium VP in Externality WBB in Pivotal
a > 1 with N and c s.t.
(1 + N−2a )
N−1 > (ac )
a−1 CASE α : xˆ
i
i = 0, xˆ
i
j > 0 No No
a > 1 with N and c s.t.
(1 + N−2a )
N−1 < (ac )
a−1 CASE β : xˆ
i
i > 0, xˆ
i
j > 0 No No
a < 1 with N and c s.t.
(1 + N−2a )
a > (ac )
1−a CASE γ : xˆ
i
i = 0, xˆ
i
j > 0 No No
a < 1 with N and c s.t.
(1 + N−2a )
a < (ac )
1−a
CASE γ : xˆii = 0, xˆ
i
j > 0
CASE ω : xˆii > 0, xˆ
i
j = 0
CASE ζ : xˆii > 0, xˆ
i
j > 0
Yes
(iff ω or ζ)
Yes
(iff ω or ζ)
scenarios; formal analysis is given in Appendices C and D.
2.4.2.1 Effects of self-dependence
Consider a network of N users, with the dependence matrix given by (2.9), and
total utility functions4
vi(x, ti) = W − exp(−axi −
∑
j 6=i
xj)− cxi − ti .
The following theorem characterizes the possible exit equilibria of this game un-
der different parameter conditions, as well as whether the voluntary participation
conditions are satisfied under the Externality mechanism, and whether the Pivotal
mechanism can operate without a budget deficit. The results are summarized in
Table 2.1.
Theorem 2.1. For the weighted effort security game described by the dependence
matrix (2.9):
(i) There exist five possible exit equilibria (cases α, β, γ, ω, and ζ, summarized in
Table 2.1) depending on the values of the number of players N , self-dependence
a, and cost of investment c. In particular, note the multiplicity of exit equilibria
4We assume c < a, so as to ensure the existence of non-zero equilibria, i.e., at least one user
exerts non-zero effort at any equilibrium of the game.
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Figure 2.1: Increasing self-dependence in weighted effort games
under the parameter conditions of the last row in Table 2.1: either γ, ω, or ζ
may be realized in such instances.
(ii) Either of the Externality or Pivotal mechanisms can guarantee social optimality,
voluntary participation, and weak budget balance, if and only if the realized exit
equilibrium is ω or ζ of Table 2.1.
The proof, including formal derivations of the exit equilibria, as well as the anal-
ysis of the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms under each exit equilibrium, are
presented in Appendix C.
Using numerical simulations, we further examine the effect of changing a on the
mechanisms’ performance. In particular, we plot the sum of all taxes,
∑
i t
P
i , in the
Pivotal mechanism. For the Externality mechanism, we plot vi(x
∗, tEi ) − ui(xˆi) per
user i, i.e., the benefit of participation (in terms of increase in payoff) for that user.
We set N = 6 and c = 1. We then increase a, starting from a = 1, hence moving
gradually from the exit equilibrium in [Case α] to [Case β]. Intuitively, by increasing
users’ self-dependence, a unit of investment becomes more effective for the user. As
a result, we move towards an exit equilibrium in which outliers exert non-zero effort.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the results. From our analysis and simulations, we make the
following observations:
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Higher self-dependence improves performance of mechanisms: from
Fig. 2.1 we observe that (as predicted by the analysis) the Pivotal mechanism will
always carry a deficit, while the Externality mechanism will always fail to guarantee
voluntary participation. Nevertheless, as self-dependence increases, the performance
of both mechanisms improves. This is because higher self-dependence (equivalently,
lower interdependence) leads to closer to optimal investments by individual users in
their exit equilibrium. Such users require smaller incentives to move to the opti-
mal state, hence the reduced budget deficit of the Pivotal mechanism, and smaller
participation costs in the Externality mechanism.
Coordinating on the least beneficial exit equilibrium for the outlier:
from Table 2.1, we observe that if selection among multiple exit equilibria is pos-
sible, the Pivotal and Externality mechanism can simultaneously guarantee social
optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget balance under the less ben-
eficial exit equilibrium. A less beneficial equilibrium can be one that requires a
free-rider to become an investor when leaving the mechanism, or one that requires
an investor to continue exerting effort when out (although possibly at a lower level).
This can be seen by comparing Cases ω and ζ (in which outliers become the main
investors or have to continue exerting effort when out, respectively) with Case γ (in
which outliers become free-riders).
An exchange of favors: it is also interesting to highlight another feature of
the positive instances of Cases ω and ζ of Table 2.1: as users are mainly depen-
dent on others’ investments under these parameter conditions (a < 1), the incentive
mechanisms can facilitate coordination among them, so that each will increase their
investments in return for improved investments by others.
2.4.2.2 Effects of a dominant user
Consider a collection of N users, with dependence matrix given by (2.10), and
total utility functions
vi(x, ti) = W − exp(−ax1 −
N∑
j=2
xj)− cxi − ti ,
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Table 2.2: Effects of a single dominant user in weighted effort security games
Parameter Conditions Exit Equilibrium VP in Externality WBB in Pivotal
a < N − 1 CASE α : xˆ
1
1 = 0, xˆ
1
j > 0,∀j 6= 1
xˆi1 > 0, xˆ
i
j = 0,∀i, j 6= 1 No No
a > N − 1 CASE β : xˆ
1
1 > 0, xˆ
1
j = 0,∀j 6= 1
xˆi1 > 0, xˆ
i
j = 0,∀i, j 6= 1 No No
where c < 1 < a, and user 1 is the dominant user. In Appendix D, we show that in
a socially optimal profile, as well as for exit equilibria of non-dominant users, only
user 1 will be exerting effort. When the dominant user opts out of the mechanism,
however, she may become either a main investor or free-rider, depending on the
problem parameters.
The following theorem characterizes the possible exit equilibria and parameter
conditions for which each is possible, as well as the performance of both mechanisms.
The results are summarized in Table 2.2.
Theorem 2.2. For the weighted effort security game described by the dependence
matrix (2.10):
(i) There exist two possible exit equilibria (cases α and β, summarized in Table
2.2) depending on the values of the number of players N and dependence on
the dominant user a.
(ii) Neither of the Externality or Pivotal mechanisms can guarantee social opti-
mality, voluntary participation, and weak budget balance, regardless of the exit
equilibrium.
The proof is presented in Appendix D. Using numerical simulations, we further
illustrate the effect of increasing a, the dependence on the dominant user, on users’
benefits from participating in the Externality mechanism (i.e., vi(x, t
E
i )− ui(xˆi)), as
well as the budget of the Pivotal mechanism (i.e.,
∑
i t
P
i ). We set N = 10, c = 0.45,
and a ∈ [1, 15]. As a increases, the dominant user’s exit equilibrium switches from
free-riding to investing when opting out.
We make the following observation based on this analysis:
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Figure 2.2: Increasing dependence on a single dominant user in weighted effort games
Either main investors or free-riders may opt out: Through our analysis,
and as illustrated in Fig. 2.2, we observe that the voluntary participation conditions
of non-dominant users in the Externality mechanism are never satisfied: these users
can avoid paying taxes to the dominant user, while others pay her to increase her
investment. More interesting however, is the fact that the voluntary participation
conditions for the main investor may also fail to hold. This is because when user 1’s
exit equilibrium does not require her to exert effort, and the externality generated
by her is small (i.e., small a), the collected taxes are not enough to persuade this
dominant user to increase her effort level. Furthermore, we observe that although
the Pivotal mechanism needs to give out a smaller reward to the dominant user as
a increases (hence the jump in the third plot in Fig. 2.2), it still fails to avoid a
deficit due to the small willingness of free-riders to pay the taxes required to cover
this reward.
40
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Extending exit equilibria: Finding stable coalitions
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the definition of exit equilibrium considers unilateral
deviations of users from mechanisms incentivizing socially optimal efforts, assuming
all remaining users continue participating in the mechanism; the rationale is that it
is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for the users not to have incentives
to unilaterally deviate if the socially optimal outcome is to be incentivized while
maintaining voluntary participation and weak budget balance. In other words, if
any one user’s utility while participating in the proposed mechanism is lower than
that she can attain at her exit equilibrium, then the mechanism fails to guarantee
voluntary participation.
In this section, we look further into mechanisms which fail to guarantee voluntary
participation. We are interested in identifying stable coalitions of participating users
(a subset of all N users) that may emerge under a given incentive mechanism. To do
so, we consider the possibility of multiple users opting out of the proposed mechanism
(as opposed to only unilateral deviations considered in Section 2.2). We extend the
definition of exit equilibrium, allowing E users to exit the mechanism while the
remaining N − E users continue participating.
Specifically, when a subset of users E ⊂ N exit the proposed incentive mechanism,
the resulting exit equilibrium, xˆE := (xˆEE , xˆ
E
N−E), is given by
xˆEN−E = arg max
x0
∑
j /∈E
uj(x, xˆ
E
E) ,
xˆEk = arg max
x≥0
uk(x, xˆ
E
E−{k}, xˆ
E
N−E) ,∀k ∈ E . (2.11)
A stable coalition
Through an illustrative example, we identify stable coalitions under this extended
definition of exit equilibrium. In particular, similar to the counter-example in Section
2.3, we consider (approximations) of the weakest link risk function, i.e, users’ utility
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functions are given by
ui(x) = W − L(
N∑
j=1
exp(−γxj))1/γ − cxi .
First, using the first order conditions on (2.2), and by symmetry, all users will be
exerting the same socially optimal level of effort
x∗i =
1
γ
ln
N
( c
L
)γ
, ∀i .
Consider the subset of E users E ⊂ N who exit the proposed incentive mechanism.
The exit equilibrium under the deviation of these users can be derived using the first
order conditions on (2.11), given by
(N − E) exp(−γxˆEk)(
∑
j /∈E
exp(−γxˆEj ) +
∑
j∈E
exp(−γxˆEj ))
1
γ
−1 =
c
L
, ∀k /∈ E ,
exp(−γxˆEk)(
∑
j /∈E
exp(−γxˆEj ) +
∑
j∈E
exp(−γxˆEj ))
1
γ
−1 =
c
L
, ∀k ∈ E .
Solving the above, the exit equilibrium xˆE is given by
xˆEk =
1
γ
ln
(N − E)(E + 1)1−γ
( c
L
)γ
, ∀k /∈ E ,
xˆEk =
1
γ
ln
(E + 1)1−γ
( c
L
)γ
, ∀k ∈ E .
Now, assume a user i /∈ E is considering exiting the mechanism as well. Again,
using the first order conditions on (2.11), and following similar steps as the above,
this time for the subset of users E ∪ {i} exiting the mechanism, the exit equilibrium
42
xˆE∪{i} will be given by
xˆ
E∪{i}
k =
1
γ
ln
(N − E − 1)(E + 2)1−γ
( c
L
)γ
, ∀k /∈ E ∪ {i} ,
xˆ
E∪{i}
k =
1
γ
ln
(E + 2)1−γ
( c
L
)γ
, ∀k ∈ E ∪ {i} .
For a stable coalition of N −E users to form, we need to find the smallest set E ,
such that ui(xˆ
E∪{i}) ≤ vi(xˆE , ti), where ti is the tax assigned to a participating user
i in some proposed incentive mechanism. Substituting for the exit equilibria derived
above, user i’s utilities when participating and staying out are given by
vi(xˆ
E , ti) = W − c(E + 1 + xˆEi )− ti ,
ui(xˆ
E∪{i}) = W − c(E + 2 + xˆE∪{i}) .
The voluntary participation condition therefore simplifies to
ti ≤ c
(
1 +
1
γ
ln
1
N − E (
E + 2
E + 1
)1−γ
)
,∀i /∈ E .
Let E∗ be the smallest number for which N ≤ E + eγ(E+2
E+1
)1−γ holds (note that
we always have E∗ < N). Given E∗, the Externality mechanism of Section 2.4.1
can lead to a stable coalition of size M = N −E∗ implementing the socially optimal
solution in their M -user system, with the remainder E∗ users not participating.5
It is also interesting to mention that the condition attained for having a stable
coalition of all users (by setting E = 0) coincides with the positive instance of
Section 2.3: if N < eγ21−γ, the Externality mechanism can achieve the socially
optimal solution, while guaranteeing voluntary participation and budget balance.
5The taxes assigned to the M participating users can be found using (2.7), and will in fact be
zero at equilibrium (due to symmetry of the users). Also, the resulting effort profile will be an
improved, yet sub-optimal solution for the N -user system.
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A negative example
We close this section by noting that a stable coalition does not necessarily emerge
in all problem environments. In particular, consider the following family of total
effort games:
ui(x) = W − exp(−
N∑
j=1
xj)− cixi .
Users are indexed such that c1 < c2 < . . . < cN . Also, assume c1 <
c2
N−1 . Consider a
set of E users, E ⊂ N , exiting the mechanism. The resulting exit equilibrium, xˆE ,
depends primarily on user 1’s participation choice.
If user 1 ∈ E : xˆE1 = ln
1
c1
, xˆEk = 0, ∀k 6= 1 ,
If user 1 /∈ E : xˆE1 = ln
N − E
c1
, xˆEk = 0, ∀k 6= 1 .
First, note that once user 1 has already opted out, participation or opting out
yields equivalent utilities for users k 6= 1. Therefore, any possible coalition has to
include user 1.
Next, for any user to remain in a stable coalition N − E , we need to have
ui(xˆ
E∪{i}) ≤ ui(xˆE) − ti, where ti is the tax assigned by the incentive mechanism
to a participating user i. These conditions simplify to
t1 ≤ c1(1− 1N−E − ln(N − E)),
tk ≤ c1(N−E)(N−E−1) , ∀k /∈ E , k 6= 1.
For the mechanism to maintain weak budget balance, we need∑
i/∈E
ti ≤ c1(1− ln(N − E)) .
However, the above is always negative for N ≥ 3, indicating that there exists no
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mechanism that can sustain such coalitions while maintaining weak budget balance.
Also, note that the outcome for a coalition with N = 2 (user 1 and some user k 6= 1)
will be equivalent to the Nash equilibrium. We therefore conclude that, regardless of
the design of the mechanism, there exists no stable coalition in this family of total
effort games.
2.5.2 Risk-averse users and cyber insurance contracts
In this section, we present an extension of the impossibility result of Section 2.3
to risk-averse users. Considering risk-averse users is of particular interest in studying
the design of cyber insurance contracts. Cyber insurance has been widely proposed as
a method for incentivizing the adoption of better security practices by users through
strategies such as premium discrimination; see e.g., [57, 76]. Following the majority
of the existing literature, we consider a monopolist cyber insurer (e.g., the govern-
ment).6 We assume the insurer is interested in improving the state of cyber security
to its socially optimal levels (e.g., as required or directed by the government) through
appropriately designed insurance contracts. The weak budget balance assumption
ensures positive profits for this insurer, while voluntary participation models volun-
tary purchase of insurance from this provider.
CRRA functions for modeling risk aversion
Consider N interdependent users, with initial wealth Wi and loss Li, each choos-
ing an effort xi. The cost of investment xi is given by hi(xi), with the probability of
a successful attack given by fi(x). The utility function of user i is therefore
ui(x) = fi(x)Ui(Wi − Li) + (1− fi(x))Ui(Wi)− hi(xi) .
In general, for risk-averse users, the function Ui(·) is a concave function. Here, we
model risk aversion using CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility functions
6The assumption of a monopolist cyber insurer is in fact indispensable for this analysis. This
is because, as mentioned in Section 1.3.2, the competition among multiple cyber insurers will
inevitably lead to contracts that incentivize sub-optimal investments by the users.
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[84], defined as follows:
U(c) =
{
1
1−θc
1−θ, for θ > 0, θ 6= 1 ,
ln c, for θ = 1 .
Note also that a CRRA utility with θ = 0 represents risk-neutral users.
Assume users have the option of purchasing insurance contracts, specifying a
premium ρi and an indemnification payment (coverage) level Ii. When insurance is
purchased, the utility of user i will be given by
vi(x, ρi, Ii) =fi(x)Ui(Wi − ρi − Li + Ii) + (1− fi(x))Ui(Wi − ρi)− hi(xi) .
We now show the following negative result. Similar to Proposition 2.1, the proof
is through a counter-example.
Proposition 2.2. There exists no set of insurance contracts which can implement
the socially optimal solution, while guaranteeing weak budget balance (no loss for the
insurer) and voluntary participation (voluntary purchase of insurance contracts by
users) simultaneously, in all instances of security games with risk-averse users with
CRRA utilities.
Proof. Similar to Section 2.3, we consider the (approximations) of weakest link risk
functions fi(x) = (
∑N
j=1 exp(−γxj))1/γ, and set Wi = W , Li = L, hi(xi) = cxi, ∀i.
In this game, the socially optimal investment profile x∗ is determined using (2.2),
leading to
N exp(−γx∗i )(
N∑
j=1
exp(−γx∗j))
1
γ
−1 = c
U(W )−U(W−L) .
By symmetry, all users will be exerting the same socially optimal level of effort
x∗i = ln
N1/γ(U(W )− U(W − L))
c
,∀i .
The utility of users under this outcome, while also purchasing the optimal insurance
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contract, is given by
ui(x
∗) = −c
U(W )−U(W−L)(U(W − ρ)− U(W − L− ρ+ I))
+ U(W − ρ)− c ln N
1/γ(U(W )− U(W − L))
c
.
The exit equilibrium profile xˆi can be determined using the first order conditions
on (2.4), leading to
(N − 1) exp(−γxˆij)(
∑
k 6=i
exp(−γxˆik) + exp(−γxˆii))
1
γ
−1 = c
U(W )−U(W−L) ,
exp(−γxˆii)(
∑
k 6=i
exp(−γxˆik) + exp(−γxˆii))
1
γ
−1 = c
U(W )−U(W−L) .
Solving the above, we get
xˆii = ln
21/γ−1(U(W )− U(W − L))
c
,
xˆij = ln
(N − 1)1/γ21/γ−1(U(W )− U(W − L))
c
,∀j 6= i .
The utility of the outlier i under the exit equilibrium is given by
ui(xˆ
i) = −2c+ U(W )− c ln 2
1/γ−1(U(W )− U(W − L))
c
.
We now proceed to the analysis of insurance contracts. First note that the insurer
has the following total profit:
P ∗ :=
∑
k
ρk −
∑
k
Ikfk(x
∗) = Nρ−N c
U(W )−U(W−L)I ≥ 0 . (2.12)
where, ρk = ρ and Ik = I for all users due to symmetry.
The voluntary participation condition for a user i to purchase insurance is given
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by
−c
U(W )−U(W−L)(U(W − ρ)− U(W − L− ρ+ I)) + U(W − ρ)
− c ln N
1/γ(U(W )− U(W − L))
c
≥ −2c+ U(W )− c ln 2
1/γ−1(U(W )− U(W − L))
c
.
Define the following:
K1 :=
c
U(W )− U(W − L) , K2 := c(2 +
1
γ
ln
21−γ
N
) .
Then, the voluntary participation conditions can be re-written as
U(W )− U(W − ρ) ≤ K2 −K1(U(W − ρ)− U(W − L− ρ+ I)) . (2.13)
Can the insurer attain social optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget
balance in this game? Take equations (2.12) and (2.13) together. First, for all
inequalities (2.13), relax the requirement by assuming L = I, that is, users are
offered full coverage. Note that if this inequality fails for L = I, it will certainly fail
for any 0 ≤ I < L. Also, for the inequality in (2.12), assume I = 0. Again, if (2.12)
fails for I = 0, it will certainly fail for all 0 < I ≤ L. We show that the set of relaxed
inequalities are inconsistent, and consequently, by the above argument, the original
conditions in (2.12) and (2.13) can not be satisfied simultaneously either. We are
therefore looking to find the premiums ρ, such that
U(W )− U(W − ρ) ≤ K2 , ρ ≥ 0 .
Take any function in the CRRA family, U(c) = 1
1−θc
1−θ. The above conditions
simplify to
ρ ≤ W − (W 1−θ − (1− θ)c(2 + 1
γ
ln
21−γ
N
))
1
1−θ , ρ ≥ 0 .
Fix the approximation parameter of the weakest link risk function, γ > 0, and that
48
of the CRRA risk aversion function to a θ < 1. We observe that, if 2 + 1
γ
ln 2
1−γ
N
≤ 0,
then ρ < 0, and the second inequality (on the insurer’s profit) cannot be satisfied.
Therefore, if the number of users is such that N > e2γ21−γ, it is impossible to design
insurance contracts that guarantee social optimality, voluntary participation, and
weak budget balance.
We conclude that unless additional information on users’ preferences or the net-
work structure is available, it is in general not possible to design insurance contracts
that can result in a socially desirable state of security, are voluntarily purchased by
the users, and can generate revenue for the cyber insurer.
2.5.3 The role of a security software vendor
Given the potential budget deficit of the Pivotal mechanism when achieving social
optimality and voluntary participation in some instances of security games, in this
section, we consider the availability of additional external resources/payments to the
designer of the Pivotal mechanism. In particular, we consider a security product
vendor entering the game as the mechanism designer. The idea of bundling security
product vendors and mechanism designers (more specifically, cyber insurers) has
been studied in [72, 99]. The authors in [72] propose the idea of a provider investing
in increasing the security of widely used software products, leading to a decrease in
monoculture risks. The focus of [99] on the other hand is on the security product
pricing problem as a method for generating additional revenue for the cyber insurer.
Similarly, we consider the effects of such bundling on the performance of the Pivotal
mechanism.
Specifically, we allow the vendor to leverage the profit from the additional sales in
cyber security products resulting from the requirements of improved security imposed
on users, to cover the deficit and generate additional profit. Through an illustrative
example, we show that this modification can lead to an expansion of the space of
positive instances, but nevertheless, that this profit is not necessarily enough to cover
the budget deficit in all instances of the game.
Formally, consider the total effort security game with exponential risks and linear
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investment costs, with uniform W and L = 1. The utility functions of users in this
game are given by
ui(x) = W − exp(−
∑
j
xj) + cixi .
Users are indexed such that c1 < c2 < . . . < cN . Also, assume c1 <
c2
N−1 . The socially
optimal solution and exit equilibria are given by
SO: x∗1 = ln
N
c1
, x∗j = 0, ∀j 6= 1 ,
EE, j 6= 1: xˆj1 = ln
N − 1
c1
, xˆjk = 0,∀k 6= 1 ,
EE, j = 1: xˆ11 = ln
1
c1
, xˆ1k = 0, ∀k 6= 1 .
We consider the Pivotal mechanism, as the taxes in it guarantee voluntary partic-
ipation, and we can thus focus on budget balance issues. These taxes are given
by
tPj = c1(−
1
N
+ ln
N
N − 1),∀j 6= 1 ,
tP1 = −c1
(N − 1)2
N
.
The sum of all taxes will be given by
T P :=
∑
i
tPi = c1(N − 1)(−1 + ln
N
N − 1) .
The above is negative for all N, indicating a budget deficit for any number of users
in the absence of external resources.
Alternatively, assume the Pivotal mechanism is implemented by a security prod-
uct vendor. For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of production of security
products is negligible for the vendor. Therefore, by the introduction of the Pivotal
mechanism, the vendor makes the following additional profit from the increased se-
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curity adoption (compared to the Nash equilibrium):
∆P :=
∑
i
cix
∗
i −
∑
i
cix˜i = c1 ln
N
c1
− c1 ln 1
c1
= c1 lnN .
Considering the vendor’s profit, the total budget following the introduction of the
Pivotal mechanism is given by
T P + ∆P = c1(N − 1)(−1 + ln N
N − 1) + c1 lnN .
The above is positive if and only if N = 2. We conclude that the space of positive
instances has expanded (albeit slightly) once the profit of additional product sales
enters the market. In other words, with 2 users, a security vendor can introduce
taxes that achieves the socially optimal levels of security, are voluntarily adopted by
the users, and generate positive revenue for the designer/vendor. The budget deficit
continues to hold for N ≥ 3.
2.6 Related Work
2.6.1 Existing possibility and impossibility results
The presented impossibility results are different from those in the existing liter-
ature, in either the selected equilibrium solution concept, the set of properties the
mechanism is required to satisfy, or the space of utility functions. For example, the
Myerson and Satterthwaite result [84] (stronger version of Hurwicz’s impossibility
on dominant strategy implementation) establishes impossibility of Bayesian Nash
implementation with optimality, individual rationality, and strong budget balance
when users have quasi-linear utilities; our result differs in (1) solution concept (we
are considering full Nash implementation), and (2) by only requiring a weaker con-
dition of weak budget balance (thus making it a stronger impossibility result in this
sense).
The most closely related impossibility result to our work is that of [112], which
also studies impossibility results in the provision of non-excludable public goods. Our
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adoption of the term voluntary participation as opposed to individual rationality is
similar to this work. However, our work differs from [112] in two main aspects.
First, in terms of users’ preferences, [112] studies Cobb-Douglas utilities, whereas
we consider quasi-linear utilities, as well as risk averse users with CRRA utilities.
More importantly, [112] considers the production of a single (non-excludable) good
with constant return to scale technology. As a result, although outliers benefit from
the spill-over of the produced good, they no longer contribute to its provision. This
is in contrast to the goods studied herein, e.g., the security of an outlier can still
affect those of the participants. The notion of exit equilibrium is introduced to fully
capture this distinction.
The current work should also be viewed in conjunction with existing possibility
results, notably [25, 56, 103, 115], which consider the provision of excludable public
goods (i.e., zero outside options) for users with the same utility functions and under
the same informational constraints as the current work. As a result, they show that
the Externality and Pivotal mechanisms simultaneously guarantee social optimality,
voluntary participation, and weak budget balance. Therefore, the goal of this chapter
is not solely to prove the impossibility of the design, but to highlight the important
distinction users’ outside options make in the choice of a mechanism.
2.6.2 Incentivizing improved cyber security
Similar to the work in this chapter, existing literature has proposed the introduc-
tion of monetary taxes/rewards or transfers for incentivizing better security behavior.
One such theoretically attractive incentive mechanism that may result in optimal lev-
els of investment is the liability rule [70, 122], where users are required to compensate
others for the damages caused by their under-investment in security. However, these
mechanisms are costly in practice, as it is difficult to accurately determine the cause
of a damage. Alternatively, [122] proposes assigning a level of due care, in which
following a security incident, a user is penalized only if her level of investment is
lower than a pre-specified threshold. In [55], users can be incentivized to improve
their investment in security if they are assigned bonuses/penalties based on their
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security outcome (e.g., users get a reward if their security has not been breached),
or get subsidized/fined based on their effort (e.g., users are given discounts if they
buy security products). The current work differs in that it explicitly models budget
balance and participation incentives in these mechanisms.
Our findings in Section 2.5.2 are most related to the study of cyber insurance con-
tracts. Cyber insurance has been widely proposed as both a method for mitigating
cyber risks, and as an incentive mechanism for internalizing the externalities of se-
curity investments; see e.g., [53, 57, 76, 100, 75, 12]. In particular, [57, 76, 100] have
shown that by engaging in premium discrimination, a monopolistic profit-neutral
cyber insurer can induce socially optimal security investments in an interdependent
systems where security decisions are binary (i.e., invest or not). However, participa-
tion in these studies is assumed to be mandatory, e.g., users are enforced through
policy mandates to purchase insurance. Our findings show that this assumption
is indispensable; it is not in general possible to design non-compulsory insurance
contracts that induce socially optimal behavior and generate profits for the cyber
insurer.
The work in this chapter is also related to [64, 85]. The weighted effort risk model
studied in Section 2.4.2 is a generalization of the total effort model in [122], and is
similar to the effective investment model in [64] and the linear influence network
game in [85]. The authors in [85] identify properties of the interdependence matrix
affecting the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the linear influence
model. Using a similar effective investment model, [64] determines a bound on the
price of anarchy gap, i.e., the gap between the socially optimal and Nash equilibrium
investments, depending on the adjacency matrix. Our work on the above model fills
a gap within this literature as well, by (1) introducing the study of exit equilibria,
and (2) analyzing the general mechanism design problem, in both this model, as well
as more general environments.
Finally, the problem of incentivizing optimal security investments in an intercon-
nected system is one example of problems concerning the provision of non-excludable
public goods in social and economic networks. Other examples include creation of
new parks or libraries at neighborhood level in cities [7], reducing pollution by neigh-
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boring towns [38], or spread of innovation and research in industry [16]. Section 3.1.3
reviews additional related work in this area.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the notion of exit equilibrium to study voluntary par-
ticipation of users in mechanisms for provision of non-excludable public goods, such
as security. This equilibrium concept accounts for both the spill-over of the public
good produced by the participants on an outlier, as well as the continued influence of
the outlier on the provision of the public good (here, the state of security). We have
shown the fundamental result that, given these outside options, it is not possible
to design a tax-based incentive mechanism to implement the socially optimal solu-
tion while guaranteeing voluntary participation and maintaining a weakly balanced
budget, without additional information on the graph structure and users’ prefer-
ences. We showed that despite the lack of a reliable mechanism for general problem
instances, we can identify positive instances under restricted parameter conditions,
for which it is possible to guarantee social optimality, weak budget balance, and
voluntary participation using well-known incentive mechanisms. Alternatively, for
instances in which the three properties are not attainable, we may be able to iden-
tify stable coalitions of participating users, by using an extended definition of exit
equilibrium which accounts for possibly multiple outliers. We extended our result
to risk-averse users purchasing cyber insurance contracts, highlighting the possible
limitations of using cyber insurance as a tool for improving the state of cyber security
to its socially desirable level.
An important implication of our result is that, when a designer lacks additional in-
formation about the specifics of the problem environment and users’ preferences, she
may choose to forgo the social optimality requirement, instead focusing on reliably
attaining a sub-optimal solution while guaranteeing full voluntary participation and
weak budget balance. Characterizing mechanisms that can lead to such sub-optimal
solutions remains an interesting direction of future work.
54
Chapter 3
Public Good Provision Games on Networks
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation: Beyond security games
In this chapter, we study the class of public good provision games on networks;
i.e., the strategic interactions in a given network of agents who exert effort towards
the provision of a public good. In these settings, the effort exerted by an agent
affects not only herself, but also other agents interacting with her. The model in
this chapter includes the weighted effort games studied in Section 2.4.2 as a special
case. The setting applies to many social and economic applications. We present
some examples.
First, consider the spread of information and innovation in networks. New tech-
nologies developed by one entity/agent in the network may later be adopted by other
agents in the network. The interactions determining these innovation spillovers can
in general depend on factors such as geographic location [5] and the interacting
agents’ access to resources [43]. Given this network, the possibility of spillovers can
affect the decision of agents for investing in innovation or experimenting with new
methods, leading to possible free-riding behavior. Specifically, a neighbor’s effort can
be either a substitute or a complement to an agent’s own effort. Strategic substitutes
(complements) are defined by the property that an increase of effort by an agent
decreases (increases) her neighbors’ marginal utilities, leading them to decrease (in-
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crease) their effort levels in response. For instance, if farmers in a village have the
option of experimenting with a new variety of seeds, then those whose neighbors are
experimenting are less likely to do so themselves [43]. In this example, neighbors’
efforts are a substitute to an agent’s own effort. It may also be the case that an agent
needs to increase her levels of experimentation in response to that of her neighbors,
in order to remain competitive in her industry. In that case, the neighbors’ efforts
are a complement to the agent’s own effort.
Another setting of interest is investments in security by interdependent entities.
Security has been commonly viewed as a public good; examples include the model of
airline security in [70], as well as the studies of cyber-security in [122, 64, 85, 54, 93].
Investment in security by a neighbor can act as either a substitute or a complement
to an agent’s own effort. For example, in weakest target games [54], neighbors’ efforts
are complementary since the agent with the lowest security will be selected as the
target by an attacker. For total effort games [122, 54], on the other hand, neighbors’
efforts act as substitutes, as an agent’s overall security is assumed to be determined
by the sum of her own investment and her neighbors’ efforts.
In addition to the above applications, creation of new community parks or li-
braries in cities [7], investment in pollution reduction measures by neighboring towns
[39], and even the states of happiness of individuals on a social network [44], can be
studied using this framework.
3.1.2 Chapter overview
The public good provision game studied in this chapter belongs to the growing lit-
erature on games on networks; see [62, 17] for recent surveys. Specifically, we consider
games in which, given the network structure, an agent’s payoff depends on her own
effort, as well as a weighted sum of her neighbor’s efforts. Our model allows for both
complements and substitutes, different strengths of interactions (weighted graphs),
and unidirectional interactions (directed graphs). We are interested in the study of
Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (we
define these as the effort profiles emerging when coalitions of agents interact with one
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another). Our results provide an understanding of how the aforementioned outcomes
(i.e., the results of agents’ strategic interactions) are affected by the properties of the
network.
Our first result identifies necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of the
network (in terms of the dependence matrix) that guarantee that a Nash equilibrium
exists and is unique. We will show that previous results on the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium [92, 85, 7, 18] can be recovered as corollaries of our first theorem.
In addition to studying uniqueness, we identify (weaker) necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in two classes of games at the extremes
of our model, namely games with strategic complements and games with strategic
substitutes. The identified conditions (for both existence and uniqueness) are solely
based on the structure of the network.
We then establish a connection between the agents’ centrality in their depen-
dence network, and the effort they exert at interior Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient
outcomes, and semi-cooperative equilibria. We separate the effects of dependencies
(outgoing edges of the interaction network) and influences (incoming edges of the in-
teraction network) on agents’ effort decisions. We further discuss how the formation
of coalitions is reflected in the centrality-effort characterization. We then uncover
an alternating effect along walks of different length in the network. We show that
in a network with strategic substitutes, this alternating effect implies that changes
along each walk of odd (even) length will negatively (positively) affect the agent’s
final decision. We provide additional intuition and examples for general networks in
Section 3.4.3.
3.1.3 Related work
Public good provision games, and network games in general, have recently re-
ceived increasing attention. We refer the interested reader to [62, 17] for surveys on
this general area. Here, we present the work most related to the current chapter.
Most of the existing work has studied the Nash equilibrium of network games.
Previous work on identifying conditions for existence and uniqueness of Nash equi-
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libria in public good provision games include [92, 85, 7, 18]. Both [85, 92] identify
a similar sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in public
good provision games. The authors of [18] present a different sufficient condition
for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Their result illustrates the role of the
lowest eigenvalue of the network in determining the outcome of strategic interac-
tions. Finally, [7] provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium in a class of games with hidden complementarities. In addition
to identifying the necessary condition for uniqueness of Nash equilibria in general
networks, we show that the sufficiency results of [92, 85, 7, 18] can be recovered as
corollaries of our main theorem. This comparison will further illustrate the key role
of the lowest eigenvalue in (asymmetric) games with complementarities (in addition
to the symmetric networks and particular classes of asymmetric networks studied in
[18]).
Our work is also closely related to [39, 8], which provide graph-theoretical inter-
pretations of agents’ efforts in terms of their centralities in a suitably defined network.
The work of Elliott and Golub in [39] focuses mainly on the implementation of Pareto
efficient outcomes. The current work and [39] differ in the network used as the basis
of analysis: rather than working directly on the dependence matrix, [39] focuses on
a benefits matrix that is derived from the network graph; an entry Bij of the matrix
is the marginal rate at which i’s effort can be substituted by the externality of j’s
action. The authors show that Lindahl outcomes can be interpreted as node central-
ities in this benefits matrix. Ballester et al. [8], on the other hand, study the Nash
equilibrium of a linear quadratic interdependence model, and relate the equilibrium
effort levels to the nodes’ Bonacich centralities in a suitably defined matrix of local
complementarities. Despite the difference in the base models, both games have the
same linear best-reply functions. As a result, the characterization of Nash equilib-
ria based on Bonacich centralities (used in [8]) and alpha-centralities (used in this
chapter) are equivalent (see footnote 6). We will see that using (the more general
measure of) alpha-centrality allows us to provide graph-theoretical interpretations of
Pareto efficient efforts and semi-cooperative equilibria as well.
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3.1.4 Chapter contributions
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• This chapter identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness
of Nash equilibria in public good provision games. We show that our result
unifies, and strengthens, previous results in the literature.
• It further identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
Nash equilibria in two subclasses of our model, namely games with strategic
substitutes and games with strategic complements.
• It presents a graph theoretical characterization of agents’ actions at different
effort profiles, namely the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient outcomes, and semi-
cooperative equilibria (in terms of node centralities). Our characterization
separates the effects of agents’ dependencies and influences. It also uncovers
an alternating effect over walks of different length.
3.1.5 Chapter organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We present the model for
public good provision games in Section 3.2, followed by conditions for the existence
and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the graph
theoretical characterization of different effort outcomes. In Section 3.5, we generalize
the graph-theoretical characterization to games in which agents belong to different
coalitions. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Model and preliminaries
3.2.1 Public good provision games
We study the strategic interactions of N agents constituting the vertices of a
directed network G = (N , E); where N and E denote the set of agents and links,
respectively. Each agent i ∈ N chooses to exert effort xi ∈ R≥0 towards the provision
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of a public good.1 Agent i’s payoff depends on her own effort, as well as the effort
exerted by other agents in her local neighborhood Ni := {j|{i → j} ∈ E}. An edge
{i → j} indicates that agent i depends on agent j. The strength and type of this
dependence are determined by the weight gij ∈ R of the edge {i→ j}. In particular,
gij > 0 (< 0) indicates that j’s effort is a substitute (complement) to i’s effort. Let
G = (gij) denote the dependence matrix of the graph.
Let x = {x1, x2, . . . , xN} denote the profile of efforts exerted by all agents. The
utility of agent i at this effort profile is given by
ui(x; G) = bi(xi +
∑
j∈Ni
gijxj)− cixi . (3.1)
Here, ci > 0 is the marginal cost of effort for agent i, and bi(·) is a twice-differentiable,
strictly increasing, and strictly concave function, determining the benefit to agent i
from the aggregate effort she experiences.
This model has been used to study the local provision of public goods in [92, 18,
16]. In the context of security (when viewed as a public good), it is a generalization
of the total effort model used in the seminal work of Varian [122], and is similar to
the effective investment model of [64] and the linear influence network game of [85].
3.2.2 Characterizing effort outcomes
We now consider the problem of finding the efforts at two outcomes of public
good provision games: the Nash equilibria and Pareto efficient effort profiles. A
Nash equilibrium is an effort profile at which no agent has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from her strategy given other agents’ efforts. This is an effort profile that
emerges at the status quo as a result of strategic agents’ interactions. A Pareto
efficient outcome is an effort profile at which it is not possible to increase any agent’s
1In this thesis, we follow the definition of Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green [84], and define
public goods as those that are non-rivalrous, i.e., goods for which consumption by an agent does
not reduce its availability to others. As a result, in the public good provision games of this chapter,
we allow for both complements and substitutes, as well as both excludable and non-excludable
public goods. We only explicitly make the distinction based on excludability in Section 3.5, when
studying effort profiles that emerge under coalitions.
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utility without making at least one other agent worse off as a result. It is therefore an
indication of the profile’s efficiency relative to other possible outcomes. These profiles
can be attained through negotiation among agents, or following the introduction of
appropriate incentives such as monetary taxes/rewards.
Nash equilibria
We start with the Nash equilibria of public good provision games.2 A Nash
equilibrium is a fixed point of the best-reply map. Formally, let fi(x−i; G) be the
best reply of agent i; this is the effort that maximizes i’s payoff given other agents’
profile of efforts x−i and the dependence matrix G. For agents with utility (3.1),
this best reply is given by
fi(x−i; G) = max{0, q¯i −
∑
j∈Ni
gijxj} , (3.2)
where q¯i is the effort level at which b
′
i(q¯i) = ci. In other words, q¯i is the aggregate
effort at which i’s marginal utility equals her marginal cost.3
For each effort level xi, define a corresponding complementary variable wi. Then,
finding a fixed point of the mapping (3.2) is equivalent to finding a solution to the
2We consider pure Nash equilibria of the game. Given the strict concavity of the payoffs in (3.1),
playing the average of a set of effort levels leads to a higher payoff than a mixed strategy over that
set. As a result, there is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for our games.
3It is worth mentioning that the best-response mapping of games with linear quadratic payoffs
is also of the form (3.2). Formally, in a game with linear quadratic payoffs, the utility of agent i is
given by [8]
ui(x; G) = q¯ixi − 1
2
x2i −
∑
j 6=i
gijxixj ,
where q¯i is a given constant. The delinquency games of [9] and Cournot competitions with hetero-
geneous goods and network collaboration (in which gij determines the degree of substitutability of
i’s good with j’s output) are special cases of games with linear-quadratic payoffs; see [18, 7] for
examples. All our results regarding Nash equilibria apply to these (as well as other games with
linear best-replies of the form (3.2)) as well.
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following problem:
w − (I + G)x = −q¯ ,
w  0 , x  0 ,
wTx = 0 . (3.3)
Here, q¯ := {q¯1, . . . , q¯N}, and I is the N × N identity matrix. The optimization
problem in (3.3) is an instance of linear complementarity problems (LCPs).
The Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) refers to a family of problems which
arise in solving linear programming and quadratic programming problems, as well
as in finding Nash equilibria of bimatrix (two-player non-zero sum) games [30]. For
example, the necessary first order optimality (KKT) conditions of a quadratic pro-
gramming problem constitute an LCP. In addition to these direct connections, LCPs
have found applications in the study of market equilibrium, computing Brouwer and
Kakutani fixed points, and developing efficient algorithms for solving nonlinear pro-
gramming problems [87].
Formally, an LCP (M,q) is the problem of finding vectors x ∈ Rn and w ∈ Rn
satisfying
w −Mx = q ,
w  0 , x  0 ,
wTx = 0 . (3.4)
An LCP is therefore fully determined by an n× n square matrix M and a constant
right-hand vector q ∈ Rn.
Comparing (3.4) with (3.3), we observe that finding the Nash equilibria for the
public good provision game is equivalent to solving the LCPs ((I + G),−q¯). In
Section 3.3, we will identify conditions on the dependence matrix G such that solu-
tions to (3.3) exist and are unique, for all right-hand vectors q. In other words, we
are interested in the structural properties of the interaction network that guarantee
the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, for any payoffs of the form (3.1),
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irrespective of the realization of benefit functions or marginal costs of effort.
Remark (on the sign of q): We note that the right-hand vector entries qi in (3.4)
can be either positive, negative, or zero. In particular, for q  0 in (3.4), the LCP
always has the solution w = q and x = 0. In the case of Nash equilibria with LCP
(I + G,−q¯), q¯ ≺ 0 implies that the zero effort profile x = 0 is always a possible Nash
equilibrium. This observation can be intuitively explained as follows. Recall that qi
indicates the effort level at which agent i’s marginal utility equals her marginal cost.
A negative qi therefore indicates that exerting effort is not cost-efficient for agent i.
Hence, a zero effort equilibrium is indeed to be expected.
Pareto efficient effort profiles
We also consider Pareto efficient effort profiles of the public good provision game.
Formally, we consider the solutions to the following problem:
max
x0
∑
i
λiui(x) ,
where λ := {λ1, · · · , λN} is a vector of non-negative weights. By [84, Proposition
16.E.2], for the strictly concave utility functions ui(·) given by (3.1), the set of so-
lutions to this linear welfare maximization problem, as λ ranges over the set of all
strictly positive weight vectors, leads to the Pareto optimal effort profiles. It is worth
noting that solving for the Pareto efficient profile with unit vector of weights λ = 1
in (3.5) will lead to the socially optimal profile of efforts x∗ = arg maxx0
∑
i ui(x).
We now proceed to characterizing these profiles. Consider the Pareto efficient
effort profile xλ corresponding to the strictly positive weight vector λ. That is,
xλ = arg max
x0
∑
k
λkuk(x) . (3.5)
The first order condition on (3.5) with respect to xi implies that at the Pareto efficient
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solution, the following should hold:
b′i(x
λ
i +
∑
j∈Ni
gijx
λ
j ) +
∑
k, s.t. i∈Nk
λk
λi
gkib
′
k(x
λ
k +
∑
j∈Nk
gkjx
λ
j ) = ci − zi, ∀i . (3.6)
Here, zi is a complementary variable corresponding to the effort level x
λ
i .
Consider an interior Pareto efficient outcome in which all agents exert non-zero
effort, i.e., z = 0. We will study graph-theoretical characterizations of these out-
comes, as well as interior Nash equilibria, in Section 3.4. Define qλ as the effort
levels satisfying:
b′i(q
λ
i ) +
∑
k, s.t. i∈Nk
λk
λi
gkib
′
k(q
λ
k ) = ci ,∀i. (3.7)
Intuitively, qλ is the vector of efforts at which the marginal social benefits equal the
marginal (social) costs of effort. When I + G is invertible, we can find the following
alternative expression for qλi by solving the system of equations in (3.7):
b′i(q
λ
i ) =
(
(I + Λ−1GTΛ)−1c
)
i
.
Here, qλi can be interpreted as the aggregate effort level at which agent i’s marginal
benefit equals her modified marginal cost. The modification depends on the graph
structure, as well as the weights λ. We will elaborate further in Section 3.4.3.
Finding such interior Pareto efficient effort profile xλ is equivalent to finding a
solution with w = 0 to the following problem:
w − (I + G)x = −qλ ,
w  0 , x  0 ,
wTx = 0 . (3.8)
In other words, finding interior Pareto efficient outcomes is equivalent to finding
solutions to the LCP ((I + G),−qλ) with w = 0. We study conditions under which
such solutions exist in Section 3.4.1.
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3.3 Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria
In this section, we study conditions under which Nash equilibria for public good
provision games exist, and in particular, conditions under which these profiles are
unique. We contrast our result with those in the existing literature, and show how ex-
isting conditions on the uniqueness of Nash equilibria can be recovered as corollaries
of our main theorem.
3.3.1 Existence and uniqueness
Using the LCP formulations of the problems for finding the Nash equilibria in
(3.3), we identify conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the corresponding
effort profile. We begin with the following definition.
Definition 3.1. A square matrix M is a P-matrix if the determinants of all its
principal minors (i.e., the square submatrix obtained from M by removing a set of
rows and their corresponding columns) are strictly positive.
The following theorem provides the necessary and sufficient condition under which
the Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.
Theorem 3.1 (Uniqueness). The public good provision game has a unique Nash
equilibrium if and only if I + G is a P-matrix.
The proof follows from results on the uniqueness of solutions of LCPs; see e.g.,
[86, Theorem 4.2]. We illustrate Theorem 3.1 through an example.
Example 3.1. Consider a network of two nodes. We study the Nash equilibria of a
public good provision game with payoffs:
ui(x; G) = 1− exp(−xi − gijxj)− 1
e
xi, for i ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i .
Note that I + G is a P-matrix if and only if g12g21 < 1.
(i) First, let g12 = g21 =
1
2
. Then, by Theorem 3.1, this game should have a
unique Nash equilibrium. Indeed, this unique equilibrium is given by x1 = x2 =
2
3
.
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(ii) Next, consider g12 = g21 = 2. Then I + G is not a P-matrix, and the game
need not have a unique Nash equilibrium. For the given payoffs, there are three
possible Nash equilibria: (x1, x2) = (0, 1), (x1, x2) = (1, 0), and (x1, x2) = (
1
3
, 1
3
).
(iii) Finally, let g12 = g21 = −2. Again, I + G is not a P-matrix, and hence by
Theorem 3.1, the corresponding game need not have a unique equilibrium. In fact,
under the assumed payoff functions, the game will have no Nash equilibrium.
We now turn to the more general question of existence of Nash equilibria. We are
interested in weaker conditions than those of Theorem 3.1 that guarantee at least
one Nash equilibrium exists. Unlike uniqueness, there is no simple characterization
of matrices M for which an LCP (M,q) has a solution. Nevertheless, we can identify
existence results on two particular subclasses of games, namely games of strategic
substitutes and games of strategic complements. Recall that for a game of strategic
substitutes (complements), gij ≥ 0 (gij ≤ 0),∀i, j 6= i.
Theorem 3.2 (Existence in games with strategic substitutes). A public good provi-
sion game with strategic substitutes always has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By [86, Theorem 5.2], for a given non-negative matrix M, the corresponding
LCP (M,q) has a solution for all q if and only ifmii > 0. For a game with substitutes,
I + G is a non-negative matrix, and the diagonal entries are all 1. Therefore, for
LCP (3.3), a solution (Nash equilibrium) always exists.
We next consider the existence of Nash equilibria in games where agents’ efforts
are complements to their neighbors’. Let ρ(G) := max{|λ| s.t. Gv = λv} denote
the spectral radius of G. Also, define the following classes of matrices.
Definition 3.2 (Z-matrix, L-matrix, S-matrix).
• A square matrix M is a Z-matrix if mij ≤ 0, ∀i, j 6= i.
• A square matrix M is an L-matrix if it is Z-matrix and mii > 0,∀i.
• A matrix M is an S-matrix if there exists x  0 such that Mx  0.
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Theorem 3.3 (Existence in games with strategic complements). For a public good
provision game with strategic complements, if a Nash equilibrium exists for all q¯,
i.e., for all payoff realizations, then it is unique. Specifically, the game has a Nash
equilibrium if and only if ρ(G) < 1.
Proof. First, note that for this game, I + G is an L-matrix. For an LCP (M,q), if
M is an L-matrix, the LCP has at least one solution for all q if and only if M is
an S-matrix; see [87, p. 282]. Therefore, the LCP (3.3) has a solution if and only if
I + G is an S-matrix. A Z-matrix is an S-matrix if and only if it is a P-matrix [101].
Therefore, the condition for existence and uniqueness in games with complements
are the same. In other words, if a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, it is also
unique.
Also, for a Z-matrix G, I+G is an S-matrix if and only ρ(G) < 1 [11]. Therefore,
a solution exists and is unique if and only if ρ(G) < 1.4
It is worth noting the difference between Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 and a previous
result on the existence of Nash equilibria in concave n-person games. Rosen [111]
shows that for an n-person game, if agents’ payoffs are concave in their own effort,
and agents’ strategies are limited to a convex, closed, and bounded set, then the
corresponding n-person game always has a Nash equilibrium [111, Theorem 1]. The
latter assumption does not hold in the current model, as we allow an unbounded
effort space xi ∈ R≥0.
However, similar to [111], Theorem 3.2 concludes that for games of strategic
substitutes, a Nash equilibrium always exists. In this case, each agent’s strategy
space can be effectively bounded by qi, where b
′
i(qi) = ci, i.e., agent i may exert
effort lower than qi (due to positive externalities from her neighbors), but will never
exert an effort higher than qi, as her marginal cost to do so will be higher than her
marginal benefit. Thus in this case the existence result given by Theorem 3.2 is
equivalent to that given in [111], though arrived at using a different methodology.
4The statement of Theorem 3.3 is similar to Theorem 1 in [28], which also uses an LCP formu-
lation in the study of Nash equilibria on unweighted and undirected networks where agents have
linear quadratic payoffs. This can be explained by observing that both games have best replies of
the form (3.2), and hence have similar conclusions; cf. footnote 3.
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For games of strategic complements on the other hand, a similar upper bound on
agents’ strategies does not exist. Specifically, when an agent i’s neighbors increase
their efforts, she will experience a negative externality, and will therefore increase
her own level of effort to compensate for the lost benefit. As a result, agents’ efforts
can grow unbounded, and an equilibrium may not exist; the sufficient and necessary
condition given in Theorem 3.3 thus goes beyond that considered in [111]. If the
strategy spaces were bounded in this scenario, then agents would exert the upper
bound effort, leading to the existence result of [111].
3.3.2 Comparison with existing results
We now show how existing results in [18, 7, 92, 85] on the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium of public good provision games can be recovered as corollaries
of Theorem 3.1. These comparisons also illustrate that some well-known matrices,
namely, symmetric positive definite, strongly diagonally dominant, and (a subclass
of) Z-matrices, belong to the family of P-matrices.
We begin with the uniqueness result of [18] on networks of symmetric relations.
We note that [18] only states the sufficient condition; we also show the necessary
condition in the following corollary using Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1 (Uniqueness on symmetric networks [18]). Consider a network with
a symmetric dependence matrix G. Then, if and only if |λmin(G)| < 1, the Nash
equilibrium is unique.
Proof. By [86, Theorem 1.9] a square symmetric matrix is a P-matrix if and only if
it is positive definite. Therefore, by Theorem 3.1, the Nash equilibrium is unique if
and only if I + G is positive definite, which occurs if and only if |λmin(G)| < 1.
The results of [18] are the first to show the importance of the lowest eigenvalue in
determining outcomes of strategic interactions on networks, leading to several inter-
esting insights on equilibria stability and network structure; we refer the interested
reader to [18] for details.
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It is also worth noting that Theorem 3.1 generalizes [18] on both symmetric and
asymmetric matrices:
(i) Symmetric matrices: [18] uses the theory of potential games to show that a
positive definite I+G is a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Our result shows that this condition is necessary as well.
(ii) Asymmetric matrices: For directed, asymmetric graphs, the results of [18]
apply if |λmin(G+GT2 )| < 1; i.e., if I + G+G
T
2
is positive definite. This is equivalent
to I + G being positive definite [86, Result 1.9]. In contrast, we only require that
I + G be a P-matrix, providing a more general (weaker) sufficient condition (as well
as a necessary condition). This is because there exist (asymmetric) P-matrices that
are not positive definite [86, Theorem 1.10]. Hence, positive definite matrices are in
general a subset of P-matrices.
We next show that the uniquness result of [7] can also be recovered as a corollary
of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.2 (Uniqueness on networks with hidden complementarities [7]). Let T
be a Z-matrix such that T(I + G) is both a Z-matrix and an S-matrix. Then, the
Nash equilibrium is unique if and only if I + G is an S-matrix. In particular, if G
is a Z-matrix (i.e., a game with complementarities), the equilibrium is unique if and
only if ρ(G) < 1.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, we know that the Nash equilibrium is unique if and only if
I + G is a P-matrix. On the other hand, a matrix I + G satisfying the conditions
of the corollary is a hidden Z-matrix [101]. By [101, Theorem 1], a hidden Z-matrix
is a P-matrix if and only if it is an S-matrix. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is
unique if and only if I + G is an S-matrix. Finally, when G is a Z-matrix, I + G is
an S-matrix if and only ρ(G) < 1 [11].
We also prove an alternative expression for Corollary 3.2.
Corollary 3.3. If G is a Z-matrix, a unique Nash equilibrium exists if and only if
|λmin(G)| < 1.
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Proof. For a Z-matrix G, −G is a non-negative matrix. Then, by the Perron-
Frobenius theorem, −G has a positive eigenvalue equal to its spectral radius,
λmax(−G) = ρ(−G). Noting that ρ(−G) = ρ(G) and λmax(−G) = −λmin(G),
we conclude that for Z-matrices, ρ(G) < 1 if and only if |λmin(G)| < 1.
Comparing the above with Corollary 3.1, we conclude that the lowest eigenvalue
of the dependence matrix has the key role in determining sufficient (and necessary)
conditions for the uniqueness of Nash equilibria in (asymmetric) networks with com-
plementarities (in addition to the symmetric networks and some subclasses of directed
networks shown in [18]).
Finally, we show that the result of [92, 85] can also be recovered as a corollary of
Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.4 (Uniqueness on strictly diagonally dominant networks [92, 85]). If
I + G is strictly diagonally dominant, i.e.,
∑
i |gij| < 1,∀i, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that if I+G is strictly diagonally dominant,
then it is a P-matrix. This is because by the Gershgorin circle theorem, for a strictly
diagonally dominant matrix with positive diagonal elements, all real eigenvalues are
positive. Following a similar argument, all real eigenvalues of all sub-matrices of I+G
are also positive. Since the determinant of a matrix is the product of its eigenvalues,
and as for real matrices, the complex eigenvalues appear in pairs with their conjugate
eigenvalues, it follows that I+G, as well as all its square sub-matrices, have positive
determinants. Therefore, I + G is a P-matrix. The uniqueness then follows from
Theorem 3.1.
3.4 Efforts as node centralities
In this section, we focus on interior effort profiles of the public good provision
game; these are outcomes in which all agents exert strictly positive efforts. We
establish a connection between agents’ actions at different effort outcomes and their
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centralities in the dependence network. Using this connection, we can identify the
effects of dependencies (outgoing edges in G) and influences (incoming edges in G),
as well as walks of different length, on the efforts exerted by agents.
3.4.1 Existence and uniqueness of interior effort profiles
We first identify conditions under which a game with payoffs (3.1) has interior
Nash equilibria and Pareto efficient effort profiles. We begin with a definition.
Definition 3.3 (Positive cone). The positive cone (or positive linear span) of a set
of vectors v = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is given by pos(v) := {
∑
i αivi| αi ≥ 0,∀i}.
For a Nash equilibrium (or a Pareto efficient effort profile) to be interior, the
corresponding LCP (3.3) (or (3.8)) should have a solution with x  0,w = 0.5
Theorem 3.4 (Existence and uniqueness of interior effort profiles). The LCP (3.3)
(or (3.8)) leads to an interior Nash equilibrium (or Pareto efficient effort profile)
if and only if q¯ (or qλ) is in the positive cone generated by the columns of I + G.
Furthermore, the interior effort profile (when one exists) is unique if and only if
I + G is a P-matrix.
Proof. Solving the LCP (3.3) for interior solutions is equivalent to finding a solution
to:
(I + G)x = q¯, x  0 .
The theorem then follows from Definition 3.3. The same argument applies to finding
interior Pareto efficient profiles using (3.8). It is also worth mentioning that given
G, non-interior solutions will necessarily exist for some q ∈ Rn, as we need at least
n + 1 vectors to positively span Rn [31, Theorem 3.8]. In other words, as expected,
there is no network structure for which solutions are guaranteed to be interior.
Finally, when I + G is a P-matrix, the LCPs in (3.3) and (3.8) will have unique
solutions [86, Theorem 4.2]. Therefore, under this condition, when a solution with
x  0,w = 0 exists, it is also the unique solution.
5With a slight abuse of terminology, we consider solutions with xi = 0, wi = 0 to be interior as
well.
71
We now proceed to establishing a connection between interior effort profiles (when
they exist) and agents’ centralities in their interaction network, starting with an
overview of centrality measures.
3.4.2 Alpha-centrality: An overview
Centrality measures have been used extensively in the graph theory and network
analysis literatures as indicators of importance of nodes in their interaction network.
Some of these measures (e.g., degree centrality) take into account the number of
connections of a node in determining her centrality. In contrast, another class of
measures (e.g. eigenvector centrality) account for the importance of the connections
as well, such that a node’s centrality is (recursively) related to those of her neighbors.
Alpha-centrality, considered herein, belongs to the latter family. This measure was
introduced by Bonacich and Lloyd in [14], mainly as an extension of eigenvector
centrality that is applicable to networks of asymmetric relations.
Formally, denote the centrality of node i by xi. Let G be the adjacency matrix
of a network, where gij determines the dependence of node i on node j. Then, the
eigenvector centrality of nodes will be proportional to Gx. Alpha-centrality gener-
alizes this measure by allowing the nodes to additionally experience an exogenous
source of centrality e, such that,
x = αGx + e .
Here, α is a constant that determines a tradeoff between the endogenous (eigenvector)
and exogenous centrality factors. The nodes’ alpha-centralities are therefore given
by
calpha(G, α, e) = (I− αG)−1e . (3.9)
On the interpretation of α: As mentioned above, α determines the tradeoff
between the endogenous and exogenous sources of centrality. We will now illustrate
that powers of α also appear as weights of walks of different length in determining
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nodes’ centralities.
We do so by noting the connection between alpha-centrality and the measure
proposed by Katz [68]. Katz centrality defines a weighted sum of powers of the
adjacency matrix G as an indicator of nodes’ importance; intuitively, longer paths
are weighed differently (and often less favorably) in determining nodes’ centralities.
Formally, Katz’ measure is given by
ckatz(G, α) = (
∞∑
i=1
αiGi)1 ,
where α is an attenuation factor. In particular, if α < 1|λmax(G)| , the infinite sum
converges, so that,
(
∞∑
i=1
αiGi)e = (−I + (I − αG)−1)e . (3.10)
Comparing (3.9) and (3.10), we conclude that the parameter α of alpha-centrality
can be similarly interpreted as a weight assigned to the walks of different length in
determining the effect of endogenous centralities on the overall centrality of a node.
6
6Alpha centrality is also similar to the measure introduced earlier by Bonacich in his seminal
work [13]. Formally, Bonacich’s centrality is defined as cbonacich(R, β, α) = β(I−αR)−1R1. Here, R
is a symmetric matrix of relationships, with main diagonal elements equal to zero. The parameter β
only affects the length of the final measures, and has no network interpretation. The parameter α on
the other hand can be positive or negative, and determines the extent and direction of influences.
On symmetric matrices, Katz’ measure is essentially equivalent to Bonacich centrality; in fact,
ckatz(R,α) =
∑∞
i=1 α
iRi1 = αcbonacich(R,α, 1). To summarize, taking the three measures on a
symmetric matrix A, and setting e = 1 for the alpha-centralities, we have:
calpha(A,α,1) = 1 + αcbonacich(A,α, 1) = 1 + ckatz(A,α) .
Therefore, in essence, alpha-centrality generalizes Bonacich and Katz centralities, allowing for vec-
tors of exogenous status e. Using the above equivalence, we can show that our characterization
of Nash equilibrium based on alpha-centralities in Theorem 3.5, and the Nash-Bonacich linkage
established in [8] are equivalent (see also footnote 3).
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3.4.3 A centrality-effort connection
We now establish the connection between agents’ efforts at interior profiles, and
their alpha-centralities in the interaction network.
Theorem 3.5 (Centrality-effort connection). (i) Consider an interior Nash equilib-
rium x∗. Then,
x∗ = calpha (G,−1, q¯) ,
where q¯ is such that b′i(q¯i) = ci.
(ii) Consider an interior Pareto efficient effort profile xλ. Then,
xλ = calpha
(
G,−1,qλ) ,
where qλ is such that b′i(q
λ
i ) = calpha,i(Λ
−1GTΛ,−1, c).
Proof. (i) An interior Nash equilibrium is a solution to LCP (3.3) with w = 0, i.e.,
(I + G)x = q¯, x  0 .
Therefore, when such solution exists, x∗ = (I + G)−1q¯. Comparing this expression
with (3.9) establishes the connection.
(ii) An interior Pareto efficient profile with weights λ is a solution to LCP (3.8)
with w = 0, i.e.,
(I + G)x = qλ, x  0 .
Therefore, when such solution exists, xλ = (I + G)−1qλ. Also, by definition, we
know that qλ satisfies b′i(q
λ
i ) =
(
(I + Λ−1GTΛ)−1c
)
i
. Comparing these expressions
with (3.9) establishes the connection.
The connection established in Theorem 3.5 leads to several interesting insights.
Recall that an entry gij 6= 0 in G indicates that agent i’s payoff depends on agent
j’s action; we therefore refer to G as the dependence matrix. On the other hand, an
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entry gji 6= 0 in the GT indicates that agent j’s effort influences agent i’s payoff. We
will therefore refer to GT as the influence matrix.
Perceived costs at different effort profiles: comparing parts (i) and (ii) of
Theorem 3.5, we observe that the only difference when determining nodes’ efforts is
in the corresponding vectors of exogenous centralities. These vectors are determined
by efforts at which agents’ marginal benefits equal their (perceived) marginal costs.
At the Nash equilibrium, each agent acts independently and perceives only her own
cost of effort, leading to b′i(q¯i) = ci. On the other hand, for Pareto efficient solutions
to emerge, the cost perceptions are modified according to agents’ positions in the
network, as well as the importance placed on each agent’s welfare, as determined
by λi. Consequently, both G and λ play a role in determining agents’ perceived
marginal costs, leading to b′i(q
λ
i ) = calpha,i(Λ
−1GTΛ,−1, c).
Effects of dependencies: consider agents’ dependencies (outgoing edges in the
network). We observe that by the definition of alpha-centrality (3.9), the matrix
of dependencies G shapes the endogenous component of the centrality measure,
determining a node’s centrality as a function of her neighbors’ centrality. Similarly,
G in Theorem 3.5 indicates that the dependence of an agent on her neighbors (and
the efforts they have exerted) will shape her final effort. Note also that this is the case
for both Nash equilibria (part (i)) and Pareto efficient efforts (part (ii)): an agent
benefits of any neighbor’s effort regardless of the solution concept, or the mechanism
or negotiations through which the effort profile is implemented.
Effects of influences: we further observe the effects of agents’ influences (in-
coming edges in the network) on the outcomes of their strategic interactions. The
matrix of influences GT appears when determining the perceived costs of agents in
Pareto efficient solutions. Intuitively, an agent with higher influence on others (as
determined by her alpha-centrality in the network of influences) will have a lower per-
ceived marginal cost, hence a higher exogenous centrality (due to concavity of bi(·)),
which in turn increases a node’s alpha-centrality (i.e, her level of effort/contribution).
Note also that the matrix of influences GT does not appear in the characterization
of the Nash equilibria in Theorem 3.5. This is because at a Nash equilibrium, an
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agent only accounts for her own marginal costs when selecting an effort level.
Alternating effect – the role of α: most interestingly, we note that the
alpha parameter of all the alpha-centralities in Theorem 3.5 is α = −1. Recall
that, as shown in Section 3.4.2, αk is a weight associated with a walk of length
k in determining an agent’s centrality.7 Let i0, i1, . . . , ik be the agents along this
walk. Then, for walks of odd length, α = −1 induces a sign reversal on the weight
gi0i1gi1i2 . . . gik−1ik of the walk. For walks of even length on the other hand, α = −1
leaves the sign on the weight associated with the walk unchanged.
To better highlight the intuition behind this observation, consider a network of
substitutes, i.e., gij ≥ 0,∀i, j. Consider a walk of length one by choosing a neighbor
j of i. If agent j increases her effort, agent i benefits from the positive externality
of j’s increased effort, and can in turn reduce her effort. Thus, changes along this
walk of odd length negatively affect agent i’s effort decision; this is consistent with
(−1)1gij < 0. Now, consider a neighbor k of j. Therefore, there is a walk of length 2
from i to k. By the same argument as above, if k increases her effort, j will decrease
her effort in response. To compensate for the lost externality, agent i will now have
to increase her own effort. Thus, a change along this walk of even length positively
affects agent i’s effort decision, which is again consistent with (−1)2gijgjk > 0. The
same argument extends to walks of longer lengths.
Alternatively, consider a network of complementarities, i.e., gij ≤ 0,∀i, j 6= i.
Again, consider a walk of length one from i to j. If agent j increases her effort, agent
i’s benefit is reduced, and so she will increase her level of effort in response. Thus,
a change along this walk of odd length positively affects agent i’s effort decision,
which is consistent with (−1)1gij > 0. Now, consider a walk of length 2 from i to
k (j’s neighbor). By the same argument as above, if k increases her effort, j will
increase her effort in response, and so agent i will have to increase her effort as well.
Thus, the change along this walk of even length also positively affects agent i’s effort
decision; this is again consistent with (−1)2gijgjk > 0. The same argument extends
7Given α = −1, the condition α < 1|λmax(G)| holds for all adjacency matrices G. Therefore,
the alpha-centralities can be interpreted as the limit of a weighted sum of powers of the adjacency
matrix, and the interpretation of α as a weight on walks of different length in applicable.
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to walks of longer lengths.
3.4.4 Numerical examples
We illustrate the centrality-effort connection through some examples.
Example 3.2 (Alternating effect of α). Consider the three node network of Fig.
3.1, and a public good provision game of strategic substitutes (i.e., g12, g13, g21 > 0)
played on this network. Set g12 = g21 = 0.2. Let agents’ payoffs be given by
ui(x; G) = 1− exp(−xi −
∑
j 6=i
gijxj)− 1
e
xi .
Consider the edge between agents 1 and 3. Assume we increase the weight g13, and
want to know how this change affects the efforts of the agents at the Nash equilibrium.
The results are given in the bottom two networks of Fig. 3.1, and can be explained
as follows.
• Agent 1: the edge 1→ 3 is on all the outgoing walks of odd length from node
1. Increasing g13 increases the weights of these walks. However, given α = −1, each
walk weight is multiplied by (−1)2k+1 = −1 (this is the alternating effect induced by
α). Therefore, the increase in g13 should negatively affect agent 1’s effort decision,
leading her to decrease her effort levels in response.
• Agent 2: the edge 1 → 3 is on (some of) the outgoing walks of even length
from node 1. Increasing g13 increases the weights of these walks. Given α = −1,
each walk weight is multiplied by (−1)2k = 1. Therefore, the increase in g13 should
positively affect agent 2’s effort decision, leading her to increase her effort levels in
response.
• Agent 3: we are changing the weight of an incoming edge to agent 3. By
Theorem 3.5, only outgoing edges and walks affect the agent’s effort decisions at the
Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we expect agent 3’s effort to remain unchanged.
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g13
g21
0.62 0.871.00 g13
0.42 0.921.00
g′13
Figure 3.1: Alternating effect of α is illustrated by increasing g13 = 0.2 to g
′
13 = 0.4
(bottom left to bottom right) in this network (Example 3.2). Numbers
inside nodes at the bottom networks indicate efforts at the Nash equilib-
rium.
Example 3.3 (Effects of incoming edges and perceived costs). Consider the 4 agent
network of Fig. 3.2. Agents’ payoffs are given by
u1(x; G) = 1− exp(−x1 − go
∑
j 6=i
xj)− 1ex1 ,
uk(x; G) = 1− exp(−xk − gix1)− 1exk , k 6= 1 .
We consider the socially optimal effort profile in this network, i.e.,
x∗ := arg maxx≥0
∑
i ui(x). This corresponds to a Pareto efficient solution of (3.5)
with weights λ = 1. Thus, according to Theorem 3.5, the vector of perceived costs
of agents at this outcome is given by (I + GT )−1c.
Fix go = 0.2. To illustrate the effect of incoming edges on agents’ perceived costs,
and consequently their efforts, we increase gi from 0.2 to 0.3. The vector of per-
ceived costs of agents will change from [0.17, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33] to [0.04, 0.36, 0.36, 0.36].
Therefore, the perceived cost of agent 1 (the center) decreases considerably when her
influence on others increases, leading her to exert higher effort as a result. Further-
more, as the center invests more, the leaves now have an incentive to decrease their
investment (alternating effect of α). These effects combined lead the center (leaves)
to exert higher (lower) effort when the weight of incoming edges, gi, increases.
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go
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go
gi
gi
gi
1.28
0.83
0.830.83
gi
gi
gi 3.04
0.11
0.110.11
g′i
g′i
g′i
Figure 3.2: Effect of incoming edges on perceived costs is illustrated by changing gi =
0.2 to g′i = 0.3 (bottom left to bottom right) in this network (Example
3.3). Numbers inside nodes indicate efforts exerted at the socially optimal
outcome.
3.5 Extension to coalitions
In this section, we extend the results of Section 3.4 to effort profiles that emerge
when agents belong to different coalitions. For this analysis, we distinguish between
excludable and non-excludable public goods. With excludable goods, each coalition
may choose to exclude other coalitions from experiencing the externalities of its
produced good. If this is the case, each coalition can be studied in isolation, and
therefore the results of the previous sections will be directly applicable. For non-
excludable goods on the other hand, such separation is not possible; each coalition
needs to further account for the externalities from and on other coalitions. Through-
out this section, we are interested in the provision of such non-excludable goods. We
do not explicitly model coalition formation or stability; we assume each coalition
has emerged through either collaboration or appropriate incentive mechanisms. We
present a centrality-effort connection, and the corresponding intuition, for the effort
profiles emerging as the result of strategic interactions of such coalitions.
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3.5.1 Semi-cooperative equilibrium
Let agents form K coalitions, denoted by the collection of disjoint sets C :=
{C1, . . . , CK}, such that C1 ∪ . . . ∪ CK = N . We refer to C as the coalition partition.
Individual agents are allowed to form their own one-member coalition. The effort
profile emerging from the interactions of these coalitions is affected by both intragroup
and intergroup decisions.
Intragroup decisions refer to those adopted within each coalition. Specifically,
we assume that the members within a coalition Ci agree (either cooperatively or
through the implementation of an incentive mechanism) on a vector of welfare weights
λi := {λik, for k ∈ Ci}, and implement the corresponding Pareto efficient solution in
(3.5), i.e.,
x¯λ
i
Ci = arg maxxCi≥0
∑
k∈Ci
λikuk(xCi ,xN\Ci) , (3.11)
where xN\Ci denotes the efforts of agents outside the coalition. The profile x¯
λi
Ci is
therefore a Pareto efficient effort profile with weights λi for the agents in Ci.
At the intergroup level, each coalition is viewed as a super-agent, playing a non-
cooperative game with other coalitions/super-agents, and best-responding to their
decisions. The resulting equilibrium effort profile x¯λC :=
(
x¯λ
1
C1 , . . . , x¯
λK
CK
)
is the Nash
equilibrium among these super-agents, i.e., a solution to the system of equations
determined by (3.11). We refer to x¯λC as a semi-cooperative equilibrium for coalition
partition C with weights λ.8
Similar to the characterization of interior Pareto efficient outcomes in Section
3.2.2, the problem of characterizing interior semi-cooperative equilibria can be for-
mulated as an LCP. Assume agents are indexed in an order consistent with the
index of their coalition memberships. Also, to simplify notation, denote the semi-
cooperative equilibrium by x¯; dependence on the coalition partition C and the weights
8A semi-cooperative equilibrium is an “equilibrium” in the sense that, assuming binding coalition
memberships, the effort profile resulting from intergroup interactions is the fixed-point of a best-
response mapping. It has the limitation that it does not preclude the possibility of agents moving
to other coalitions if the memberships are not binding or appropriately incentivized.
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λ is implied. Then, the first order condition on (3.11) with respect to xi, i ∈ Ci,
implies that at the interior Pareto efficient solution, the following should hold:
λib
′
i(x¯i +
∑
j∈Ni
gijx¯j) +
∑
k∈Ci, s.t. i∈Nk
λkgkib
′
k(x¯k +
∑
j∈Nk
gkjx¯j) = λici, ∀i .
Define qC,λi as the effort levels at which
b′i(q
C,λ
i ) =
(
(I + Λ−1GTCΛ)
−1c
)
i
.
Note that the only difference of these efforts with the qλi defined for Pareto efficient
outcomes is in the coalition-modified dependence matrix GC, which is defined as
follows: for each row k corresponding to an agent in coalition Ci, set the entries
gkl,∀l /∈ Ci to zero. This matrix is therefore equivalent to the dependence matrix of
a network obtained by removing all edges between coalitions.
Then, finding an interior semi-cooperative equilibrium x¯ is equivalent to finding
a solution with w = 0 to the following LCP:
w − (I + G)x = −qC,λ ,
w  0 , x  0 ,
wTx = 0 . (3.12)
Using a similar procedure as Section 3.4.1, such profile exists under the following
condition.
Theorem 3.6 (Existence and uniqueness of interior semi-cooperative equilibria).
The public good provision game has an interior semi-cooperative equilibrium x¯λC if
and only if the corresponding qC,λ is in the positive cone generated by the columns
of I + G. Furthermore, the interior effort profile (when one exists) is unique if and
only if I + G is a P-matrix.
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3.5.2 A centrality-effort connection
We now present a centrality-effort characterization of interior semi-cooperative
equilibria.
Theorem 3.7 (Centrality-effort connection for semi-cooperative equilibria). Con-
sider an interior semi-cooperative equilibrium x¯λC . Then,
x¯λC = calpha
(
G,−1,qC,λ) ,
where qC,λ is such that b′i(q
C,λ
i ) = calpha,i(Λ
−1GTCΛ,−1, c).
Proof. An interior semi-cooperative equilibrium for coalition partition C and weights
λ is a solution to LCP (3.12) with w = 0, i.e.,
(I + G)x = qC,λ, x  0 .
Therefore, when such solution exists, x¯λC = (I + G)
−1qC,λ. Also, by definition, we
know that qC,λ satisfies b′i(q
C,λ
i ) =
(
(I + Λ−1GTCΛ)
−1c
)
i
. Comparing these expres-
sions with (3.9) establishes the connection.
The implications of the centrality-effort connection on effects of incoming and
outgoing edges and the alternating effect induced by α = −1 are applicable to the
characterization of Theorem 3.7 as well. The main difference resulting from the
formation of coalitions is the following.
The effect of coalitions – benefiting from dependencies and ignoring
influences: with non-excludable goods, an agent can benefit from the externalities
of the effort exerted by her neighbor, whether or not that neighbor is a member of
the agent’s coalition. Consequently, the alpha-centralities (i.e, efforts) of agents are
calculated on the full network of dependencies G.
However, recall that the perceived costs of each agent are affected by the influence
of the agent on those with whom she is cooperating to implement a Pareto efficient
effort profile. The agents in a coalition account for their influences on others in their
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group, but disregard their influence on all other agents. Therefore, agents’ perceived
costs calpha,i(Λ
−1GTCΛ,−1, c), while again evaluated on the network of influences (i.e.,
the transpose of the dependence matrix), are now evaluated on a coalition-modified
matrix of influences GTC . In other words, when determining their perceived costs,
agents act as if the dependence network is one in which all edges between coalitions
are removed.
3.6 Conclusion
We studied the provision of public goods on a network of strategic agents. We
identified a necessary and sufficient condition on the dependence matrix of the net-
work that guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in these games. Our
condition unifies (and strengthens) existing results in the literature. We also identi-
fied necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria in subclasses
of games that lie at the two extremes of our model, namely games of strategic com-
plements and games of strategic substitutes. An interesting direction of future work
is to identify similar conditions for a general model of games on networks, and in
particular, games with non-linear best replies.
We further presented a graph theoretical characterization of different interior
effort outcomes, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient outcomes, and semi-
cooperative equilibria, in terms of agents’ alpha-centralities in their dependence net-
work. Using this characterization, we were able to identify the effects of incoming
edges, outgoing edges, and coalitions, as well as an alternating effect over walks of
different length in the network. An interesting direction of future work is to use this
connection for conducting comparative statics (e.g., the effects of adding/removing
links), as well as for the design of targeted tax/subsidy policies that can incentivize
the improved provision of the public good.
83
Chapter 4
Inter-temporal Incentives in Security Information
Sharing Agreements
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we take a game-theoretic approach to understand firms’ behav-
ior and (dis)incentives in a particular class of security games, namely, security in-
formation sharing agreements. Improving the ability of analyzing cyber-incidents,
and ensuring that the results are shared among organizations and authorities in a
timely manner, has received increased attention in the recent years by governments
and policy makers. This is because the availability of information on previous cyber-
incidents can lead to better protection of the national infrastructure against potential
cyber-attacks, allow organizations to invest in the most effective preventive and pro-
tective measures, and protect consumer rights. However, there is a conflict between
individual and social goals in these agreements: despite the benefits of making such
information available, the associated disclosure costs (e.g., drop in market value and
loss of reputation) act as a disincentive for firms’ full disclosure.
To capture this conflict, we model security information sharing agreements as an
N -person prisoner’s dilemma (NPD) game. In an NPD, there will be no informa-
tion sharing at the state of equilibrium, as also predicted by similar game-theoretic
models that consider one-shot information sharing games (see Section 4.1.1). Ex-
isting research has further proposed audits and sanctions (e.g. by an authority or
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the government) or introducing additional economic incentives (e.g. taxes and re-
wards for members of information sharing agreements) as remedies for encouraging
information disclosure.
We take a different approach and account for the repeated nature of these agree-
ments to propose the design of inter-temporal incentives that lead sufficiently patient
firms to cooperate on information sharing. It is well-known in the economic litera-
ture that repetitions of an otherwise non-cooperative and inefficient game can lead
economically rational agents to coordinate on efficient equilibria [80]; conditions un-
der which such cooperation is possible are known as folk theorem. The possibility
of achieving efficient outcomes however depends on whether the monitoring of other
participants’ actions is perfect or imperfect, and private or public. In particular,
for information sharing games, each firm or an outside monitor can (at best) only
imperfectly assess the honesty and comprehensiveness of the shared information. Ac-
cordingly, we model these agreements as repeated games with imperfect monitoring,
and consider two possible monitoring structures for these games.
First, we analyze the role of a rating/assessment system in providing an imperfect
public signal about the quality of firms’ reports in the agreement. We show that for
the proposed NPDs equipped with a simple monitoring structure, the folk theorem of
[45] holds in the repeated game, therefore making it possible to design appropriate
inter-temporal incentives to support cooperation. We illustrate the construction
of these incentives through an example, and discuss the effects of the monitoring
accuracy on this construction.
We then consider the design of such incentives in the absence of a pubic monitor-
ing system. Specifically, we assume that the firms have access to a communication
platform, through which they are allowed to report their private beliefs on whether
other firms are adhering to the agreement. We show that given a simple imperfect
private monitoring structure by each firm, the folk theorem of [67] will be applica-
ble to our proposed NPDs, again enabling the design of appropriate incentives for
information sharing.
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4.1.1 Related work
A number of research papers have analyzed the welfare implications of informa-
tion sharing agreements, as well as firms’ incentives for adhering to these agreements.
The work by [98] and [73] consider the effects of security breach reporting between
firms and an authority. The authors of [98] show that if the availability of shared
information1 can reduce either attack probabilities or firms’ interdependency, it will
benefit social welfare by inducing firms to improve investments in self-protection
and cyber-insurance. On the other hand, [73] studies the effectiveness of mandatory
breach reporting, and shows that enforcing breach disclosure to an authority (through
the introduction of audits and sanctions) is effective in increasing social welfare
only under certain conditions, including high interdependence among firms and low
disclosure costs.
Game-theoretic models of information sharing among firms have been proposed
in [50] and [47]. Gordon et al. [50] show that, if security information from a partner
firm is a substitute to a firm’s own security expenditure, then (mandatory) infor-
mation sharing laws reduce expenditure in security measures, but can nevertheless
increase social welfare. However, firms will not voluntarily comply with sharing
agreements, requiring additional economic incentives to be in place, e.g., a charge on
a member of an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for the losses of
other members. Gal-Or and Ghose [47] on the other hand allow information shar-
ing to be a complement to the firm’s own security expenditure, as it may increase
consumer confidence in a firm that is believed to take steps towards securing her
system. Using this model, the authors show that when the positive demand effects
of information sharing are high enough, added expenditure and/or sharing by one
firm can incentivize the other firm to also increase her expenditure and/or sharing
levels.
In this chapter, similar to [50, 98, 73], we assume disclosure costs to be higher
than potential demand-side benefits, therefore similarly predicting a lack of voluntary
information sharing at equilibrium. Our proposed approach of considering the effects
1Firms’ incentives for information disclosure or the mechanisms for ensuring breach disclosure
have not been modeled in [98].
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of repeated interactions as an incentive solution is however different from those pro-
posed in the aforementioned literature, as they consider one-shot information sharing
games.
4.1.2 Chapter contributions
The contributions of this chapter are the following:
• This chapter proposes the design of inter-temporal incentives for supporting
cooperative behavior in security information sharing agreements. To this end,
we model firms’ interactions as an N -person prisoner’s dilemma game and equip
it with a simple monitoring structure.
• It illustrates the role of a public rating/assessment system in providing imper-
fect public monitoring, leading to coordination on cooperation in information
sharing agreements.
• It establishes the possibility of sustaining cooperative behavior in the absence
of a public monitor, by introducing a platform for communication among firms
through which they can exchange their beliefs on others’ adherence to the
agreement.
4.1.3 Chapter organization
Section 4.2 presents the model and proposed monitoring structure for information
sharing games. Section 4.3 discusses the role of a public monitoring system in the
design of inter-temporal incentives. In Section 4.4, we illustrate the design of such
incentives based on private observations and communication among firms. Section
4.5 concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Information sharing games
4.2.1 The stage game
Consider N (symmetric) firms participating in an information sharing agreement
(e.g. firms within an ISAC). Each firm can choose a level of expenditure in security
measures to protect her infrastructure against cyber incidents. Examples include
implementing an intrusion detection system, introducing employee education initia-
tives, and installing and maintaining up-to-date security software. We assume these
measures are implemented independently of the outcome of the sharing agreement,
and focus solely on firms’ information sharing decisions.2
The information sharing agreement requires each firm i to share her security
information with other participating firms. This disclosure can include information
on both successful and failed attacks, as well as effective breach prevention methods
and the firm’s adopted security practices. A firm i should therefore decide whether
to fully and honestly disclose such information. We denote the decision of firm i by
ri ∈ {0, 1}, with ri = 0 denoting (partially) concealing and ri = 1 denoting (fully)
disclosing.3 Denote the number of firms adopting a full disclosure decision by x; i.e.,
x := |{i| ri = 1}|.
A decision of ri = 1 is beneficial (to firms j 6= i, and also firm i herself) for the
following reasons. On one hand, the disclosed information can allow other firms j 6= i
to leverage the acquired information to protect themselves against ongoing attacks
and to adopt better security practices. Aside from this security-related implications,
information disclosure ri = 1 may further provide a competitive advantage to firms
2This assumption is adopted for two reasons. First, this allows us to focus only on firms’
incentives for information sharing. More importantly, we assume the information shared by firm
i to be a substitute to firm j’s investment. That is, firm j can decrease her security expenditure
when she receives information from firm i. This possible reduction in the positive externality from
j’s investments may therefore result in further disincentives for firm i for sharing her security
information. We therefore remove these effects by decoupling the decisions on information sharing
and security efforts, and assume fixed security expenditures. Analyzing the interplay of investment
and sharing decisions remains a direction of future work.
3The results and intuition obtained in the following sections continue to hold when firms can
choose one of finitely many disclosure levels, given an appropriate extension of utilities and moni-
toring structure.
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j 6= i. This is because a firm j can increase her share of the market by strategically
leveraging the attained information to attract a competitor i’s customers. Finally,
sharing of security information may be beneficial to firm i herself as well (especially
when many other firms are disclosing as well), as it may garner trust from potential
partners and customers. We denote all such applicable information gains to a firm, as
a function of firm i’s decision and the number of other firms making a full disclosure
decision, by G(r, z) : {0, 1} × {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} → R≥0, with G(0, 0) = 0. We
assume that given r, G(r, ·) is increasing in z, the number of other firms sharing
their information.
Despite the benefits that adopting ri = 1 can have for all participating firms,
sharing of security information may not be in firm i’s interest; this disincentive for
full disclosure is due to the associated costs. These costs include the man-hours spent
in documenting and reporting security information, as well as potential losses in rep-
utation, business opportunities with potential collaborators, stock market prices,
and the like, following the disclosure of a breach or existing security flaws. In ad-
dition, it may be in i’s interest to conceal methods for preventing ongoing threats,
predicting that an attack on the competitor j will result in j’s customers switch-
ing to i’s products/services, increasing firm i’s profits. Consequently, such potential
market loss or competitors’ gain in sales can further deter firms from adhering to
information sharing agreements. We denote all these associated disclosure costs by
L(r, z) : {0, 1} × {0, . . . , N − 1} → R+, with L(0, 0) = 0, where the cost can poten-
tially depend on how many other firms, z, are disclosing their security information.
We can now define the utility of each user based on her disclosure decision.
Given the number of firms that are sharing, x, and substituting z = x − 1{ri = 1}
(where 1(·) denotes the indicator function), we define the following utilities for the
cooperators (ri = 1) and deviators (ri = 0):
Cooperator: C(x) := G(1, x− 1)− L(1, x− 1) ,
Deviator: D(x) := G(0, x)− L(0, x) .
We impose the following two assumptions on the utility functions:
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Assumption 4.1. Non-cooperation dominates cooperation,
(A1) D(x− 1) > C(x), ∀1 ≤ x ≤ N .
Assumption 4.1 entails that the disclosure costs outweigh the gains from sharing
for the firm, making ri = 0 a dominant strategy. In other words, the marginal
benefit from increased trust or approval due to disclosure is limited compared to the
potential market and reputation loss due to disclosed security weaknesses. Therefore,
the only Nash equilibrium of a one-shot information sharing game is for no firm to
disclose her information. This observation is consistent with similar studies of one-
shot information sharing games in [53, 73], which also conclude that, in the absence of
audit mechanisms or secondary incentives, firms will choose to share no information
because of the associated disclosure costs.
Assumption 4.2. Non-cooperation is inefficient,
(A2) C(N) > D(0) = 0 .
Assumption 4.2 entails that the resulting non-disclosure equilibrium is subopti-
mal, particularly compared to the outcome in which all firms disclose. That is, full
disclosure dominates the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. We may
further be interested in imposing a more restrictive condition (although this is not
necessary for our technical discussion).
(A2’) xC(x) + (N − x)D(x) > (x− 1)C(x− 1) + (N − x+ 1)D(x− 1),
∀1 ≤ x ≤ N .
Under (A2’) (which indeed implies (A2)), non-disclosure by any firm decreases social
welfare, making the full disclosure equilibrium x = N the socially desired outcome.
Example 4.1. Consider the gain functionsG(1, z) = G(0, z) = zG and loss functions
L(0, z) = 0 and L(1, z) = L. Here, each firm obtains a constant gain G from any
other firm who is disclosing information, and incurs a constant loss L if she discloses
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herself, both regardless of the number of other firms making a disclosure decision. It is
easy to verify that these functions satisfy (A1). Furthermore, if G > L
N−1 , conditions
(A2) and (A2’) hold as well. Note also that the 2-player prisoner’s dilemma can be
recovered as a special case when N = 2.
Example 4.2. Alternatively, consider the gain functions G(1, z) = G(0, z) = f(z)G,
where f(·) : {0, . . . , N − 1} → R+ is an increasing and concave function, and loss
functions L(0, z) = 0 and L(1, z) = L. The concavity of f(·) implies that as the num-
ber of cooperators increases, the marginal increase in information gain is decreasing
due to potential overlap in the disclosed information. The utilities of cooperators
and deviators will be given by:
C(x) = f(x− 1)G− L, and, D(x) = f(x)G .
Condition (A1) in Assumption 4.1 is satisfied. For Assumption 4.2, condition (A2)
will hold if and only if G > L
f(N−1)−f(0) . However, unlike the previous example,
for (A2’) to hold we need additional restrictions beyond that required for (A2).
Specifically, the full disclosure equilibrium will be the optimal solution only if the
constants G and L are such that:
G[(N − x) (f(x)− f(x− 1)) + (x− 1) (f(x− 1)− f(x− 2))] > L,∀x .
The described N -player game with Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 is known as the N -
person Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) game; see e.g., [15, 48]. These games are used
to model social situations in which there is a conflict between individual and social
goals; examples include individual decisions whether to belong to unions, political
parties, or lobbies, and problems of pollution or overpopulation [15]. The imposed
assumptions then model the intuition that in such situations, any individual has
a disincentive for cooperation, (A1), despite the fact that an outcome in which all
cooperate would have been preferred by each participant, (A2).
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4.2.2 Repeated interactions and the monitoring structure
Throughout the following sections, we are interested in the design of inter-temporal
incentives that can incentivize firms to move away from the one-shot equilibrium of
the information sharing game, and adopt full disclosure decisions when they inter-
act repeatedly. Such inter-temporal incentives should be based on the history of
firms’ past interactions. We therefore formalize firms’ monitoring capabilities, and
the ensuing beliefs, of whether other firms are adhering to the information sharing
agreement.
First, note that such monitoring is inevitably imperfect ; after all, the goal of an
information sharing agreement is to encourage firms to reveal their non-verifiable
and private breach and security information. Furthermore, the monitoring can be
either carried out independently by the firms, or be based on the reports of a central
monitoring system. We consider both possibilities.
Imperfect private monitoring First, assume each firm conducts her own mon-
itoring and forms a belief on other firms’ disclosure decisions. Specifically, by mon-
itoring firm j’s externally observed security posture, firm i forms a belief bij about
j’s report. We let bij = 1 indicate a belief by firm i that firm j has been honest
and is fully disclosing all information, and bij = 0 otherwise. In other words, bij = 0
indicates that firm i’s monitoring provides her with evidence that firm j has experi-
enced an undisclosed breach, has an unreported security flaw, or has fabricated an
incident. Formally, we assume the following distribution on firm i’s belief given firm
j’s report:
pi(bij|rj) =

, for bij = 0, rj = 1
1− , for bij = 1, rj = 1
α, for bij = 0, rj = 0
1− α, for bij = 1, rj = 0
(4.1)
with  ∈ (0, 1/2) and α ∈ (1/2, 1). First, note that  is in general assumed to
be small; therefore, if firm j fully discloses all information (rj = 1), firm i’s belief
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will be almost consistent with the received information. Intuitively, this entails the
assumption that with only a small probability , firm i will be observing flaws or
breaches that have gone undetected by firm j herself, as internal monitoring is more
accurate than externally available information. On the other hand, firm i has an
accuracy α in detecting when firm j conceals security information (rj = 0). Note
that ( = 0, α = 1) is equivalent to the special case of perfect monitoring.
We assume the evidence available to firm i, and hence the resulting belief bij, is
private to firm i, and independent of all other beliefs. Specifically, bij,∀i 6= j are
i.i.d. samples of a Bernoulli random variable (with parameter α or , depending on
rj).
Imperfect public monitoring Alternatively, consider an independent entity (the
government, a white hat, or a research group), referred to as the monitor, who assesses
the comprehensiveness of firms’ disclosure decisions, and publicly reveals the results.
We assume the distribution of the beliefs {b01, . . . , b0N} formed by the monitor is:
pˆi({b01, . . . , b0N}|{r1, . . . , rN}) := ΠNj=1pi(b0j|rj) , (4.2)
where the distributions pi(b0j|rj) follow (4.1), with  and α interpreted similarly. Note
that the monitoring technology of the monitor, i.e. (α, ), may in general be more
accurate than that available to the firms.4
4.3 Imperfect public monitoring: The role of centralized
monitoring
The possibility of public monitoring (either perfect or imperfect) can enable the
design of inter-temporal incentives for cooperation in repeated interactions. With
perfect public monitoring, deviations from the intended equilibrium path are per-
fectly observable by all participants, and can be accordingly punished. As a result,
4It is worth mentioning that the binary beliefs are assumed for ease of exposition; the results of
the subsequent sections continue to hold if the monitoring technology has finitely many outputs.
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it is possible to design appropriate punishment phases (i.e., a finite or infinite set of
stage games in which deviators receive a lower payoff) that keep sufficiently patient
players from deviating to their myopic (stage game) best responses. This has led to
folk theorems under perfect monitoring; see e.g., [46]. With imperfect public mon-
itoring on the other hand, deviations cannot be detected with complete certainty.
Nevertheless, the publicly observable signals can be distributed so that some are
more indicative that a deviation has occurred. In that case, as players can all act
based on their observations of the same signal to decide whether to start punishment
or cooperation phases, despite the fact that punishment phases may still occur on the
equilibrium path, it is possible for the players to cooperate to attain higher payoffs
than those of the stage game.
In the remainder of this section, we first formalize the above intuition by present-
ing some preliminaries on infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring,
and in particular, the folk theorem of [45] for these games. In Section 4.3.2, we show
that this folk theorem applies to NPD information sharing games with monitoring
given by (4.2).
4.3.1 The folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring
In this section, we present the folk theorem due to [45]. Consider N rational
players. At the stage game, each player i chooses an action ri ∈ Ri. Let r ∈ R :=∏N
i=1Ri denote a profile of actions. At the end of each stage, a public outcome b ∈ B
is observed by all players, where B is a finite set of possible signals. The realization
of the public outcome b depends on the profile of actions r. Formally, assume the
probability of observing b following r is given by pi(b|r). Let u∗i (ri, b) be the utility of
player i when she plays ri and observes the signal b. Note that i’s utility depends on
others’ actions only through b, and thus the stage payoffs are not informative about
others’ actions. The ex-ante stage game payoff for user i when r is played is given
by:
ui(r) =
∑
b∈B
u∗i (ri, b)pi(b|r). (4.3)
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Let F † denote the set of convex combinations of players’ payoffs for outcomes in
R, i.e., the convex hull of {(u1(r), . . . , un(r))|r ∈ R}. We refer to F † as the set of
feasible payoffs. Of this set of payoffs, we are particularly interested in those that are
individually rational ; an individually rational payoff profile v is one that gives each
player i at least her minmax payoff vi := minρ−i maxri ui(ri,ρ−i) (where ρ−i denotes
a mixed strategy profile by players other than i). Let ρi, with
ρi−i ∈ arg min
ρ−i
(
max
ri
ui(ri,ρ−i)
)
,
ρii ∈ arg max
ri
ui(ri,ρ
i
−i) ,
denote the minmax profile of player i, and F∗ := {v ∈ F †|vi > vi,∀i} denote the
set of feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs. The main purpose of a folk
theorem is to specify which of the payoffs in F∗ (of which Pareto efficient payoffs are
of particular interest) can be supported (as average payoffs) by some equilibrium of
the repeated game.
Let us now discuss the repeated game. When the stage game is played repeatedly,
at time t, each player has a private history containing her own past actions, ht−1i :=
{r0i , . . . , rt−1i }, as well as a public history containing the public signals observed so
far, ht−1 := {b0, . . . , bt−1}. Player i then uses a mapping σti from (ht−1i , ht−1) to (a
probability distribution over) Ri to decide her next play. We refer to σi = {σti}∞t=0
as player i’s strategy. Each player discounts her future payoffs by a discount factor
δ. Hence, if player i has a sequence of stage game payoffs {uti}∞t=0, her average payoff
throughout the repeated game is given by (1− δ)∑∞t=0 δtuti. Player i is choosing her
strategy σi to maximize this expression.
Among the set of all possible strategies σi, we will consider public strategies :
these consist of decisions σti that depend only on the public history h
t−1, and not
on player i’s private information ht−1i . Whenever other players are playing public
strategies, then player i will also have a public strategy best-response. A perfect
public equilibrium (PPE) is a profile of public strategies that, starting at any time t
and given any public history ht−1, form a Nash equilibrium of the game from that
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point on. PPEs facilitate the study of repeated games to a great extent, as they are
recursive. This means that when a PPE is being played, the continuation game at
each time point is strategically isomorphic to the original game, and therefore the
same PPE is induced in the continuation game as well. Note that such recursive
structure can not be recovered using private strategies, leading to the comparatively
limited results in private monitoring games (see Section 4.4). Let E(δ) be the set of
all payoff profiles that can be attained using public strategies as PPE average payoffs
when the discount factor is δ. We know that E(δ) ⊆ F∗. The main question is under
what conditions does the reverse hold, i.e., when is it possible to attain any point in
the interior of F∗ as PPE payoffs?
In order to attain nearly efficient payoffs, players need to be able to support
cooperation by detecting and appropriately punishing deviations. In PPEs, where
strategies are public, all such punishment should occur solely based on the public
signals. As a result, the public signals should be distributed such that they allow
players to statistically distinguish between deviations by two different players, as well
as different deviations by the same player. We now formally specify these conditions.
The first condition, referred to as individual full rank, gives a sufficient condition
under which deviations by a single player are statistically distinguishable. This
means that the distribution over signals induced by some profile ρ are different from
that induced by any (ρ′i,ρ−i) for ρ
′
i 6= ρi. This condition is formally stated as follows.
Definition 4.1. The profile ρ has individual full rank for player i if given the strate-
gies of the other players, ρ−i, the |Ri|×|B| matrix Ai(ρ−i) with entires [Ai(ρ−i)]ri,b =
pi(b|ri,ρ−i) has full row rank. That is, the |Ri| vectors {pi(·|ri,ρ−i)}ri∈Ri are linearly
independent.
The second general condition, pairwise full rank, is a strengthening of individual
full rank to pairs of players. In essence, it ensures that deviations by players i and j
are distinct, as they introduce different distributions over public outcomes. Formally,
Definition 4.2. The profile ρ has pairwise full rank for players i and j if the (|Ri|+
|Rj|)× |B| matrix Aij(ρ) := [Ai(ρ−i);Aj(ρ−j)] has rank |Ri|+ |Rj| − 1.
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Therefore, given an adequate public monitoring signal, we have the following folk
theorem under imperfect public monitoring.
Theorem 4.1 (The imperfect public monitoring folk theorem, [45]). Assume R is
finite, the set of feasible payoffs F † ⊂ RN has non-empty interior, and all the pure
action equilibria leading the extreme points of F † have pairwise full rank for all pairs
of players. If the minmax payoff profile v = (v1, . . . , vN) is inefficient, and the
minmax profile ρˆi has individual full rank for each player i, then for any profile of
payoffs v ∈ intF∗, there exists a discount factor δ < 1, such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1),
v ∈ E(δ).
4.3.2 Cooperation in information sharing with public monitoring
We now verify that the above folk theorem applies to information sharing games
with imperfect public monitoring structure given by (4.2). That is, when the firms
are sufficiently patient, they can sustain cooperation on full security information
sharing in a repeated setting, by making their disclosure decisions based only on the
imperfect, publicly announced observations of the monitor about their past actions.
To this end, we need to verify that the conditions of the folk theorem, in particular
those on the informativeness of the public monitoring signal, hold for (4.2). First,
note that the public signal b has 2N possible outcomes; we view each signal as a binary
string and assume the columns of the following matrices are ordered according to
the decimal equivalent of these binary strings.
We first verify that the minmax profile of the repeated information sharing game
has individual full rank for any firm. The minmax action profile for some firm i, rˆi,
is all firms concealing their information, i.e., rˆi = 0. Consider deviations by firm 1
(by the symmetric nature of the game, the same argument holds for other firms).
Then A1(rˆ
i) is given by:
(b = (0, 0, . . . , 0) (1, 0, . . . , 0) . . . (0, 1, . . . , 1) (1, 1, . . . , 1)
r1 = 0 α
N (1− α)αN−1 . . . α(1− α)N−1 (1− α)N
r1 = 1 α
N−1 (1− )αN−1 . . . (1− α)N−1 (1− )(1− α)N−1
)
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The rows of the above matrix are linearly independent (given α 6= ), and hence the
minmax profiles have individual full rank for all firms.
We also need to verify that all pure strategy action profiles have pairwise full
rank. We do so for rk := (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), where the first k firms disclose, and
the remainder N−k conceal; the result for other profiles can be shown similarly. For
the profile rk, first consider the firms i = 1 and j = N . The matrix Aij(rk) is given
by:
b = (0, 0, . . . , 0) (1, 0, . . . , 0) . . .

r1 = 0 α · k−1 · αN−k−1 · α (1− α) · k−1 · αN−k−1 · α . . .
r1 = 1  · k−1 · αN−k−1 · α (1− ) · k−1 · αN−k−1 · α . . .
rN = 0  · k−1 · αN−k−1 · α (1− ) · k−1 · αN−k−1 · α . . .
rN = 1  · k−1 · αN−k−1 ·  (1− ) · k−1 · αN−k−1 ·  . . .
. . . (0, 1, . . . , 1) (1, 1, . . . , 1)

. . . α · (1− )k−1 · (1− α)N−k (1− α) · (1− )k−1 · (1− α)N−k
. . .  · (1− )k−1 · (1− α)N−k (1− )k · (1− α)N−k
. . .  · (1− )k−1 · (1− α)N−k (1− )k · (1− α)N−k
. . .  · (1− )k−1 · (1− α)N−k−1 · (1− ) (1− )k · (1− α)N−k−1 · (1− )
Note that the rows corresponding to r1 = 1 and rN = 0 are the same: indeed when
both firms follow the prescribed strategy, the distribution of the signals is consistent.
It is straightforward to verify that the above has row rank 3; i.e., removing the
common row, the three remaining rows are linearly independent. As a result, rk has
pairwise full rank for firms i = 1 and j = N . A similar procedure follows for other
pairs of firms i, j, the remaining pure action profiles, verifying that all have pairwise
full rank.
We have therefore established the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. The conditions of the folk theorem of Section 4.3.1 hold with
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C D
C G− L, G− L −L, G
D G, −L 0, 0
Table 4.1: Firms’ payoffs in a two-person prisoner’s dilemma game
the public signals distributed according to (4.2). As a result, when the firms are
sufficiently patient, i.e., they value the future outcomes of their information sharing
agreement, it is possible for them to nearly efficiently cooperate on full information
disclosure through repeated interactions.
4.3.3 Constructing public strategies: An example
In this section, we present the process through which equilibrium public strategies
leading to a desired payoff profile are constructed. To simplify the illustration, we
consider a two player prisoner’s dilemma game with payoff matrix given by Table
4.1.
We first present an overview of the idea behind constructing the equilibrium
strategies. The utility of firms at each step of the game can be decomposed into
their current payoff, plus the continuation payoff; the latter is the expected payoff
for the remainder of the game depending on the observed public monitoring output.
Therefore, to achieve an average payoff profile v as equilibrium in the repeated game,
the action profile and the continuation payoffs should be selected so as to maximize
firms’ expected payoff.
Formally, we say v is decomposed by r on a set W using a mapping γ : B → W
if we have:
vi = (1− δ)ui(r) + δE[γi(b)|r]
≥ (1− δ)ui(r′i, r−i) + δE[γi(b)|r′i, r−i], ∀r′i ∈ Ri ,∀i. (4.4)
Here, the mapping γ determines firms’ continuation payoffs (selected from a set
W ) following each signal b ∈ B. The goal is thus to set W = E(δ) (the set of PPE
payoffs), and find appropriate actions r and mappings γ decomposing (i.e., satisfying
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(4.4) for) payoff profiles v ∈ E(δ). We can then conclude that any payoff profile v
for which the above decomposition is possible, will be attainable as a PPE average
payoff, as we can recursively decompose the selected continuation payoffs on E(δ) as
well. This procedure thus characterizes the set of payoffs that can be attained using
public strategies.
However, the set of decomposable payoffs on arbitrary sets W is in general
hard to characterize; let’s instead consider the simpler decomposition on half-spaces
H(λ, λ·v) := {v′ ∈ RN : λ·v′ ≤ λ·v}. With W = H(λ, λ·v), (4.4) can be re-written
as:
vi = ui(r) + E[γ¯i(b)|r] ≥ ui(r′i, r−i) + E[γ¯i(b)|r′i, r−i], ∀r′i ∈ Ri ,∀i ,
and, λ · γ¯(b) ≤ 0, ∀b ∈ B , (4.5)
where γ¯ : B → RN , and γ¯i(b) = δ1−δ (γi(b) − vi). We refer to γ¯i as the normalized
continuation payoffs.
It can be shown (see [80]) that characterizing the set of attainable PPE payoffs
E(δ) is equivalent to finding the maximum average payoffs that can be decomposed
on half-spaces using different actions r and in various directions λ. We therefore first
find the maximum average payoffs v enforceable on half-spaces (i.e, satisfying (4.5),
and with λ· γ¯(b) = 0 whenever possible), for each action profile r and direction λ. We
will then select the best action r for each direction, and finally take the intersection
over all possible directions λ to characterize E(δ).5
We now find the average payoffs decomposable on half-spaces for the prisoner’s
dilemma game in Table 4.1. Let us first consider profile r = (1, 1),6 and an arbitrary
5Define k∗(λ; r) := λ · v¯, where v¯ is the maximum payoff profile satisfying (4.5). It can be shown
that k∗(λ; r) ≤ λ ·u(r), and so the maximum is attained when r is orthogonally enforced (whenever
possible); this is λ · γ¯(b) = 0 in (4.5). Let k∗(λ) = supr k∗(λ; r). Intuitively, k∗(λ) is a bound on the
average payoff for firms for which the incentive constraints are satisfied. Let H∗(λ) := H(λ, k∗(λ))
be the corresponding maximal half-space. Then, that the set of PPE payoffs is contained in the
intersection of these maximal half-spaces, i.e., E(δ) ⊆ ∩λH∗(λ) :=M, and that the reverse is also
true for sufficiently large δ; i.e, limδ→1 E(δ) = M. We refer the interested reader to [80] for more
details.
6Note that decomposing using (0, 0) is not considered as it leads to the maximal half-space R2.
It thus provides no information on the set of attainable payoffs as we already know that E(δ) ⊆ R2.
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direction λ = (λ1, λ2). Setting λ · γ¯(b) = 0, (4.5) reduces to:
G− L = G− L+ (2γ¯1(0, 0) + (1− )γ¯1(0, 1) + (1− )γ¯1(1, 0) + (1− )2γ¯1(1, 1))
≥ G + (αγ¯1(0, 0) + α(1− )γ¯1(0, 1) + (1− α)γ¯1(1, 0) + (1− )(1− α)γ¯1(1, 1))
and ,
G− L = G− L+ (2γ¯2(0, 0) + (1− )γ¯2(0, 1) + (1− )γ¯2(1, 0) + (1− )2γ¯2(1, 1))
≥ G + (αγ¯2(0, 0) + (1− α)γ¯2(0, 1) + (1− )αγ¯2(1, 0) + (1− )(1− α)γ¯2(1, 1))
and ,
λ1γ¯1(b) + λ2γ¯2(b) = 0, ∀b ∈ B .
Substituting for γ¯2(b) using the last equation, and writing the inequalities as equali-
ties, finding the normalized continuation payoffs is equivalent to solving the following
system of equations:

2 (1− ) (1− ) (1− )2
α α(1− ) (1− α) (1− α)(1− )
2 (1− ) (1− ) (1− )2
α (1− α) α(1− ) (1− α)(1− )


γ¯1(0, 0)
γ¯1(0, 1)
γ¯1(1, 0)
γ¯1(1, 1)
 =

0
−L
0
Lλ2
λ1
 .
The first and third rows represent the same equations (corresponding to the equi-
librium outcome). Removing the third row and performing row-reduction on the
remaining matrix, the continuation payoffs should satisfy the following set of equa-
tions:
γ¯1(0, 0) + (1− )γ¯1(0, 1) = −L
ακ
1− 

γ¯1(1, 0) + (1− )γ¯1(1, 1) = L
ακ
−γ¯1(0, 1) + γ¯1(1, 0) = L
ακ
(
λ2
λ1
+ 1) ,
where κ := 1−

− 1−α
α
> 0. The above is an underdetermined system, and thus has
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γ¯1(b) γ¯2(b)
b=(0,0) L
ακ
1−

(λ2
λ1
− 1) L
ακ
1−

(λ1
λ2
− 1)
b=(0,1) −λ2
λ1
L
ακ
L
ακ
b=(1,0) L
ακ
−λ1
λ2
L
ακ
b=(1,1) 0 0
Table 4.2: An example of normalized continuation payoff choices in repeated infor-
mation sharing games
infinitely many solutions depending on the designer’s choice of continuation payoffs.
We construct and interpret one such possibility.
Set γ¯1(1, 1) = 0, implying γ¯2(1, 1) = 0 as well. This means if the signal indicates
that both firms are cooperating with high probability, there is no need for punish-
ments, so that both firms expect their continuation payoff to remain unchanged (i.e.,
equal to their current payoff). Given this choice, we can solve for the remaining
normalized continuation payoffs, illustrated in Table 4.2.
Intuition. These normalized continuation payoffs can be intuitively interpreted
as follows. Fix a direction with λ1, λ2 > 0 (similar interpretations follow for other
directions). Then, given a signal b = (1, 0), which is more likely under a deviation by
firm 2, firm 1 expects a higher continuation payoff (γ¯1(1, 0) > 0), while the suspect
deviator expects a lower one (γ¯2(1, 0) < 0).
7 A similar intuition applies to the
continuations under the signal (0, 1). On the other hand, with b = (0, 0), either firm
1 or 2 will be punished, depending on the direction λ. Specifically, for a direction
λ1 = λ2, neither firm expects a change in her continuation payoff. Note that with
λ1 = λ2, the change in continuation payoffs between the outcomes (0, 1) and (1, 0),
as well as among firms in either outcome, are also of equal size. Note also that both
firms are never punished simultaneously under any outcome, so as to maintain a high
average payoff.
Finally, it is worth noting the effect of the monitoring accuracy, α and , on the
normalized continuation payoffs. Consider direction λ1 = λ2 = 1, and fix L = 1.
First, note that ακ = α(1 − ) − (1 − α) is increasing in α and decreasing in
7It is worth emphasizing that due to the equilibrium construction, firms are both playing ri = 1;
nevertheless, punishments on the equilibrium path happen due to imperfect monitoring.
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Figure 4.1: Effect of monitoring accuracy on normalized continuation payoffs, γ¯1(1, 0)
. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1, which shows the dependence of γ¯1(1, 0) on the
monitoring parameters. As a result, as the monitoring technology becomes more
accurate, i.e., α increases and/or  decreases, the size of the normalized continuation
payoffs for firms, when (1, 0) or (0, 1) is observed, becomes smaller. This is because,
as monitoring becomes accurate, signals indicating deviations (despite equilibrium
being played) are more likely to be due to monitoring errors rather than actual
deviations, and therefore the required continuation punishments/rewards become
less severe to maintain high average payoffs for firms.
We conclude that in general, using the described procedure, we can decompose
payoff profiles in the half-spaces H(λ, k∗(λ, (1, 1))), where k∗(λ, (1, 1)) = λ ·u(1, 1) =
(G − L)(λ2 + λ1), using the action profile r = (1, 1) and continuation payoffs de-
termined as above. Using a similar procedure, the corresponding half-spaces for
the remaining action profiles will have k∗(λ, (0, 1)) = Gλ1 − Lλ2 and k∗(λ, (1, 0)) =
Gλ2 − Lλ1.
We next choose, for a given direction λ, the action for which the corresponding
half-spaces cover a larger set of average payoffs; these are k∗(λ) = maxr{Gλ2 −
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Lλ1, Gλ1 − Lλ2, (G− L)(λ1 + λ2)}. We therefore have:
k∗(λ) =

Gλ2 − Lλ1 λ2 ≥ GLλ1
(G− L)(λ1 + λ2) LGλ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ GLλ1
Gλ1 − Lλ2 λ1 ≥ GLλ2
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the intersection of half-spaces H(λ, k∗(λ)),
as λ ranges over R2, is equivalent to the set of feasible and strictly individually
rational payoffs of the two-person prisoner’s dilemma game of Table 4.1. That is,
it is possible to find an action profile r and the corresponding continuation payoff
mapping γ (constructed as described above), so as to incentivize any feasible strictly
individually rational payoff profile.
4.4 Imperfect private monitoring: The role of communica-
tion
In this section, we consider the use of private monitoring in providing inter-
temporal incentives for information sharing. Unlike repeated games with imperfect
public monitoring, relatively less is known about games with private monitoring [66].
In particular, we are interested in a folk theorem for this repeated game; a folk
theorem in this scenario is a full characterization of payoffs that can be achieved when
firms only have private observations, if firms are sufficiently patient. As discussed
in Section 4.3, with imperfect public monitoring, [45] presents a folk theorem under
relatively general conditions. The possibility of this result hinges heavily on that
firms share common information on each others’ actions (i.e., the public monitoring
outcome), as a result of which it is possible to recover a recursive structure for the
game, upon which the folk theorem is based. However, a similar folk theorem with
private monitoring remained an open problem until recently,8 mainly due to the
8A recent advance in the field is by Sugaya [117, 118], who presents a folk theorem for repeated
games with imperfect private monitoring, without requiring cheap talk communication or pub-
lic randomization. The conditions on the private monitoring structure required by Sugaya’s folk
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lack of a common public signal. Nevertheless, the possibility of cooperation, and
in particular folk theorems, have been shown to exist for some particular classes of
these games. Examples include:
• Games in which firms are allowed to communicate (cheap talk) after each pe-
riod. This approach has been proposed in [27, 67], and in essence, uses the
signals collected through communication as a public signal, allowing partici-
pants to coordinate on cooperation.
• Games in which firms have public actions (e.g., announcement of sanctions) in
addition to private decisions (here, disclosure decisions), as proposed by [102]
for the study of international trade agreements. Intuitively, public actions
serve a similar purpose as communication, allowing participants to signal the
initiation of punishment phases.
• Games with almost public monitoring, i.e., private monitoring with signals
that are sufficiently correlated. With such signals, [79] proves a folk theorem
for almost-perfect and almost-public monitoring.
In this section, we present the folk theorem with private monitoring and commu-
nication due to [67] in Section 4.4.1, and in Section 4.4.2, verify that it applies to
NPD information sharing games with monitoring given by (4.1).
4.4.1 The folk theorem with imperfect private monitoring and commu-
nication
In this section, we state the folk theorem with imperfect private monitoring,
allowing for communication between players, due to [67].
The stage game is similar to the setup of [45] in Section 4.3.1. Consider N
rational players. At the stage game, each player i chooses an action ri ∈ Ri. Let
theorem are however more restrictive than those of Kandori and Matsushima’s folk theorem with
(cheap talk) communication [67]. Therefore, we analyze the application of the folk theorem with
communication of [67]; this will further allow us to draw a closer parallel with the public monitoring
structure of the previous section.
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r ∈ R := ∏Ni=1Ri denote a profile of actions. At the end of an stage, each player
privately observes an outcome bi ∈ Bi, where Bi is a finite set of possible signals.
The probability of observing the profile of private signals b ∈ B := ∏Ni=1 Bi following
r is given by the joint distribution pi(b|r). Assume pi has full support, i.e., pi(b|r) >
0, ∀b,∀r. Let u∗i (ri, bi) be the utility of player i when she plays ri and observes the
signal bi. Note that i’s utility depends on others’ actions only through bi, and thus
the stage payoffs are not informative about others’ actions. The expected stage game
payoff for user i when r is played is therefore given by
ui(r) =
∑
b∈B
u∗i (ri, bi)pi(b|r). (4.6)
The definition of the minmax action profiles ρi and the set of feasible and strictly in-
dividually rational payoffs F∗ ⊂ RN are the same as those in Section 4.3.1. However,
in addition to the private nature of signals bi, the current model differs from the setup
in Section 4.3.1 in that we allow the players to communicate in this game. Formally,
after choosing the action ri and observing the signal bi, each player i will publicly
announce a message mi ∈ Mi, selected from the finite set of possible messages Mi.
Let M = ΠNi=1Mi.
Consequently, the strategy si = (ri,mi) of each player consists of both an action
ri and a message mi. In particular, when the game is played repeatedly often, the
strategy specifies a choice for each time step t, i.e, ri = (ri(t))
∞
t=0 and mi = (mi(t))
∞
t=0,
where,
ri(t) : R
t−1
i ×Bt−1i ×M t−1 → ∆(Ri) ,
mi(t) : R
t
i ×Bti ×M t−1 → ∆(Mi) .
Let rti = (ri(0), . . . , ri(t)). Define b
t
i and m
t similarly. Then, the private history of
player i at the end of time t is given by hti := (r
t
i , b
t
i), and the public history is h
t := mt.
Therefore, players’ strategies depend on both private and public histories. Given the
strategy profiles s = (s1, . . . , sN), and assuming that players discount future payoffs
by a discount factor δ, a player’s average payoff throughout the repeated game is given
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by (1− δ)∑∞t=0 δtui(s(t)). Each player i is choosing her strategy si to maximize the
expected value of this expression.
We are interested in characterizing the payoffs attainable by the strategy profiles s
that are a sequential equilibrium of the game. Formally, s is a sequential equilibrium
of the game if for every player and her history (hti, h
t), si|(hti,ht) is a best reply to
E[s−i|ht−i,ht|hti]. That is, a player is best-responding according to her belief over
private histories of other players, in particular those which are consistent with her
own private history. Let V (δ) denote the set of sequential equilibrium average payoffs
when the discount factor is δ. We are interested in identifying conditions under which
V (δ) ⊆ F∗.
Recall that in the game of imperfect public monitoring, conditioning of strate-
gies on the publicly observed signal allowed players to coordinate, and to recover a
recursive structure in the game. The possibility of communication allows for recover-
ing a similar recursive structure in games with private monitoring. The equilibrium
strategies leading to nearly efficient payoffs will be constructed as follows. At the
end of each period t, each player i is asked to report her privately observed signal
as her message, i.e, mi(t) = bi(t). To make sure that players truthfully report their
signals, the equilibrium strategies use this private information to determine other
players’ deviations and future payoffs, and maintain i’s payoff independent of her
report. As a result, truthful reporting of privately observed signals will be a (weak)
best-response.9,10 It remains to ensure, following a rationale similar to the folk theo-
rem of Section 4.3.1, that the available signals are informative enough, in the sense
that they allow players to distinguish between different deviations of individuals, and
to differentiate among deviations by different players.
The required conditions on the informativeness of the players’ signals are as
9It is also possible to make truth reporting a strict best-response if players’ privately observed
signals are mutually correlated; see [67, Section 4.2].
10Note that unlike Section 4.3, each player will be playing a private strategy at equilibrium, as
she is using her private information as her message mi. However, the choice of action ri will be
based only on the public information (i.e., the disclosed messages available to all players).
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follows. First, define the following vectors:
p−i(r) := (pi−i(b−i|r))b−i∈B−i ,
p−ij(r) := (pi−ij(b−ij|r))b−ij∈B−ij
Qij(r) := {p−ij(r−i, r′i)|r′i ∈ Ri\{ri}} ,
where B−i := Πk 6=iBk, B−ij := Πk 6=i,jBk, and pi−i and pi−ij are marginal distributions
of the joint distribution pi(b|r) of privately observed signals. The three sufficient
conditions on signals can be expressed accordingly.
Condition 4.1. At the minmax strategy profile of a player i, ρˆi, for any player j 6= i
and any mixed strategy ρ′j ∈ ∆(Rj), either
(i) p−j(ρˆ
i) 6= p−j(ρˆi−j, ρ′j) or,
(ii) p−j(ρˆ
i) = p−j(ρˆ
i
−j, ρ
′
j) and uj(ρˆ
i) ≥ uj(ρˆi−j, ρ′j).
Condition 4.1 states that at the minmax profile of any player, a deviation by
another player is either statistically distinguishable, and if not, it reduces the payoff of
the deviator, and is hence not profitable. This condition ensures that we can provide
incentives to players to punish (minmax) one another. Note that this requirement is
similar to (but weaker than) the individual full rank condition in the folk theorem
of Section 4.3.1.
Condition 4.2. For each pair of players i 6= j, and each pure action equilibrium r
leading to an extreme point of the payoff set F †, we have:
p−ij(r) /∈ co(Qij(r) ∩Qji(r)) ,
where co(X) denotes the convex hull of the set X.
Recall that Qij(r) denotes the vector of distribution of beliefs of players other
than i and j, when player i is deviating. Condition 4.2 therefore requires that a
deviation by either i or j (but not both) is statistically detected by the remaining
players.
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Condition 4.3. For each pair of players i 6= j, and each pure action equilibrium r
leading to an extreme point of the payoff set F †, we have:
co(Qij(r) ∪ p−ij(r)) ∩ co(Qji(r) ∪ p−ij(r)) = {p−ij(r)} .
Finally, Condition 4.3 requires that players other than i, j can statistically dis-
tinguish deviations by i from deviations by j, as the resulting distribution on b−ij
will be different under either player’s deviation. In other words, the only consistent
distribution arises when neither player is deviating. It is worth mentioning that Con-
ditions 4.2 and 4.3 hold when the pairwise full rank condition of the folk theorem of
Section 4.3.1 holds.
Therefore, given adequate private monitoring signals and communication, we have
the following folk theorem under imperfect private monitoring.
Theorem 4.2. (The Imperfect private monitoring with communication folk theorem,
[67]) Assume that there are more than two players (N > 2), and the set of feasible and
strictly individual rational payoffs F∗ ⊂ RN has non-empty interior (and therefore
dimension N). Then, if the monitoring of players satisfy Conditions 4.1, 4.2, and
4.3, any interior payoff profile v ∈ intF∗ can be achieved as a sequential equilibrium
average payoff profile of the repeated game with communication, when δ is close
enough to 1.
4.4.2 Cooperation in information sharing with private monitoring and
communication
We now verify that the above folk theorem applies to information sharing games
with imperfect private monitoring structure given by (4.1). That is, when the firms
are sufficiently patient, they can sustain cooperation on full security information shar-
ing in a repeated setting, by truthfully revealing their private signals, and making
their disclosure decisions based only on the imperfect, publicly announced collective
observation about their past actions. To this end, we need to verify that the three
conditions of the folk theorem on the informativeness of the monitoring signal hold
for the joint distribution of the private signals in (4.1). However, note that once
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these signals are truthfully reported, it is as if we have access to N − 1 indepen-
dent realizations of the public monitoring distribution in (4.2). Assume that to test
the conditions of the folk theorem, we randomly choose one of the available cross-
observations about a possible deviator (from all players other than the suspect for
Condition 4.1, or other than the two suspects for Conditions 4.2 and 4.3) and test the
statistical distinguishability of the signal. With this method, the joint distribution
of the private signal that is being tested will be equivalent to the public monitoring
distribution of (4.2).
On the other hand, as mentioned in Section 4.4.1, the conditions of the folk
theorem for imperfect private monitoring are weaker than the full rank conditions
required by the folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring: Condition 4.1 is a
weaker condition than individual full rank, and Conditions 4.2 and 4.3 are weaker
versions of pairwise full rank. This is because the individual and pairwise full rank
conditions require linear independence of their corresponding signal distributions,
while Conditions 4.1-4.3 are stated in terms of convex combinations. As shown in
Section 4.3.2, the distribution in (4.2) satisfies the full rank conditions, and conse-
quently, the joint private distribution resulting from (4.1) satisfies Conditions 4.1-4.3.
We have therefore established the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. The conditions of the folk theorem of Section 4.4.1 hold with pri-
vate monitoring (4.1) and communication. As a result, when the firms are sufficiently
patient, i.e., they value the future outcomes of their information sharing agreement,
and are allowed to communicate their private signals, it is possible for them to nearly
efficiently cooperate on full information disclosure through repeated interactions.
4.5 Conclusion
We modeled information sharing agreements among firms as an N -person pris-
oner’s dilemma game, and equipped it with a simple binary monitoring structure.
We proposed a repeated game approach to this problem, and discussed the role of
monitoring (private vs. public) on determining whether inter-temporal incentives
can lead to the support of cooperation (i.e., full disclosure). Specifically, we showed
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that a rating/monitoring system can play a crucial role in providing a common public
signal which, despite being imperfect, can be used to design inter-temporal incen-
tives that lead firms to cooperate on information sharing. We also showed that in the
absence of a monitor, if the firms are provided with a platform to communicate their
privately observed beliefs on each others’ adherence to the agreement, it is again
possible to design similar inter-temporal incentives.
An important requirement for the folk theorem, and consequently the design of
inter-temporal incentives, is to ensure that firms are sufficiently patient (i.e., they
place significant value on their future interactions), as characterized by having dis-
count factors higher than δ. Despite the fact that the proposed binary monitoring
structures in (4.1) and (4.2) are informative enough for the folk theorem to hold,
their accuracy, (α, ), will impact the requirement on firms’ patience, δ. Character-
izing the dependence of δ on (α, ) is a direction of future work. Particularly, we
have only considered one method for using firms’ communication of their privately
observed signals to establish the folk theorem of Section 4.4.1. Determining the opti-
mal method for combining firms’ inputs to ensure the lowest δ remains an interesting
question.
Another possible extension is to consider the design of inter-temporal incentives
when both types of public and private monitoring are available. It is indeed still
possible to have firms coordinate based on the public monitoring system’s report
alone (i.e., use public strategies); nevertheless, it may also be possible to employ
private strategies, in which firms use both their own observations, as well as the
public signal. Private strategies may lead to higher payoffs than those attainable
through public strategies alone [80, Chapter 10], thus making their study of interest
to either lower the required discount factor, or to implement such strategies when the
monitoring signals are not informative enough for a public monitoring folk theorem
to hold.
Finally, studying the possibility of sustaining inter-temporal incentives under gen-
eralizations of the current model are of interest. While we have assumed that all firms
benefit equally from others’ disclosed information, a generalized model can introduce
a network structure among firms to capture the importance of firms’ information to
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one another. We have also assumed that the monitoring, as well as its accuracy, are
fixed and available to firms at no additional cost. Analyzing the effects of costly
monitoring, as well as the dependence of the accuracy on the underlying security
incident, are other interesting questions for future work.
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Chapter 5
Crowdsourcing Reputation in Security Games
5.1 Introduction
A common assumption required in some classes of incentive mechanisms, in-
cluding the Externality mechanism of Section 2.4.1, is that users’ levels of effort
are observable by the regulator, and can thus be used to determine appropriate
taxes/rewards. Similarly, to mitigate the problem of moral hazard when designing
cyber insurance contracts, or in order to devise insurance contracts with premium
discrimination, an insurer needs to observe the investments of the insured, or at least
have access to an accurate estimate of their effort levels. Finally, in security infor-
mation sharing agreements, there is a need for forming assessments of participants’
adherence to the terms of the agreement.
In general, the exact amount of security expenditure or security decisions by an
autonomous entity remains her private information. Nevertheless, we can assume
that a noisy observation of each entity’s level of effort is available to the regulator,
as well as to other entities. Such observation can be based on analyzing the ex-
changed traffic, past data on security incidents [32, 124, 104], externally observable
mismanagement symptoms [127], or reputation blacklists [22, 60, 105, 37]. These
observations can be mapped to appropriate security scores [77], which can then be
aggregated to form an opinion about the security status, or reputation, of each entity.
While the (noisy) reputation assessment gleaned from an external vantage point
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can be used for offering insurance contracts, determining taxes, or assessing adher-
ence to the sharing agreement, we ask whether it is possible to design a reputation
mechanism that can improve upon this assessment, by incorporating input from all
entities in the environment. Ultimately, the designer aims to find the best estimate of
each entity’s security status. The entities themselves are on one hand attempting to
have the best estimate of others’ efforts to choose an action, such as the optimal level
of self-protection, in response. On the other hand, each entity attempts to inflate the
perception of other entities, as well as the regulator, about her own effort, so as to
spend less resources while appearing to have a better security posture, consequently
enjoying more favorable contracts, higher rewards, lower taxes, or continued benefits
from the information sharing agreement.
In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on the general problem of reputation
mechanism design, and when appropriate, interpret the model and results in the
context of network (security) reputation.
5.1.1 Related work
The theory of mechanism design has been increasingly used to address problems
of resource allocation in informationally decentralized systems with strategic users.
Pricing schemes, e.g. [78], and auctions, e.g. [58], are two popular approaches in
the design of allocation schemes in communication systems. The use of pricing al-
lows the system to align individual users’ objectives with global performance goals
to implement optimal outcomes. Despite the possibility of using monetary taxa-
tion in our setting, alternative forms of leverage may be preferred in incentivizing
user cooperation, though they are relatively hard to identify; two notable exceptions
are [107, 126]. In [107], the authors study the problem of using the downlink rate
allocated to a user as an alternative commodity to induce socially optimal uplink
rate allocation in a multi-access broadcast channel with selfish users. The work of
[126] proposes an intervention mechanism that uses the commodity of interest as
the means for preventing users’ deviation from their designated strategies. Specif-
ically, a monitoring device is used to estimate the transmit power profile of selfish
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users in a wireless network; it then chooses to transmit at a positive power level if
users deviate to higher transmission powers, thus negatively affecting users’ utili-
ties. The punish-reward mechanism proposed in Section 5.3.1 of this chapter also
relies on a credible threat of punishment to deter non-cooperative users from devia-
tion. However, the above intervention mechanism only exercises punishment, while
our punish-reward mechanism can also reward users’ cooperative actions using the
commodity of interest.
The work presented in this chapter is also closely related to elicitation and pre-
diction mechanisms used for aggregating the predictions of agents about an event,
see e.g. [125, 106, 49]. Scoring rules [125] incentivize an agent to truthfully reveal
her prediction by offering rewards based on the accuracy of the agent’s estimation
as compared to the actual realization of the event. Although these rules can be
used to quantify the performance of forecasters, they rely on the observation of an
objective ground truth. A class of peer prediction methods can be used to eliminate
the need for such verification by requesting an agent’s own assessment, as well as
her prediction of other agent’s assessment. For example, the elicitation methods in
[106] and [49] result in truthful revelation even for subjective assessments. However,
in all aforementioned work, the users are essentially rewarded in accordance with
their participation, but do not attach any value to the realization of the event, or the
outcome that the elicitor may be building using the aggregated data. In this chapter,
users attach value to the outcome built by the estimator. This allows our proposed
mechanism to use non-monetary rewards (a vector of accurate reputation indices)
to incentivize participation, whereas in elicitation methods monetary rewards are
used to incentivize cooperation. Furthermore, although we are studying a problem
of elicitation about an objective ground truth, this event is not observable by the
elicitor.
5.1.2 Chapter contributions
The contribution of this chapter is to propose a simple punish-reward reputation
mechanism that, by soliciting both self-assessments and cross-assessments from a
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set of strategic users, is able to improve its own prior assessment of these users’
reputation (security posture or related decisions), without the need for monetary
incentives.
5.1.3 Chapter organization
Section 5.2 presents the model and preliminaries. The design and analysis of
the punish-reward mechanism is presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 concludes the
chapter.
5.2 The reputation system model
Consider a collection of K ≥ 2 entities1, denoted by N1, N2, . . . , NK . In the
context of network reputation, a user Ni may refer to a network in a system of
interconnected networks. Each user Ni’s overall quality is described by a quantity
rii, which we refer to as the real or true quality of Ni, or simply the truth. We assume
without loss of generality that rii ∈ [0, 1],∀i. With a slight abuse of notation we will
use K to denote both the number of users and the set of user indices {1, 2, · · · , K}
whenever there is no ambiguity. We assume that each user Ni is aware of her own
condition, and therefore knows rii precisely, but this is her private information. We
do note however that while it is technically feasible for any entity to obtain rii by
monitoring her own actions/interactions (e.g. a network is aware of its expenditures
in security measures), this is by no means always the case due to reasons such as
resource constraints.
There is a central reputation system that is responsible for soliciting input from
participants, and coming up with the system estimates. For instance, this could be
a regulator or insurer in the network reputation example. Specifically, the system
proposes a mechanism, according to which it collects input from participants and
uses it to build a global quality assessment, in the form of a reputation index, for
each of the K users in the system. Its goal is to have the reputation index reflect
1We will use the terms users, entities and participants interchangeably.
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the true quality rii as accurately as possible.
In general, each user Nj independently monitors her interactions with another
user Ni to form an estimate Rji based on her observations. For example, a network Nj
can monitor the inbound traffic from network Ni to form an opinion. However, Nj’s
observation is in general an incomplete view of Ni, and may contain errors depending
on the monitoring and estimation technique used. We will thus assume that Rji is
described by a normal distribution N (µji, σ2ji), which itself may be unbiased (µji =
rii) or biased (µji 6= rii) 2. We will further assume that this distribution (but not its
realization) is common knowledge.
The reputation system itself may also be able to monitor the actions of each user
Ni so as to form its own estimate of Ni’s condition. This will be denoted by R0i,
again a random variable for the same reason given above. In the network reputation
example, the system’s observations can be gathered by monitoring the outgoing
traffic of a network, and by considering externally observable security indicators,
including mismanagement symptoms and malicious activity data. As before we will
assume that R0i is normally distributed with N (µ0i, σ20i), and that this distribution
is known to user Ni.
Reputation mechanism’s objective The reputation system operates as follows.
It can collect a vector (xij)j∈K of reports from each user Ni. It consists of cross-
reports xij, i, j = 1, · · · , K, j 6= i, which represent Ni’s assessment of Nj’s quality,
and self-reports xii, i = 1, 2, · · · , K, which are the users’ self-advertised quality mea-
sure. The mechanism may be such that only a subset of these reports are collected.
Furthermore, there is no a priori guarantee that the participants will report any of
these quantities truthfully.
The reputation system’s goal is to derive the reputation index for each user Ni so
as to accurately reflect the true quality rii. This objective is different from what is
commonly studied, e.g., revenue maximization. Formally, the reputation mechanism
2The assumption of a normal distribution is made for simplicity and concreteness. Our proposed
framework is also applicable given other distributions.
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is designed to solve the following problem:
min
∑
i
|rˆi − rii| . (5.1)
Here, we have used the absolute error as a performance measure; other error functions
may be adopted as well.
A reputation mechanism specifies a method used by the reputation system to
compute the reputation indices, i.e., what input to solicit and how the inputs are
used to generate output estimates. As users are entities acting in self-interest and
the truth is their own private information, the key to a successful mechanism (one
that attains the solution to (5.1)) is to induce the users to provide useful, or ideally
truthful, input. Such a reputation mechanism will also be referred to as a collective
revelation mechanism, a term borrowed from [49]. It is assumed that the mechanism
is common knowledge among all K participating users.
Individual users’ objectives In modeling users’ objectives, we identify two ele-
ments of a user’s payoff.
• Truth: Each user Ni may wish to obtain accurate estimates on a set of users
of interest Ii ⊂ K. Formally, this part of the objective function is given by
Ii = −
∑
j∈Ii
fi(|rˆj − rjj|) .
Here, fi(·) ≥ 0 are increasing and convex functions. This element captures a
user’s interest in having accurate assessment of other users’ quality so that she
can properly regulate her actions. For instance, each network in an interdepen-
dent system requires an accurate assessment of others’ security effort in order
to decide on her own optimal level of investment.
• Image: Each user Ni may further wish to obtain as high as possible an estimate
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on herself. Formally,
IIi = gi(rˆi) .
Here, gi(·) ≥ 0 are concave and increasing. This element reflects a user’s
interest in having a high reputation herself as it translates into other benefits
as mentioned earlier. For instance, a network can enjoy higher rewards or lower
taxes as a result of appearing more secure.
A general preference model of a legitimate, non-malicious user may consist of
both elements, possibly weighted; that is, user Ni may be captured by
ui = −λ
∑
j∈Ii
fi(|rˆj − rjj|) + (1− λ)gi(rˆi) , (5.2)
for some constant 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Throughout this chapter, for simplicity and tractability,
we assume the two elements are weighed equally by all users, and that fi(z) = gi(z) =
z,∀i; extension to other choices of λ, gi(·), and fi(·), is straightforward. Our work
in [90] contains the study of reputation mechanisms for several other environments,
including environments with only truth type (utilities with only a truth element),
only image type (utilities with only an image element), or a mix of truth and image
type users.
By defining these two utility elements, we assume a user’s preference is in general
increasing in the accuracy of others’ quality estimate, and increasing in her own
quality estimate. We assume these two characteristics to be common knowledge.
It should be noted that rˆj is a function of the proposed game form (M, h),
whereM denotes users’ message space, and h(·) denotes the function mapping users’
messages to an outcome. Here, rˆj = h(m1,m2, . . . ,mK), with mj denoting Nj’s
message. Since the proposed model is one of incomplete information, from Ni’s
viewpoint, the message profile m ∈ M, and consequently ui, is in general a random
variable. Therefore, it is understood that Ni is an expected-utility maximizer.
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5.3 Design of a reputation mechanism
5.3.1 The punish-reward (PR) mechanism
We next set out to construct a reputation mechanism which invokes the use of
both self-reports and cross-reports, and will forgo the use of taxation. As we shall see
later, even though the system’s own observation R0i is sufficient for implementing the
proposed reputation mechanism, more cross-reports can improve the performance of
our proposed mechanism when used properly. In particular, we allow the system to
collect cross-observations from users Nj on users Ni who are in her set of interest,
i.e., i ∈ Ij. We will assume that a user Nj has observations of a user Ni if and only
if this user is within her set of interest.
We first introduce a simple, benchmark mechanism, referred to as the simple
averaging mechanism, where the reputation agent solicits cross-reports xji for j, i ∈
Ij, and computes the estimate rˆi as the average of these xji and its own observation
R0i. This is the basic mechanism used in many existing online systems, e.g., Amazon
and Epinions [65]. The following proposition shows that for this mechanism, Nj will
choose to participate, and truthfully disclose her observation Rji. The proof is given
in Appendix E.
Proposition 5.1. Under the simple averaging mechanism, truthful revelation of the
observation Rji, by Nj, j : i ∈ Ij is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In addition, this
mechanism is individually rational.
In fact, if the estimates Rji, for j, i ∈ Ij, are unbiased, then rˆi can be made
arbitrarily close to rii as the number of participants increases. It is not hard to see
that under this mechanism, if asked, Ni will always report xii = 1, and thus the
self-reports will bear no information.
Alternatively, we could seek to build a mechanism that incentivizes Ni to provide
a useful self-report even if it is not the precise truth rii. With this in mind, a good
mechanism might on one hand convince Ni that she can help contribute to a desired,
high estimate rˆi by supplying input xii, while on the other hand try to use the cross-
reports, which are estimates of the truth rii, to assess Ni’s self-report and threaten
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with punishment if it is judged to be overly misleading.
Furthermore, we design the mechanism such that Ni’s cross-reports are not used
in deriving her own reputation. By doing so, we ensure that the cross-reports of Ni
affect only her truth elements fi(|rˆj − rjj|). It is worth mentioning that in another
class of reputation systems, Ni could exploit the indirect effect of her cross-report
by badmouthing other users so as to improve its relative position in the system, i.e.,
make herself look better by comparison. Here however, there is no clear incentive
for Ni to do so, since the current model is one of absolute, rather than propor-
tional/relative reputations. If our proposed mechanism is to be used in a relative
reputation setting, the system should not collect self-reports, and instead operate
based on its own observations R0i alone.
Consider the following way of computing the reputation index rˆi for Ni. The
system uses its own observation R0i, along with the received cross-reports Rji, for
j, i ∈ Ij, to judge Ni’s self-report. In the simplest case, the system can take the
average of all these estimations to get x¯0i :=
Σj:i∈Ijxji+R0i
Ti+1
, where Ti := ‖{k : i ∈ Ik}‖,
and derive rˆi using:
rˆi(xii, x¯0i) =
 x¯0i+xii2 if xii ∈ [x¯0i − , x¯0i + ],x¯0i − |x¯0i − xii| if xii /∈ [x¯0i − , x¯0i + ]. (5.3)
where  is a fixed and known constant. In words, the reputation system takes the
average of the self-report xii and the aggregate cross-report x¯0i if the two are suffi-
ciently close, or else punishes Ni for reporting significantly differently. We refer to
this mechanism as the punish-reward mechanism. There are other ways to convey
the same idea of weighing between averaging and punishing, such as punishing only
when the self-report exceeds the cross-report. We analyze this simple variant in this
chapter.
Next we examine the strategic behavior of users when playing the induced game.
We will start by assuming that all cross-observations are unbiased and are reported
truthfully, i.e., xji ∼ N (rii, σ2), j, i ∈ Ij and R0i ∼ N (rii, σ2).3 This will allow us
3Note that we are assuming σ is common, and known by the reputation system as well as the
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to focus on the strategic choice of the self-reports rii. We return to characterizing
the mutual best-response strategies for all participants in Section 5.3.3, where we
allow users to strategically bias their cross-reports.
5.3.2 Choice of self-reports in the PR mechanism
As Ni knows the distribution of the observations Rji, she is best-responding to
an aggregate cross-report which is a sample of a distribution N (µ, σ′2), with µ = rii
and σ′2 = σ
2
Ti+1
. The choice of self-report xii is then determined by the solution to
the optimization problem maxxii E[rˆi].
Using (5.3), E[rˆi] eventually simplifies to (with F (·) and f(·) denoting the CDF
and PDF of x¯0i, respectively):
E[rˆi] = xii +

2
(F (xii + )− 3F (xii − ))− 12
∫ xii+
xii−
F (x)dx− 2
∫ xii−
−∞
F (x)dx .
(5.4)
Taking the derivative with respect to xii, we get:
dE[rˆi]
dxii
= 1 +

2
[f(xii + )− 3f(xii − )]− 1
2
[F (xii + ) + 3F (xii − )]. (5.5)
We next re-write  = aσ′; this expression of  reflects how the reputation system
can limit the variation in the self-report using its knowledge of this variation σ′.
Replacing  = aσ′ and x¯0i ∼ N (µ, σ′2) in (5.5), and making the change of variable
y := xii−µ
aσ′ results in:
a√
2pi
(e
−(a(y+1)√
2
)2 − 3e−(a(y−1)√2 )2)− 1
2
(erf(
a(y + 1)√
2
) + 3erf(
a(y − 1)√
2
)) = 0 . (5.6)
Therefore, if y solves (5.6) for a given a, the optimal value for xii would be x
∗
ii =
µ+ aσ′y. Equation (5.6) can be solved numerically for a, resulting in Figure 5.1.
participants. This standard deviation σ can be thought of as a measure of the variation of the
estimates on Ni, which depends on the nature of the observations and the algorithm used for the
estimate.
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Figure 5.1: Solution of (5.6): y vs. a
Two interesting observations can be made from Figure 5.1: (1) 0 < y < 1, and
(2) as a consequence µ < x∗ii < µ + . This means that Ni chooses to inflate her
self-report in hope of inflating rˆAi , while trying to stay within her prediction of the
acceptable range.
5.3.2.1 Properties of the PR mechanism
We first compare the performance of (5.3) to the simple averaging mechanism.
Define em := E[|rˆi − rii|] as the mean absolute error (MAE) of the mechanism
described in (5.3) with  = aσ′. Assuming the optimal self-report x∗ii, and unbiased,
truthful cross-reports, it is possible to find the expression for em as a function of the
parameter a. We can thus optimize the choice of a by solving the problem mina em.
Taking the derivative of em we get:
dem
da
= σ
′
2
(
a√
2pi
(e−
(a(y+1))2
2 − 3e− (a(y−1))
2
2 )
+ (ay + y′)
(
erf( ay√
2
)− 1
2
(erf(a(y+1)√
2
)− 3erf(a(y−1)√
2
))
+
a√
2pi
(e−
(a(y+1))2
2 + 3e−
(a(y−1))2
2 ) + 2
))
= 0 . (5.7)
As seen in (5.7), the optimal choice of a does not depend on the specific values
of µ and σ′. Therefore, the same mechanism can be used for any set of users.
Equation (5.7) can be solved numerically, with a result that the minimum error is
achieved at a ≈ 1.7. This can be seen from Figure 5.2, which shows the MAE of
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Figure 5.3: Expected reputation of a user
in the PR mechanism
the PR mechanism compared to that of the averaging mechanism. Under the simple
averaging mechanism the MAE is E[|x¯0i − rii|] =
√
2
pi
σ′. We see that for a large
range of a values, the PR mechanism given in (5.3) results in smaller estimation
error. This suggests that Ni’s self-report can significantly benefit the system, as well
as all users other than Ni.
We have now verified the PR mechanism as a suboptimal solution to the problem
of determining users’ reputations; when designed appropriately, it can outperform
the simple averaging mechanism. It is clearly budget balanced as no taxation is
imposed. We next check whether there is incentive for Ni to provide her self-report,
i.e., does this benefit Ni herself? Figure 5.3 compares Ni’s estimated reputation rˆi
under the proposed mechanism to that under the averaging mechanism4; the latter
is simply the average of all observations on Ni, and is E[x¯0i] = rii when cross-reports
are unbiased.
Taking Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 together, we see that there is a region, a ∈ [2, 2.5]
in which the presence of the self-report helps Ni obtain a higher reputation index,
while helping the system reduce its estimation error on Ni. This is a region that is
mutually beneficial to both Ni and the system, and Ni clearly has an incentive to
participate and provide her self-report.
4In calculating the reserved utility, we have assumed that in the event Ni chooses to stay out
of the game, the reputation system will use simple averaging on the gathered cross-observations to
estimate Ni’s reputation.
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5.3.3 Choice of cross-reports in the PR mechanism
As shown in Section 5.3.2, each user will introduce a positive bias in her self-
report. Predicting this, one may expect other users (and the reputation system)
to decrease the effect of this positive bias, by say, negatively biasing their submit-
ted cross-reports. In this section, we formalize this intuition by allowing users to
strategically choose their cross-reports. We will model this strategic behavior by the
addition of a bias term to the initial observation, so that xji = Rji + bji. As all users
Nj providing cross-reports on Ni are assumed symmetric, they will choose the same
bias term, denoted bii.
As a result, the new aggregate cross-report to be used in the PR mechanism
is given by x¯0i ∼ N (µ, σ′2), where µ = rii + bii and σ′2 = σ2K . The argument to
derive the optimal self-report will proceed exactly as in Section 5.3.2, so that Ni
will accordingly adapt her self-report to be x∗ii = rii + bii + ayσ
′, given other users’
strategic behavior.
We next find an expression for em, the MAE of the PR mechanism, given the
parameter a.5
em =
1
2
∫ µ+a(y+1)σ′
2rii−µ−ayσ′
xf(x)dx− 1
2
∫ 2rii−µ−ayσ′
µ+a(y−1)σ′
xf(x)dx− 2
∫ µ+a(y−1)σ′
−∞
xf(x)dx
+ µ− rii + ayσ′ + (µ+ ayσ′)(3
2
F (µ+ a(y − 1)σ′)− 1
2
F (µ+ a(y + 1)σ′))
+ (2rii − µ− ayσ′) F (2rii − µ− ayσ′) . (5.8)
where F (·) and f(·) are the CDF and PDF of x¯0i. To find the value of b at which
the error is minimized, we take the derivative of (5.8), resulting in:
dem
dµ
= 1− 2F (2rii − µ− ayσ′) . (5.9)
Setting (5.9) equal to zero for a given a, we find that the MAE is minimized at
b∗ii = −ayσ
′
2
. As a result, each Nj will choose the cross-report x
∗
ji = Rji − ayσ
′
2
.
5The following calculations are for moderate values of bias bii ∈ [−ayσ′,−ayσ′ + aσ′2 ].
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Similarly, the reputation system will choose to input x0i = R0i− ayσ′2 . By predicting
this behavior, Ni will choose the self-report x
∗
ii = rii +
ayσ′
2
. Therefore, given the
mechanism, Nj can strategically choose her cross-report to decrease the estimation
error on Ni.
5.4 Discussion and conclusion
As mentioned earlier, several variations on the proposed punish-reward mecha-
nism are possible, and can potentially improve the performance of the reputation
mechanism. One straightforward variation would be to use the weighted mean of the
cross-reports, instead of a simple average, to generate the aggregate cross-report
x¯0i :=
∑
j:i∈Ij wjxji∑
j:i∈Ij wj
, (5.10)
where w := (wj)j:i∈Ij is a vector of weights, also specified by the reputation system.
One reasonable choice for w could be a vector of previously computed reputations
rˆj, with the intention of allowing the more reputable users to have a higher influence
on the estimates. Similar ideas are commonly used in rating/ranking systems. We
proceed by analyzing the performance of this alternative mechanism.
Assume xji ∼ N(rii, σ2ji), i.e., all interested users have an unbiased view of Ni,
but with potentially different accuracy as reflected by different values of σji, with
smaller variances corresponding to more precise estimates. In the special case σji = σ,
∀j, i ∈ Ij, it can be shown that the weighted average will (regardless of the choice
of w) increase the variance of the aggregated cross-report, and thus the estimation
error. What this implies is that users with equally accurate views should be given
the same power to affect the outcome.
On the other hand, if σji’s are different across users, then choosing w such that∑
j:i∈Ij wj
2σ2ji ≤
∑
j:i∈Ij
1
T 2i
σ2ji leads to a lower variance, and thus a lower estimation
error. This rearrangement shows clearly that for the inequality to hold, it suffices to
put more weight on the smaller σji’s, i.e., more weight on those with more accurate
observations. Technically this result is to be expected. However, in our context it
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points to the following interesting interpretation: more reputable users (higher rˆj)
should only be given higher weights if they also have more accurate observations
(smaller σji), which may or may not be the case. This is a scenario where reputation
itself should not carry more voting power. Otherwise the system is better off assigning
equal weights to all.
We end this chapter by noting that the punish-reward mechanism is only one
possible mechanism to achieve a sub-optimal solution to problem (5.1). We have
chosen it for its simplicity and effectiveness. An additional advantage of the PR
mechanism is that its design (specifically the choice of a) is independent of the
other model parameters (e.g., the true reputations and the number of users), with
appropriate choices of its parameter a resulting in a mutually beneficial region for the
users and the system, regardless of the problem instance. Most importantly, the PR
mechanism only uses the commodity of interest to shape users’ incentives, allowing
us to forgo the issue of modeling users’ valuation of monetary taxation/rewards. It
remains an interesting and challenging problem to find a mechanism that results in
the smallest performance gap, if it exists, compared to the solution to the centralized
problem (5.1).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 A brief review
In this thesis, we investigated the theoretical underpinnings of users’ incentives
in exerting effort towards the provision of public goods on networks. We studied
incentive mechanisms for implementing the socially optimal outcomes in these envi-
ronments, with a focus on the issue of voluntary participation. We show the impor-
tance of accounting for users’ outside options when providing non-excludable goods,
such as security, as the non-excludability of the good presents additional challenges
that are not present in previously studied private or excludable public good provision
problems. In particular, we propose the notion of exit equilibrium to describe users’
outside options from mechanisms for incentivizing the provision of non-excludable
public goods. We use this notion to show the negative result that there exists no tax-
based incentive mechanism which can implement the socially optimal effort profile,
while guaranteeing voluntary participation and maintaining weak budget balance,
in all instances of games of provision of non-excludable goods. By extending this
result to risk-averse users purchasing cyber-insurance contracts, we highlight the
limitations of using cyber-insurance as a method for improving the state of cyber
security.
We then considered a particular class of public good provision games played
on networks. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of
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Nash equilibria of these games, based solely on the network structure. We show
that existing results in the literature can be recovered as special cases of our result.
We further identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash
equilibria for the family of games at the two extremes of our model, namely games of
strategic complements and games of strategic substitutes. We establish a connection
between agents’ efforts at different outcomes of these games, namely Nash equilibria,
Pareto efficient outcomes, and semi-cooperative equilibria, and their positions in the
interdependence network. We separate the effects of agents’ dependencies (outgoing
edges in the network) and influences (incoming edges in the network) on their effort
decisions, and uncover an alternating effect over walks of different length in the
network.
We studied the design of inter-temporal incentives in a particular class of security
games, namely security information sharing agreements. We show that if participants
condition their future cooperation on the history of their past interactions, where
the history consists of announcements by a public monitor who provides (imperfect)
assessments of participants’ cooperation, then it is possible for firms to play equilibria
in which they always truthfully disclose their security information. We show that in
the absence of public monitoring, the same result can be attained if firms are provided
with a platform to communicate their private assessments of others’ adherence to the
agreement.
6.2 Future directions
We first discuss additional directions for alleviating the negative result on a si-
multaneous guarantee on social optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget
balance. One alternative is to consider restricted utility functions and/or network
structures, and leverage the additional information in the design of incentive mech-
anisms. We have considered this alternative by finding families of positive instances
for the weighted effort models in Section 2.4.2. Chapter 3 provides additional tools
for this analysis. An interesting direction of future work using the framework and re-
sults of Chapter 3 is to identify conditions on the network structure under which the
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aforementioned requirements on the performance guarantees of incentive mechanisms
can be simultaneously satisfied.
Another implication of our negative result is that, when a designer lacks addi-
tional information about the specifics of the problem environment and users’ pref-
erences, she may choose to forgo the social optimality requirement, instead focusing
on reliably attaining a sub-optimal solution while guaranteeing full voluntary par-
ticipation and weak budget balance. Characterizing mechanisms that can provide a
guarantee on the sub-optimality of the solution (e.g., -close to, or a β-fraction of,
the optimal solution), as well as the best attainable sub-optimal solution, remain as
directions of future work.
We further considered the alternative of designing inter-temporal incentives by
studying public good provision games in a repeated framework. We illustrate the
methodology in our study of repeated information sharing agreements in Chapter
4. Possible extensions of this study include the analysis of inter-temporal incentives
that use both public and private assessments simultaneously, as well as the benefits of
increasing the accuracy of the monitoring. It is also interesting to consider alternative
monitoring technologies, in particular those in which the accuracy of the assessment
of firms’ truthfulness is dependent on the type of underlying (un)disclosed incident.
The inter-temporal incentives proposed for achieving cooperation in security in-
formation sharing agreements are to be sustained among peers, that is, a perceived
deviation by a firm leads her peers to modify their future actions. As a direction
of future work, we also propose the design of such inter-temporal incentives in a
principal-agent framework. Consider a cyber-insurer, who proposes bundles of con-
tracts to the insured. A bundle of contracts purchased by an insured consists of
sub-contracts, one of which is activated, for the duration of a pre-agreed fraction of
the contract term, depending on the (perceived) effort exerted by the insured. For
example, when an ongoing threat is discovered, an insured who is perceived to have
patched her system against this threat will activate a contract with lower premium
and/or higher coverage for that month. An interesting direction of future work is
studying the design of these bundles of contracts, such that the insured has incen-
tives to exert effort throughout the term of the contract, especially as the threat
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landscape changes.
Finally, we propose possible directions of future work for the study of public good
provision games on networks. First, we are interested in the generalization of the
current results to other games played on networks, in particular, games in which
agents’ best replies are non-linear in others’ actions. The other interesting direction
is using the centrality-effort characterization for conducting comparative statics (e.g.,
the effects of adding/removing links), as well as for the design of targeted tax/subsidy
policies that can incentivize the improved provision of the public good.
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Appendix A
The Pivotal Mechanism: Social optimality and voluntary
participation
We present two propositions to illustrate the main properties of the Pivotal mech-
anism, namely social optimality and voluntary participation. The proofs follow di-
rectly from the classical literature on VCG mechanisms and are included for com-
pleteness.
Proposition A.1. In the Pivotal mechanism with taxes given by (2.6), reporting the
true type, i.e., the true utility function ui(·), is a dominant strategy for all users i.
Therefore, the socially optimal solution is implemented.
Proof. The total utility of user i when reporting u˜i(·), while others report u˜j(·), j 6= i,
is given by
vi(x˜, ti) = ui(x˜) +
∑
j 6=i
u˜j(x˜)−
∑
j 6=i
u˜j(xˆ
i) ,
where x˜ = arg maxx0
∑N
k=1 u˜k(x) is the allocation that is optimal given the re-
ported types u˜k(·),∀k. We first note that the last term is independent of user i’s
report. Then, as the allocation x˜ is chosen according to the optimization problem
arg maxx0
∑N
k=1 u˜k(x) over the reported types, the sum of the first and second terms
is maximized at u˜i(·) = ui(·). Therefore, users will reveal their true preferences, irre-
spective of other users’ reports. Consequently, the socially optimal investment profile
will be prescribed by the mechanism designer.
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Proposition A.2. The Pivotal mechanism with taxes given by (2.6) satisfies volun-
tary participation.
Proof. The change in the utility of a user i when staying in vs. opting out of the
mechanism is given by
vi(x
∗, ti)− ui(xˆi) =
ui(x
∗) +
∑
j 6=i
uj(x
∗)−
∑
j 6=i
uj(xˆ
i)− ui(xˆi) =∑
j
uj(x
∗)−
∑
j
uj(xˆ
i) ≥ 0 .
The inequality is due to the fact that x∗ is the socially optimal solution given by
the maximizer of the sum of all users’ utilities. We conclude that it is in the best
interest of users to participate in the Pivotal mechanism with the given taxes.
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Appendix B
The Externality Mechanism: Social optimality and budget
balance
We present two propositions to illustrate the main properties of the Externality
mechanism, namely social optimality and budget balance.
Proposition B.1. In the Externality mechanism with taxes given by (2.7), investing
the socially optimal security effort x∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First, note that the taxes assigned to users at a vector of investments x
(possibly off equilibrium) is given by
tEi (x) = −
N∑
j=1
xjLi
∂fi
∂xj
(x∗)− xi∂hi
∂xi
(x∗i ) .
Now, assume all users other than i are investing at the socially optimal level x∗−i.
Then, user i’s total utility is
vi(xi,x
∗
−i, ti) = Wi − Lifi(xi,x∗−i)− hi(xi)
+ xiLi
∂fi
∂xj
(x∗) +
N∑
j 6=i
x∗jLi
∂fi
∂xj
(x∗) + xi
∂hi
∂xi
(x∗i ) .
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The first derivative of i’s utility with respect to xi is given by
∂vi(xi,x
∗
−i, ti)
∂xi
= −Li ∂fi
∂xj
(xi,x
∗
−i)−
∂hi
∂xi
(xi)
+ Li
∂fi
∂xj
(x∗) +
∂hi
∂xi
(x∗i ) .
We conclude that x∗i is a best response for user i, and hence the socially optimal
effort profile x∗ is a Nash equilibrium given the Externality taxes (2.7).
Proposition B.2. The Externality mechanism with taxes given by (2.7) has strong
budget balance.
Proof. The sum of taxes in (2.7) is given by
N∑
i=1
tEi (x
∗) = −
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
x∗jLi
∂fi
∂xj
(x∗)−
N∑
i=1
x∗i
∂hi
∂xi
(x∗i )
=
N∑
i=1
x∗i
(
−
N∑
j=1
Lj
∂fj
∂xi
(x∗)− ∂hi
∂xi
(x∗i )
)
= 0 . (B.1)
The last line follows from the observation that, using (2.2), at the socially optimal
solution, either x∗i or the term inside the parentheses in (B.1) is zero. Hence, the
Externality mechanism guarantees (strong) budget balance.
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Appendix C
Effects of self-dependence in weighted effort games
In this appendix, we consider the security game where users’ utilities are given by
(2.8) and interdependence matrix (2.9). We solve for the socially optimal investment
profile, and identify the possible exit equilibria, and parameter conditions under
which each equilibrium is possible.
The socially optimal investment profile in this game will be given by
x∗i =
1
a+N − 1 ln
a+N − 1
c
,∀i .
To find the exit equilibrium for user i, xˆi, we write the first order conditions on (2.4).
To simplify notation, denote x := xˆii and y := xˆ
i
j, ∀j 6= i. The system of equation
determining x and y is given by
−a exp(−ax− (N − 1)y) + c ≥ 0 ,
−(a+N − 2) exp(−x− (a+N − 2)y) + c ≥ 0 . (C.1)
There are four possible exit equilibria, depending on whether x and/or y are non-zero.
We look at each case separately.
Exit equilibria with x > 0, y > 0 Intuitively, when user i steps out, both sides
continue to invest in security, perhaps at reduced levels, but no user is fully free-
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riding. We would need the following to hold simultaneously:
−a exp(−ax− (N − 1)y) + c = 0 ,
−(a+N − 2) exp(−x− (a+N − 2)y) + c = 0 .
Solving for x, y leads to
x =
1
(a− 1)(a+N − 1) ln(
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1) ,
y =
1
(a− 1)(a+N − 1) ln(
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a .
To find the range of parameters for which the above holds, we need to ensure that
x, y are indeed positive.
• If a > 1, then y > 0. For x > 0, we need
(
a
c
)a−1 > (1 +
N − 2
a
)N−1 .
• If a < 1, then x > 0. For y > 0, we need
(1 +
N − 2
a
)a < (
a
c
)1−a .
Exit equilibria with x > 0, y = 0 In this case, the participating users revert to
investing zero, so that the outlier is forced to increase her investment:
−a exp(−ax) + c = 0 ,
−(a+N − 2) exp(−x) + c > 0 .
As a result, we get x = 1
a
ln a
c
. For this to be consistent with the second condition,
we require
(1 +
N − 2
a
)a < (
a
c
)1−a .
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The above always fails to hold for a > 1, as the LHS is always more than 1, while the
RHS is surely less than 1 by the assumption a > c. Intuitively, when self-dependence
is higher than co-dependence on the outlier, the remaining users will not rely solely
on externalities, and continue investing even when user i steps out.
For a < 1 on the other hand, for a small enough c (which leads to higher invest-
ment x be the outlier), the equation can hold.
Exit equilibria with x = 0, y > 0 This means that the loner free-rides, so that
we have
−a exp(−(N − 1)y) + c > 0 ,
−(a+N − 2) exp(−(a+N − 2)y) + c = 0 .
As a result, we get y = 1
a+N−2 ln
a+N−2
c
. For this to be consistent with the first
condition, we need
(1 +
N − 2
a
)N−1 > (
a
c
)a−1 .
Note that this always hold for a < 1, but not necessarily for a > 1.
Exit equilibria with x = 0, y = 0 We would need the following to hold simulta-
neously:
−a+ c > 0 ,
−(a+N − 2) + c > 0 ,
which will never hold, as we initially required that c < a.
Weak budget balance and voluntary participation constraints We now
separately analyze each of the possible cases identified in the previous section, sum-
marized in Table 2.1. Specifically, we are interested in the weak budget balance
condition under the Pivotal mechanism, and users’ participation incentives in the
Externality mechanism.
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Case α In this case, the underlying parameters satisfy a > 1 and (1 + N−2
a
)N−1 >
(a
c
)a−1. As a result, the exit equilibrium (EE) is such that x = 0, and y =
1
a+N−2 ln
a+N−2
c
. Therefore, the utilities of users at the SO and EE are given by
uj(x
∗) = W − c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
),∀j
uj(xˆ
i) = W − c
a+N − 2(1 + ln
a+N − 2
c
),∀j 6= i
ui(xˆ
i) = W − c
a+N − 2
N−1
a+N−2
.
Weak Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism Note that 1+ln z
z
is a de-
creasing function of z. Thus, uj(xˆ
i) > uj(x
∗) for all j, resulting in tPi < 0, indicating
rewards to all users i, and thus a budget deficit in all scenarios. Intuitively, although
when a user i steps out, other users have to invest less in security (thus decreasing
their direct investment costs), still their overall security costs go up as a result of
the increased risks. Consequently, each user i should be payed a reward to be kept
in the mechanism, resulting in a budget deficit.
Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism Voluntary partici-
pation will hold if and only if ui(xˆ
i) ≤ vi(x∗, tEi ), that is,
c
a+N − 2
N−1
a+N−2 ≥ c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
)
⇔ c
a+N − 2
N−1 ≥ ( c
a+N − 1)
a−1+N−1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
)a−1+N−1
⇔(a+N − 1
a+N − 2)
N−1(1 +
N − 1
a
)a−1(
a
c
)
a−1 − (1 + ln a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
))a+N−2 ≥ 0
Based on the last inequality, define the function g(z) := κ1z
a−1− (1 + ln z)a+N−2.
This function is increasing in z. As a result, it obtains its maximum when z reaches
its maximum value, which by the initial condition is given by a
c
= (1 + N−2
a
)
N−1
a−1 .
140
Thus,
gmax = (
a+N − 1
a+N − 2)
N−1(1 +
N − 1
a
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)N−1
− (1 + ln(1 + N − 2
a
)
N−1
a−1 (1 +
N − 1
a
))a+N−2
≤ (1 + N − 1
a
)a+N−2 − (1 + ln(1 + N − 1
a
) +
N − 1
a− 1 ln (1 +
N − 2
a
))a+N−2
≤ (1 + N − 1
a
)a+N−2 − (1 + ln(1 + N − 1
a
) +
N − 1
a
ln (1 +
N − 2
a
))a+N−2
Let z := N−1
a
, and define f(z) := ln(1+z)+z ln(1+z− 1
a
)−z (i.e., we are assuming
a fixed a). The derivative of this function wrt z is given by
1
1 + z
+ ln(1 + z − 1
a
) +
z
1 + z − 1
a
− 1 = ln(1 + z − 1
a
) +
1
a
z
(1 + z)(1− 1
a
+ z)
.
As the above is positive for all a > 1, we conclude that f(z) is an increasing function
in z. Furthermore, limz→0 f(z) = 0, which in turn means that f(z) ≥ 0,∀z ≥ 0,
and therefore, gmax is always non-positive. This in turn means that the voluntary
participation condition can never be satisfied.
Case β For this case, the underlying parameters satisfy a > 1 and (1 + N−2
a
)N−1 <
(a
c
)a−1. As a result, the exit equilibrium (EE) is such that x > 0, y > 0, and are given
by x = 1
(a−1)(a+N−1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 + N−2
a
)−(N−1) and
y = 1
(a−1)(a+N−1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 + N−2
a
)a. Therefore, the utilities of users at the SO
and EE are given by:
uj(x
∗) = W − c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
),∀j
uj(xˆ
i) = W − c
a+N − 2 +
c
(a−1)(a+N−1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a,∀j 6= i
ui(xˆ
i) = W − c
a
+ c(a−1)(a+N−1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1) .
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Weak Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism If uj(xˆ
i) ≤ uj(x∗), the
mechanism would always have a budget deficit. This holds if and only if
c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
) ≤ c
a+N − 2 +
c
(a−1)(a+N−1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a
⇔1 + ln a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≤ 1 + 1a+N−2 + ln
a
c
(1 +
N − 2
a
)
a
a−1
⇔ ln(1 + N − 1
a
) ≤ 1
a+N − 2 +
a
a− 1 ln (1 +
N − 2
a
)
⇐ ln(1 + N − 1
a
) ≤ 1
a+N − 2 + ln (1 +
N − 2
a
)
⇔ ln(1 + 1
a+N − 2) ≤
1
a+N − 2
The last line is true because ln(1 + x) ≤ x, for all x > 0. Therefore, the mechanism
always carries a budget deficit.
Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism The mechanism fails
voluntary participation if and only if
c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
) ≥ c
a
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1)
⇔1 + ln a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≥ 1 + N − 1
a
+ ln
a
c
(1 +
N − 2
a
)
−(N−1)
a−1
⇔ ln(1 + N − 1
a
) +
N − 1
a− 1 ln (1 +
N − 2
a
) ≥ N − 1
a
⇐ ln(1 + N − 1
a
) +
N − 1
a
ln (1 +
N − 1
a
− 1
a
) ≥ N − 1
a
Let z := N−1
a
, and define f(z) := ln(1+z)+z ln(1+z− 1
a
)−z (i.e., we are assuming a
fixed a). The derivative of this function wrt z is given by ln(1 + z− 1
a
) +
1
a
z
(1+z)(1− 1
a
+z)
.
As this is positive for all a > 1, we conclude that f(z) is an increasing function in
z. Furthermore, limz→0 f(z) = 0, which in turn means that f(z) ≥ 0,∀z ≥ 0, and
therefore, that the voluntary participation condition always fails to hold under these
parameter settings.
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Case γ Here, we only require that a < 1, and all other values of N or c will
guarantee the existence of an equilibrium x = 0 and y = 1
a+N−2 ln
a+N−2
c
. This is
thus parallel with Case α. Users’ utilities in the SO and EE are similarly given by
uj(x
∗) = W − c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
),∀j
uj(xˆ
i) = W − c
a+N − 2(1 + ln
a+N − 2
c
),∀j 6= i
ui(xˆ
i) = W − c
a+N − 2
N−1
a+N−2
.
Weak Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism Note that 1+ln z
z
is a de-
creasing function of z. Thus, uj(xˆ
i) < uj(x
∗) for all j, resulting in tPi < 0, indicating
rewards to all users i, and thus a budget deficit in all scenarios (exactly similar to
case α).
Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism Voluntary partici-
pation will fail to hold if and only if ui(xˆ
i) ≥ vi(x∗, tEi ), that is,
c
a+N − 2
N−1
a+N−2 ≤ c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
)
⇔ c
a+N − 2
N−1 ≤ ( ca+N−1)a−1+N−1(1 + ln a+N−1c )a−1+N−1
⇔(
a
c (1 +
N−1
a )
1 + ln ac (1 +
N−1
a )
)a−1 ≥ (1 + ln
a
c (1 +
N−1
a )
1 + 1a+N−2
)N−1
First, we note that the RHS is always greater than 1, as 1 + lnx ≤ x. On the other
hand, since a < 1, 1
a+N−2 < ln
a
c
(1 + N−1
a
) holds for all N ≥ 3, so that the LHS will
be less than 1. Therefore, the voluntary participation condition always fails.
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Case ζ This case has equilibrium investments similar to case β, but under param-
eter conditions a < 1, and (1 + N−2
a
)a < (a
c
)1−a. Therefore, we have
uj(x
∗) = W − c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
),∀j
uj(xˆ
i) = W − c
a+N − 2 +
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a,∀j 6= i
ui(xˆ
i) = W − c
a
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1) .
Weak Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism If uj(xˆ
i) ≥ uj(x∗), we
would always have weak budget balance. This holds if and only if
c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
) ≥ c
a+N − 2 +
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a
⇔1 + ln a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≥ 1 + 1
a+N − 2 + ln
a
c
(1 +
N − 2
a
)
a
a−1
⇔ ln(1 + N − 1
a
) ≥ 1
a+N − 2 +
a
a− 1 ln (1 +
N − 2
a
)
⇐ ln(1 + N − 1
a
) ≥ 1
a+N − 2
The last line follows from the previous because a < 1, and is true because its LHS
is ≥ lnN and its RHS is ≤ 1/(N − 1). Therefore, the mechanism always has weak
budget balance in this scenario.
Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism The mechanism has
voluntary participation if and only if
c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
) ≤ c
a
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1) ln (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1)
⇔1 + ln a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≤ 1 + N−1a + ln
a
c
(1 +
N − 2
a
)
−(N−1)
a−1
⇔ ln(1 + N − 1
a
)(1 +
N − 2
a
)
N−1
a−1 ≤ N − 1
a
The last statement holds because the second element in the logarithm is always less
than 1, due to a < 1, and the result follows as ln(1 + z) ≤ z, for all z > 0.
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Case ω The last case emerges under parameter settings a < 1 and (1 + N−2
a
)a <
(a
c
)1−a, and x = ln a
c
and y = 0 is the possible exit equilibrium. The users’ utilities
in the SO and EE here are given by
uj(x
∗) = W − c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
),∀j
uj(xˆ
i) = W − ( c
a
)
1
a ,∀j 6= i
ui(xˆ
i) = W − c
a
(1 + ln
a
c
) .
Weak Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism First we use (1 + N−2
a
)a <
(a
c
)1−a to conclude that ( c
a
)
1
a ≤ c
a+N−2 . Now, for the mechanism to have weak budget
balance it would be enough to have uj(xˆ
i) ≥ uj(x∗), which holds if and only if
c
a+N − 1(1 + ln
a+N − 1
c
) ≥ ( c
a
)
1
a
⇐1 + ln a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≥ 1 + 1
a+N − 2
⇐ ln(1 + N − 1
a
) ≥ 1
a+N − 2
where the last line line follows from the previous because a
c
> 1, and is true because
its LHS is ≥ lnN and its RHS is ≤ 1/(N − 1). Therefore, the mechanism always
has weak budget balance in this scenario.
Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism As 1+lnx
x
is a decreas-
ing function in x when x > 1, and 1 < a
c
< a+N−1
c
, the utilities when staying out
are lower for user i. Therefore voluntary participation is satisfied in the Externality
mechanism in this case.
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Appendix D
Effects of a dominant user in weighted effort games
In this appendix, we consider the weighted effort game with interdependence
matrix (2.10), and solve for the socially optimal investment profile, and identify the
possible exit equilibria, and parameter conditions under which each equilibrium is
possible. It is straightforward to show that in a socially optimal investment profile
x∗, only user 1 will be exerting effort, so that
x∗1 =
1
a
ln
aN
c
, x∗j = 0,∀j = 2, . . . , N .
We next find the exit equilibria. First, if any non-dominant user i 6= 1 steps out of
the mechanism, user 1 will continue exerting all effort, but at a lower level given by
xˆi1 =
1
a
ln
a(N − 1)
c
, xˆij = 0,∀j = 2, . . . , N .
Next, if user 1 steps out of the mechanism, there are two possible exit equilibria: if
a > N − 1, there will be enough externality for users j 6= 1 to continue free-riding,
resulting in the following equilibrium investment levels:
xˆ11 =
1
a
ln
a
c
, xˆ1j = 0, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
However, when a < N − 1, user 1 will free-ride on the externality of other users’
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investments, leading to the exit equilibrium
xˆ11 = 0, xˆ
1
j =
1
N − 1 ln
N − 1
c
,∀j = 2, . . . , N .
Voluntary participation in the Externality mechanism We now analyze the
performance of the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms, under the different exit
equilibria identified in the previous section, and summarized in Table 2.2.
In the Externality mechanism, users’ taxes are given by
tE1 (x
∗) = cx∗1(
1
N
− 1) ,
tEj (x
∗) =
c
N
x∗1,∀j = 2, . . . , N .
For non-dominant users i ∈ {2, . . . , N} to voluntarily participate in the mechanism,
we require ui(xˆ
i) ≤ vi(x∗, tEi (x∗)), which reduces to
c
a(N − 1) ≥
c
aN
+
c
aN
ln
aN
c
⇔ 1
N − 1 ≥ lnN + ln
a
c
.
However, lnN ≥ 1
N−1 ,∀N ≥ 3, and a > c. Therefore, the voluntary participation
constraints will always fail to hold for free-riders in the Externality mechanism.
A perhaps more interesting aspect is that the voluntary participation of user 1,
i.e., the main investor who is receiving a reward, may also fail to hold. Specifi-
cally, when a < N − 1, user 1 will participate voluntarily if and only if u1(xˆ1) ≤
v1(x
∗, tE1 (x
∗)), which reduces to
c
N − 1 ≥
c
aN
+
c
aN
ln
aN
c
.
However, the above inequality does not necessarily hold. For example, with N = 10,
c = 0.45, and a < 5, the above will fail to hold, indicating that the main investor
will also prefer to opt out. It is also interesting to mention that when a > N − 1,
the voluntary participation of the main investor always holds.
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Weak budget balance in the Pivotal mechanism Finally, we analyze the total
budget in the Pivotal mechanism. The taxes for the non-dominant users i 6= 1 will
be given by
tPi =
c
a
(ln
N
N − 1 − 1) .
The taxes for user 1 will depend on the realized exit equilibrium. If a < N − 1, this
tax is given by
tP1 = (N − 1)
c
aN
− c(1 + ln N − 1
c
) .
The sum of the Pivotal taxes under this parameter conditions will then be given by
∑
i
tPi = c(
N − 1
a
(ln
N
N − 1 − 1 +
1
N
)− (1 + ln N − 1
c
))
Note that ln z − 1
z
< 0,∀z < 3
2
, and therefore, with N ≥ 3, the above sum is always
negative. We conclude that the Pivotal mechanism will always carry a deficit.
On the other hand, when a > N − 1, the tax for the dominant user is given by
tP1 = (N − 1)
c
aN
− (N − 1) c
a
= (N − 1) c
a
(
1
N
− 1) .
The sum of the Pivotal taxes will then be given by
∑
i
tPi =
c(N − 1)
a
(
−1 + ln N
N − 1 − 1 +
1
N
)
By the same argument as before, the above sum will always be negative, indicating
a budget deficit in the Pivotal mechanism under this scenario as well.
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Appendix E
Proof of Proposition 5.1
We need to show that Ni’s expected utility when choosing the message xii under
any strategy profile {xjj}j 6=i for all other users, is maximized at xii = rii. Ni’s
expected utility is given by
E [vi(xii, {xjj}j 6=i)] = −
∑
j∈Ii
E[fi(|rˆj − rjj|)]
−E[ |xii −R0i|2] + 1K−1
∑
j 6=i
E[|xjj −R0j|2] (E.1)
It can be easily seen that Ni’s report xii can only adjust the second term in (E.1)
regardless of other participants’ strategies. Ni is a self-utility maximizer, therefore
xii is chosen so as to minimize the second term, i.e., minimize the punishment due
to discrepancy with respect to the system’s observation. By assumption, Ni knows
that R0i ∼ N (rii, σ20), and it is easy to see that the optimal choice is indeed xii = rii.
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